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 Since the implementation of Medicare Part D in 2006, a growing body of 
evidence has shown that Medicare Part D might offset the total healthcare spending by 
improving the use of prescription drugs. However, little is known about the impact of 
different types of Part D plans – Stand-alone Prescription Drug Plan (PDPs) and 
Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug Plan (MA-PDs) – on health care utilizations and 
expenditures. This dissertation examined the association between the effect in PDPs on 
health care utilizations as well as expenditures, and medication adherence among elderly 
Medicare beneficiaries, compared to MA-PDs. Data was pooled from 2006-2010 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) providing information on independent 
variable (type of Part D plans), primary outcomes of interest (health services use, costs 
and medication adherence) and covariates at the individual level. The study sample 
includes community-dwelling beneficiaries aged 66 years and older, who enrolled in Part 
D plans for the entire study year. Beneficiaries enrolled in employer sponsored insurance 
were excluded from the analysis. Cost-related nonadherence was evaluated based on 
beneficiaries’ self-reports. Proportion of Days Covered (PDC) was used as a quantitative 
measure of Medication adherence for beneficiaries who were diagnosed with type 2 
diabetes.  Univariate and bivariate analyses were carried out to describe sample baseline 
characteristics. Naïve generalized linear models and two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
methods were performed to examine the relationship between types of part D plans and 
outcomes of interest. This study included 6,596 PDP enrollees and 5,430 MA-PD 
vi 
enrollees. The study showed PDP enrollees generally had lower socioeconomic status, 
were more likely to have additional prescription drug coverage other than Part D, had 
more comorbidities and, were less likely to visit physicians when they felt sick than MA-
PD enrollees. PDP enrollees tended to use more health services and had higher costs of 
total healthcare and prescription drugs, while had higher cost-related nonadherence and 
difficulties in affording prescription drugs, compared to those enrolled in MA-PDs. In the 
generalized lineal models, PDPs were associated with increased use and costs of health 
services. In the 2SRI, there was substantial evidence to support the selection bias into 
PDP plans. After controlling selection bias, PDPs was still associated with higher use and 
costs of all medical care (only expect hospitalizations) and prescription drugs. In 
addition, among diabetic beneficiaries, PDP group was associated with lower medication 
adherence to antihypertensive drugs, but had similar adherence to anti-diabetic drugs and 
antihyperlipimic drugs, compared to MA-PD group. 
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To date, the elderly are the most intensive users of health care services in the 
United States (U.S.). It estimated that elderly Americans only accounted for 13% of the 
total population, but consumed 36% of healthcare services.
1
 It is widely believed that 
providing individuals with prescription drug coverage may lead to cost-saving by 
reducing other medical services that are related to suboptimal care.
2
 As the U.S. President 
mentioned when he signed the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) into law in 2003, 
“Drug coverage under Medicare will allow seniors to replace more expensive surgeries 
and  hospitalizations with less expensive prescription medicine.”
3
 The Medicare program 
is the main insurance program for the elderly in the U.S. Prior to 2006, Medicare only 
covered prescription drugs that were administered during a hospital stay (under Medicare 
Part A) or a physician’s office (under Medicare Part B), but did not cover outpatient 
prescription drugs until the implementation of Medicare Part D, which was part of 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. Before the 
introduction of Part D, Medicare beneficiaries can pay the total costs for outpatient 
prescription drugs, or obtain their prescription drug benefits through Medicare Advantage 
(MA) plans with drug benefits, Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI), public insurance 
plans (e.g., Medicaid), or Medigap with prescription drug coverage. Unlike Medicare Part 
2 
A and B, Medicare Part D is delivered entirely by private insurance plans: stand-alone 
prescription drug plans (PDPs) and Medicare Advantage-Prescription Drug plans (MA-
PDs). In 2014, more than 37 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D. Among 
them, approximately 62% beneficiaries were in PDPs, and the rest were in MA-PDs. The 
average monthly premiums were $29, but the monthly premiums were varied by 
individual, due to the plans enrolled, beneficiaries’ levels of income and assets, and late 
enrollment for Part D. 
This chapter presents background information about the overview of the Medicare 
program, significance, and study objectives and specific aims for this dissertation. 
1.1 A Brief Overview of Medicare and Supplemental Insurance 
Medicare is a national health insurance program administered by the United 
States (U.S.) federal government. Since its establishment in 1965,
4
 Medicare provides 
millions of Americans – mainly Americans aged 65 and older – with substantial 
protection against catastrophic losses due to medical care. With the aging of the U.S. 
population and the emergence of new technologies, Medicare has grown rapidly with an 
increasing number of beneficiaries and rising health care cost. Over the past decades, the 
number of Medicare beneficiaries has been tripled from 19 million in 1965 to 55 million 
in 2013.
5
 Medicare has also expanded its range of coverage, e.g., prescription drugs 
benefits.  Consequently, spending for Medicare increased dramatically. In 2014, 
Medicare payments totaled $597 billion, accounting for 14% of the federal budget; 23% 
of Medicare benefits were for hospital care, 12% for physician services, 11% for the Part 





1.1.1 Original Medicare 
To be eligible for Medicare, an individual or his spouse must be aged 65 or over 
who would be eligible for the social security benefits, and be a U.S. citizen or permanent 
resident. For individuals under age 65, they must be permanently disabled and receive 
disability benefits for at least two years, or have End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) or 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis. In 2014, 84% of Medicare beneficiaries were elderly.
7,8
 
The original Medicare has 2 parts: Part A Hospital Insurance, which covers 
hospital, skilled-nursing facility, hospice and some home health care, Part B Medical 
Insurance, which provides coverage on medically necessary services, such as physician 
and outpatient services, home health care and preventative services. In addition, Part B 
covers a limited number of outpatient prescription drugs under certain conditions. In 
general, prescription drugs covered under Part B are drugs administered at a doctor's 
office or hospital outpatient setting. All Medicare beneficiaries are automatically covered 
under Part A without paying a premium, while Part B requires a monthly premium from 
those who choose to enroll in the program (Table 1)  
Table 1.1 Summary of Medicare Part A and Part B Benefits 
Covered Services Beneficiary pays Medicare Pays 
Medicare Part A 
Inpatient Hospital Stay     
  Days 1-60 $1,260 deductible  Balance 
  Days 61-90 $315 coinsurance per day Balance 
  
Days 91-150 (lifetime 
reserve days)  
$630 coinsurance per day Balance 
  All additional days All costs None 
Skilled Nursing Facility Care 
 
  
  Days 1-20 None All costs 
4 
Covered Services Beneficiary pays Medicare Pays 
  Days 21-100 
Up to $152 coinsurance per 
day 
Balance 
  All additional days All costs None 




Part-time or intermittent 
skilled care, home health 
aide services 







Pain relief, symptom 
management and support 
services for the terminally ill 
Small co-payments Balance 
Durable Medical Equipment 
and Supplies 
20% coinsurance for 
approved payments 
Balance 
Medicare Part B 
Medical Expenses     
  Doctor's services 
$147 deductible  
20% coinsurance for most 
covered services for 
providers accepting 
assignment. 






Inpatient and outpatient 
medical services and 
supplies 
  Physical and speech therapy 
  Diagnostic tests 
  Ambulance services 
Clinical Lab Tests 
 
  
  Blood tests, urinalysis, etc. $0 if medically necessary 
100% for 
approved care. 




Part-time or intermittent 
skilled care, home health 
aide services 
$0 for up to 35 hours per 
week 
All costs 
Durable Medical Equipment 
and Supplies 
20% coinsurance for 
approved payments after 
$147 deductible 





20% coinsurance for 




hospital based on 
fee schedule. 
Source: Medicare and You, 2015. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 
Link: https://www.medicare.gov/pubs/ebook/pdf/Medicare_and_You-2015.pdf  
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1.1.2 Medicare Advantage plans 
Since the 1970s, managed care program was offered as an option of the original 
Medicare program through private health insurance companies.  Medicare’s managed 
care program was named “Medicare+Choice” by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 
1997, and “Medicare Advantage” by the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. 
The enrollment in managed care is open to all Medicare beneficiaries without preexisting 
ESRD.  In 2015, 16.8 million or 31% Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans.
9
 
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans include Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 
Plans, Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Plans, Private FFS Plans, Medical 
Savings Account (MSA) Plans, Special Needs Plans (SNP), Point of Service (POS) 
Plans, and Provider Sponsored Organizations (PSOs) Plans. MA plans provide more 
comprehensive coverage than the original Medicare, for example, most of the MA plans 
cover outpatient prescription drugs, which are not normally covered by traditional Part B 
plans. MA plans are required to set a yearly limit on out-of-pocket costs for medical 
services. Once this limit has been reached, the plan will pay 100% for the covered 
services for the remainder of the calendar year. Medicare pays the private companies a 
fixed amount ("capitation”) for each enrollee every month. Table 1.2 shows the 
differences in the original Medicare and Medicare Advantage plans. 
Table 1.2 Comparison Between the Original Medicare and MA Plans 
  Original Medicare MA plans 
Premiums Medicare premiums 
Medicare premiums plus 





Deductibles and copays 
set by MA plans 
Out-of-pocket limit No Yes 
6 










No, but can buy a separate 
Part D plan 
Most plans provide drug 
coverage 
Source: Medicare and You, 2015. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  
Link: https://www.medicare.gov/pubs/ebook/pdf/Medicare_and_You-2015.pdf  
1.1.3 Medicare Part D 
As part of the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization 
Act (MMA), Medicare's drug benefit (or referred as “Part D”) became effective in 
January 01 2006. Medicare Part D was introduced to provide Medicare beneficiaries with 
affordable outpatient prescription drug coverage. Unlike the existing Part A and Part B 
program, Part D plans are delivered entirely by private companies through two distinct 
health care delivery systems: stand-alone Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) and Medicare 
Advantage Prescription Drug plans (MA-PDs). PDPs provide prescription drug plans to 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in traditional fee-for-service plans for Part A and Part B 
programs, while MA-PDs offer prescription medication coverage to Medicare 
beneficiaries who enrolled in the MA plans with prescription drug coverage. Medicare 
beneficiaries can choose one of these two coverage options during Medicare open 
enrollment period (October 15-December 7), or switch from MA-PDs to PDPs during 
MA Disenrollment Period (January 1-February 14) each year. In 2015, more than 37 
million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in Part D plans, an increase of 15 million 
compared to 2006. Among all the Part D enrollees, 62% of them were enrolled in PDPs.   
Medicare Part D plans offered by PDPs and MA-PDs must comply with model 
7 
plan developed by CMS each year. All part D plans have the following four coverage 
phases: (1) Deductible phase: beneficiaries pay 100% for drug costs until they reach the 
deductible amount ($320 in 2015). (2) Initial coverage limit: after the deductible is met, 
beneficiaries will enter the initial coverage limit, where they will pay the plan’s cost 
share for covered medications. Once beneficiaries have spent $2,960 for covered drugs, 
including the deductible amount, they have reached the initial coverage limit and have 
entered the coverage gap. (3) Coverage gap (or “donut hole”): while in the coverage gap, 
beneficiaries will pay 45% of the cost for brand-name drugs and 65% of the cost for 
generic drugs in 2015. Beneficiaries are out of the coverage gap once their yearly out-of-
pocket drug costs reach $4,700 in 2015. (4) Catastrophic coverage phase: during the 
catastrophic coverage phase, beneficiaries pay whichever amount is greater, either 5% of 
the covered drug cost or $2.65 for generics and $6.60 for brand name drugs in 2015. 
Table 1.3 compares the plan parameters from 2006 to 2010. 
Table 1.3 Medicare Part D Benefit Parameters 2006-2010 
Part D Standard 
Benefit Design 
Parameters: 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Deductible - (after the 
Deductible is met, 
Beneficiary pays 25% 
of covered costs up to 
total prescription costs 
meeting the Initial 
Coverage Limit. 
$310 $295 $275 $265 $250 
Initial Coverage 
Limit - Coverage Gap 
(Donut Hole) begins at 
this point. (The 
Beneficiary pays 100% 
of their prescription 
costs up to the Out-of-
Pocket Threshold) 
$2,830 $2,700 $2,510 $2,400 $2,250 
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Part D Standard 
Benefit Design 
Parameters: 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Out-of-Pocket 
Threshold - This is 
the Total Out-of-
Pocket Costs including 
the Donut Hole. 
$4,550 $4,350 $4,050 $3,850 $3,600 
Total Covered Part D 
Drug Out-of-Pocket 
Spending including 
the Coverage Gap - 
Catastrophic Coverage 
starts after this point. 
$6,440.00 $6,153.75 $5,726.25 $5,451.25 $5,100.00 
Source: 2010 Medicare Part D Standard Benefit Model Plan Parameters. 
link: https://q1medicare.com/PartD-The-MedicarePartDOutlookAllYears.php 
The cost-sharing structure varies largely among different Part D plans. Generally, 
the prescription drug coverage offered by MA-PD plans is more generous than those 
provided by PDP plans, because MA-PD plans are able to use the payments for coverage 
of non-drug medical services to subsidize prescription drug coverage.
10,11
 Since MA-PD 
plans cover all the medical services, it is highly possible that they have stronger 
incentives than PDPs to offer more generous coverage to forestall the adverse health and 
economic consequences due to the unavailability of prescription drugs.
10,11
 In fact, lower 
cost-sharing of prescription drugs has been observed in MA-PD plans compared to PDP 
plans. In 2014, 53% PDPs and 14% MA-PD plans charged deductible,
12
 consequently, 
89% of MA-PD and 43% PDP enrollees were covered by an enhanced plan without 
deductible.
 11 11 11 
Furthermore, 22% of MA-PD plans covering 31% of MA-PD enrollees 
offered additional gap coverage gap, while 18% of PDPs covering 3% of PDP enrollees 
provided coverage during coverage gap.
11,12
 
1.1.4 Supplemental plans and other insurance 
In addition to the Medicare Part D plans, beneficiaries can also obtain prescription 
9 
drug benefits through private insurance (e.g., ESI) and public insurance (e.g., Medicaid, 
VA). 
Medicare Supplement Insurance plan (or Medigap policy). Although Medicare 
covers a great portion of health services, it doesn’t cover all the costs. For example, 
Medicare beneficiaries with only Part A and Part B coverage are responsible for 
copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance, which may leave a large amount of OOP 
expenses. Since 1980, beneficiaries have been offered the option to enroll in Medicare 
Supplement Insurance plans or Medigap policies, which are the health insurance to fill 
the “gaps” in the Original Medicare Plan coverages. Medigap policies are sold by private 
companies, and offer certain benefits that are not covered under the original Medicare, 
e.g., emergency foreign travel expenses. However, Medigap policies don’t cover the 
share of the costs under certain types of health coverage, including MA Plans, PDPs, 
employer/union group health coverage, Medicaid, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
benefits, or TRICARE. In addition, beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid or MA plans are 
not eligible to purchase Medigap policies. 
Medicare Extra Help Program / Low Income Subsidy (LIS). Beneficiaries with 
limited income and financial resources (e.g., bank account, real estates, stocks, bonds) 
may qualify for Extra Help/LIS, which is a federal program that helps seniors to pay for 
their Part D monthly premium, annual deductible, coinsurance, and copayments. Seniors 
are eligible if their annual income is below 150% FPL and their assets are less than the 
eligibility limits. A beneficiary can be eligible for full or partial subsidy depending on his 
income and financial resources. Table 1.4 compares the premium, deductible, and 
copayments for beneficiaries with different levels of subsidy in 2010. Beneficiaries who 
10 
are eligible for LIS can enroll in either PDPs or MA-PDs. CMS pay the subsidized 
premiums directly to PDPs/MA-PDs based on the regional benchmark premiums. For 
LIS eligible individuals who have not enrolled in Medicare drug plans (PDPs or MA-
PDs), they will automatically be enrolled in PDPs by CMS. 







Level 1- Individual with 
full Medicaid benefits in a 
nursing home 
$0 $0 $0 
Level 2- Non-
institutionalized 
individuals with full 
Medicaid  
$0 $0 
$1.1 or $2.50 for 
generic 
$3.30 or $6.30 for 
brand-name 
No copays after 
catastrophic coverage 
($6,440) 
Level 3 - Non-
institutionalized 
individuals with income 
below135% of FPL and 
resources below $8,100 
for individual or $12,910 
for married couple 
$0  $0  
$2.50 for generic 
$6.30 for brand-name 
No copays after 
catastrophic coverage 
($6,440) 
Level 4 - Non-
institutionalized 
individuals with income 
135%-150% of PFL and 
resources <$12,510 for 










Source: 2010 Medicare Part D Standard Benefit Model Plan Parameters,  
Link: https://q1medicare.com/PartD-The-MedicarePartDOutlookAllYears.php 
 
1.1.5 Medicare's plan choices 
Medicare beneficiaries have two ways to get Medicare benefits. First, an eligible 
beneficiary can enroll in the original Medicare FFS Plan to get his/her coverage on 
11 
medical services, e.g., hospitalizations (Part A), outpatient care (Part B). To get 
additional coverage on prescription drugs, he/she can also add a Medicare prescription 
drug plan. Second, an individual can join a MA Plan to get all the Medicare benefits, 
including both non-drug medical services and prescription drug benefits. MA Plans 
usually offer prescription drug coverage through the MA-PD plans. In certain types of 
MA Plans (PFFS or MSA plans) that don’t offer drug benefits, an individual can join a 
PDP plan. If an individual join in a both PDP and MA Plan with prescription drug 
coverage, however, he/she will be dis-enrolled from MA Plan and returned to the 
Original Medicare. Therefore, a beneficiary cannot enroll in both PDP and MA-PD plan 




1.1.6 Other plans in Medicare population 
Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI). Many employers and unions provide group 
health insurance coverage to their current employees and retirees as a part of employees’ 
compensation package. ESI has been considered the most reliable Medicare supplements, 
Figure 1.1 Choices of Medicare Coverage 
Source: Medicare and You, 2015. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 
Link: https://www.medicare.gov/pubs/ebook/pdf/Medicare_and_You-2015.pdf  
12 
because ESI helps beneficiaries to pay for their medical expenses by meeting cost-sharing 
requirements (e.g., copay) and covering additional services that are not covered in the 
original Medicare.
2
 Most ESI provides coverage for prescription drugs, which were not 
covered under Medicare prior to 2006. After the implementation of Part D, beneficiaries 
with ESI still have prescription drug benefits without paying Part D premiums, but they 
cannot enroll in the Part D plans, including both PDPs and MA-PDs.  
Medicaid. Medicaid is the needs-based social welfare program that assists 
Americans of all ages with limited income and financial resources in paying for their 
health care.  Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is jointly funded by both federal and state 
governments.
13
 Medicaid provides a wider range of coverage, including prescription 
drugs, transportations, compared to Medicare. Prior to the introduction of  Part D in 2006, 
Medicaid is the major source of prescription benefits for the elderly with low-income or 
permanent disabilities.
14
 Since 2006, the prescription drug benefits for Medicare-
Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries were shifted from Medicaid to Medicare Part D 
because of the mandatory requirements under MMA. Therefore, dual eligible 
beneficiaries obtain prescription benefits through Medicare. 
State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs (SPAPs). State Pharmaceutical 
Assistance Programs (SPAPs) are state-run programs that provide prescription coverage 
for low-income seniors and adults with disabilities. Eligibility requirements are varied by 
states. For example, some states require applicants to be diagnosed with certain diseases, 
such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), while other states have no requirements on the conditions to be 
eligible for SPAPs. Some states also offer assistances to Medicare beneficiaries who are 
13 
not qualified for Medicare Extra Help/LIS. In addition, SPAPs help beneficiaries to pay 
for drug costs that are not covered by Part D, such as premiums, deductible, and 
copayments. In 2010, a total of 14 states offered SPAPs for Medicare beneficiaries aged 
65 or over, including Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New 




Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). VA operates the nation’s largest integrated 
health care delivery system to improve the health and well-beings of the U.S. veterans. 
Unlike Medicare, VA provides health care directly to veterans in the VA facilities with a 
wide range of medical services, including inpatient and outpatient care, emergency care, 
preventive care, rehabilitation, mental health and substance abuse treatment, home health, 
and hospice care. VA also covers the prescription drugs prescribed by a VA physician, 
but doesn’t cover prescriptions prescribed by a non-VA physician unless certain criteria 
are met. Since the implementation of Part D in 2006, the drug benefits provided by VA 
were set to be same or better than those offered by the standard Medicare Part D plans. 
Veterans can join the Part D plans after the enrollment period without paying a penalty, 
and still be entitled all the VA health and prescription drug benefits. 
1.2 Significance 
As the elderly is the most intensive users of healthcare in the U.S., the Medicare 
program – the main insurance program for the elderly – is projected to exceed Social 
Security by 2024.
16
 This rapid growth in Medicare expenditures was slow down after the 
implementation of Part D program. Medicare Part D is estimated to be associated with 
$1.5 billion in aggregate savings to Medicare yearly.
17
 Medicare Part D is mainly 
14 
delivered through two types of plans with considerable differences in their cost-sharing 
structures, which may lead to different impact on health resources use.  MA plans were 
designed to better control healthcare costs than traditional FFS by reducing utilizations of 
hospitalizations and emergency care through comprehensive coverage. Since the 
implementation of Medicare Part D, limited studies have been published to compare FFS 
and MA plans on healthcare utilizations and expenditures. Additionally, there is no study 
to compare the health care utilizations and expenditures associated with the two specific 
types of Part D programs – PDPs and MA-PDs. Hence, real-world information 
comparing these two types of part D plans is necessary to better inform healthcare 
providers, patients, and stakeholders. 
Furthermore, increasing evidence suggested the improvement in medication 
adherence since the implementation of Part D, while it is still unclear if there are any 
differences between MA-PD and PDP plans on medication adherence. Cost-relate 
nonadherence may arise, for example, if patients respond to higher cost sharing by 
reducing or discontinuing prescription drugs for chronic illness. Since MA-PD plans are 
more generous than PDP plans, MA-PD enrollees have lower out-of-pocket costs for 
prescription drugs than those enrolled in PDPs, and hence, are more likely to be adherent 
to their medication regimens. Since cost is considered the most modifiable factor for 
medication nonadherence, it is necessary to examine the role of PDPs on medication 
adherence among Medicare beneficiaries.  
There are several challenges in conducting this project. First, there is the 
possibility of omitted variables related to both choice of Part D plans and study outcomes 
(utilizations, expenditures, and adherence). Selection of Part D plan may be determined 
15 
by many factors, such as availability of plans, health conditions, and expected use of 
prescriptions, which in return influence the health care utilizations and expenditure. This 
reverse causality may lead to biased estimates of PDP effects on the clinical and 
economics outcomes. Even though a rich variety of potential confounders could be 
controlled in the analysis, it is still very reasonable to suspect the existence of omitted 
variables. To address this concern, I applied the innovative econometric method – 
instrumental variable approach – to obtain more consistent results by eliminating omitted 
variable bias.  
In addition, it is always challenging to estimate the use of prescriptions solely 
based on pharmacy claims, because the filling of prescriptions may not be fully captured 
in the data. This challenge is becoming more salient with the emerging of generic drug 
discount programs, i.e., Walmart’s' $4 generic prescription drug program,
18
 as 
beneficiaries would pay cash directly to the pharmacies. For this case, the prescription 
fills cannot be fully captured by using the insurer’s adjudication system. Therefore, using 
claims data alone may underestimate the prescription drug use. To account for this 
possibility, I used a combined source of information, self/proxy’s reports and pharmacy 
claims, to estimate medication use, because using multiple data sources can generate 
more accurate estimates of drug use than a single source of information.  
1.3 Study Objectives and Specific Aims 
The main purpose of this project was to investigate the impact of stand-alone 
Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) on health care utilizations, expenditures, and medication 
adherence among elderly beneficiaries, compared to Medicare Advantage Prescription 
Drug plans (MA-PDs).  
16 
The specific aims are described as below. 
Aim 1. To compare the characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years 
and older who enrolled in PDPs and MA-PD plans.  
Hypothesis 1. Beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs had lower socioeconomic status, 
worse clinical conditions, and higher health care spending, compared to those enrolled in 
MA-PD plans. 
 To compare demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of beneficiaries 
enrolled in PDP and MA-PD plans. 
 To compare health conditions and healthy behaviors of beneficiaries enrolled 
in PDP and MA-PD plans. 
 To compare contextual and environmental characteristics among beneficiaries 
enrolled in PDP and MA-PD plans. 
Aim 2. To investigate the effect of the PDPs on utilizations and expenditures of 
medical care among Medicare beneficiaries compared to MA-PD plans.  
Hypothesis 2. Beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs had higher utilizations and 
expenditures of medical care compared to those enrolled in MA-PD plans. 
 To compare the annual healthcare utilizations and expenditures between 
beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and MA-PD plans. 
 To compare the annual healthcare expenditures between beneficiaries enrolled 
in PDPs and MA-PD plans. 
Aim 3. To investigate the effect of the PDPs on medication adherence among 
Medicare beneficiaries compared to MA-PD plans.  
Hypothesis 3. PDP enrollees had lower medication adherence compared to those 
17 
enrolled in MA-PD plans. 
 To compare cost-related non-adherence between beneficiaries enrolled in PDP 
and MA-PD plans. 
 To compare adherence to oral anti-diabetic drugs among beneficiaries with 




The conceptual framework of this dissertation is based the Andersen’s Behavioral 
Model (ABM) of Health Services nested with the economic theory of consumer demand 
for health insurance and health care services. This combined framework provides a 
theoretical basis for evaluating the role of part D plans on medication adherence, and 
health care utilizations and expenditures. 
2.1 An Overview of Andersen’s Behavioral Model of Health Services 
Andersen’s Behavioral Model (ABM) of Health Services was used as the 
conceptual framework for this dissertation.
19
 Since the ABM model was initially 
developed by the U.S. health services researcher Ronald M. Andersen in 1968, the model 
has evolved over time,
20
 and now there are 4 versions of ABM model that have been used 
for health services research. The initial model primarily focused on individual 
characteristics that influence the health services use.
21
 In response to expert feedback and 
health services and policy research,
22
 the ABM model was further modified by adding the 
external environment in the second revision,
23
 and personal health practices in the third 
revision,
24
 and the feedback loops in the fourth version.
25
 The current model includes 
four domains: contextual characteristics, individual characteristics, health behavior, and 
outcomes, which are connected by feedback loops. As illustrated in figure 2.1, contextual 




Figure 2.1 Andersen’s Behavioral Model of Health Services 
Sources: Andersen RM, Davidson PL. Improving access to care in America: individual and contextual indicators. In: Andersen RM, Rice TH, 







characteristics. The arrows from outcomes to health behaviors, individual characteristics, 
and contextual characteristics is the feedback, depicting the possible ways to improve 
access to health services.
20
 
2.1.1 Contextual characteristics domain 
In the ABM model, the contextual characteristics refer to the environment, in 
which individuals live, work and socialize that influence their use of health services.
25
 
Contextual characteristics include aggregate-level characteristics of community and 
health care system. The contextual levels range from the households, counties, 
metropolitan statistical areas and even the nations. As shown in Figure 2.1, contextual 
characteristics domain includes predisposing characteristics, enabling characteristics, and 
need characteristics.  
Predisposing contextual characteristics include three types of characteristics: 
demographic, social, and belief. Demographic contextual characteristics describe the 
community composition of age, gender, and marital status. A community with higher 
percentage of citizens may have different availabilities for health care facilities than a 
community with lower proportion of seniors. Social characteristics at a contextual level 
include the composition of a community on educational level, race/ethnicity, employment 
and crime rate. Contextual belief characteristics describe a community’s values, cultural 
norms, and prevailing political perspectives that determine how the health care system 
should be organized, financed, and accessed to the population.
26-28
 
Enabling contextual characteristics refer to the conditions that may influence the 
use of health service. Three types of enabling factors on the contextual level are 
specified: health policy, financing, and organization of resources. Health policy refers to 
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authoritative decisions relating to health or influencing the use of health services. Health 
policy can range from the public policies made by any type of organization (e.g., 
government) at all levels from local to national, for example, policies made in the private 
sector by accrediting agencies (e.g., the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health 
Care Organizations) or quality assessment organizations (the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance), or decision makers (e.g., executives of managed care organizations). 
Financing characteristics describe the financial resources on the contextual level that are 
potentially available to pay for health services, including per capita income, wealth, rate 
of health insurance coverage. Organization on the contextual level describes how the 
health services facilities and personnel are distributed and structured to provide the 
services to the population, such as per capita physicians and hospital beds.
29
 
Contextual need characteristics can be described by environmental need 
characteristics and population health indices. Environmental contextual characteristics 
refer to the health-related measures of the physical environment, such as the quality of 
housing, water, and air. Population health indices include general and condition-specific 
mortality rates, morbidity rates, and disability rates.
30
 
2.1.2 Individual characteristics domain 
Similar to contextual characteristics, individual characteristics are also 
categorized into predisposing, enabling, and need characteristics. Individual 
characteristics demonstrate an individual’s predisposition to use health services, ability to 
pay for health services, and need for healthcare.
22
 
Individual predisposing characteristics describe an individual’s propensity of 
using health services.
23
 Similar to contextual characteristics, predisposing individual 
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characteristics also include demographic, social, and belief factors. Individual 
demographic factors include age and gender, which may be considered as the biological 
imperatives suggesting the likelihood that an individual will need health services.
31
 Social 
factors refer to the conditions that determine the status of a person in the community as 
well as his ability to cope with presenting problems. Social factors can be measured by 
education, occupation, race, ethnicity, social network, and social interactions.
32
 Health 
beliefs describe attitudes, values, and knowledge that can affect their perception of need 
and use of health services. 
Individual enabling characteristics include financing and organization of health 
services for the individual to pay for services. Financing of health services focuses on the 
income and wealth available to the individual to pay for the health services, and the out-
of-pocket costs of health services as determined by applying cost-sharing of insurance 
plans.
23
 Organization of health services refers the source of health services, the nature of 
that source of health care, means of transportation and travel time to healthcare facilities, 
and waiting time to receive services.
19
  
Individual need characteristics refer to an individual’s reason to seek or receive 
health care, which may be perceived by the individual and/or be evaluated by a health 
care professional. Hence, need is categorized as perceived need or evaluated need. 
Perceived need describes an individual's view of his own general health and functional 
status, his experiences and emotionally responds to illness, and their perceptions about 
the importance to seek health services. Anderson et al. indicated that perceived need is a 
social phenomenon that can be largely explainable by social characteristics (e.g., 
ethnicity, education) and health beliefs (e.g., health attitudes, knowledge). Evaluated 
 
23 
individual need refers to the health care professional’s judgment and objective 
measurement of a patient's physical status and need for health care, such as blood 
pressure, temperature, body mass index, laboratory test results, diagnoses and prognoses 
for diseases and conditions.
19
 
2.1.3 Health behavior domain 
Within the ABM, three types of health behavior are described, including personal 
health practices, the medical process, and utilization of personal health services.
20
 
Personal health practices refer to the individual’s behavior or lifestyle that influence his 
health, including nutrition, physical activity, use of alcohol and tobacco, avoidance of 
drugs, adherence to medical regimens.
19
 The process of medical care is the interaction 
between the health care providers and patients in the delivery of care, which might be 




Actual use of health care is the essential component of health behavior domain in 
a comprehensive model that was originally developed to predict health services use. The 
use of health services can be measured as frequency, type, site, purpose, and coordination 
of health services received.
25
 Anderson et al. hypothesized that individual characteristics, 
which include predisposing, enabling, and need factors, had different abilities to predict 
the use of health services, depending on the type of service examined (e.g., emergency 
department, inpatient, outpatient and dental care).
21
 
2.1.4 Outcomes domain 
Outcomes domain describes the results of contextual and individual 
characteristics as well as health behaviors, and can be measured as perceived health, 
 
24 
evaluated health, and consumer satisfaction.
19
 Perceived health status describes the extent 
to which an individual can live functionally and comfortably. Perceived health status can 
be measured by self-reports of general perceived health, independence for activities of 
daily living, and disability status. Evaluated health status mainly depends on the 
professional’s judgment made based on the established clinical guidelines. Measures 
include the tests of physical and physiological functions, diagnosis and prognosis of 
condition the patient experienced. Outcome measures of perceived and evaluated health 
may be similar to the perceived and evaluated need measures, however, reducing an 
individual’s needs has been considered as the ultimate outcomes of improved access to 
health services. 
Consumer satisfaction is an individual's feel about the health services received. 
Measures include patient-reported waiting time, travel time, patient-provider 
communication, and technical care received. For a health plan perspective, patient 




2.2 Demand of Health Insurance and Healthcare Services 
The role of part D plans on the use of health services can be further explained 
using the economic theory of price elasticity of demand. This section illustrates the 
relationship between the cost-sharing of health insurance and demand for health services 
using both economic theory and empirical evidence. 
Most Americans, particularly seniors, do not pay entirely for their health services. 
Instead, they enroll in health insurance plans to pay only a portion of healthcare expenses, 
which are of great uncertainty because the occurrences of many diseases are often 
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unpredictable and associated with high costs for treating such conditions. This 
uncertainty may lead individuals to live in constant fear of losing their income. Health 
insurance is a form of risk management that allows risk-averse individuals to reduce the 
risks of uncertain loss associated with medical expenses. A large group of individuals 
make regular contributions (premiums) to an insurance provider to provide them financial 
assistance at the time of events. Hence, insurance reduces the risks of financial loss over 
a large group. 
For singles good or services, the demand curve is downward sloping, indicating 
the inverse relationship between the price and quantity demanded. That is, the quantity 
demanded for given goods decreases as the price of that particular good increases, and 
vice versa. This relationship can be demonstrated using price elasticity of demand, which 
is defined as the ratio of percent change in quantity demanded to percent change in price 
of the service. The sign of the ratio indicates the direction of price and quantity 
demanded, and typically is negative because of the inverse relationship between price and 
quantity demanded. If the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand is less than 1, 
the percent change in demand is in a smaller level than percent change in price, then 
demand is inelastic. When the absolute value equals one, demand is unit elastic. If the 
absolute value is greater than one, the percent change in demand is greater than the 
percent change in price, then demand is elastic. 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates a hypothetical example of the impact of health insurance 
on the demand of health care services. If Elizabeth is not insured, then the optimal choice 
of health care is Q0 at the cost of care at P0. When Elizabeth pays only 50% coinsurance, 
she only pays P1 (or half of P0), and her quantity demanded will increase, and the demand 
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curve will rotate outward, and reaching to a new equilibrium quantity demanded Q1. 
Having insurance will increase the demand of health services at any given market price, 
and hence, the presence of health insurance makes the demand less elastic. If Elizabeth 
pays 25% coinsurance, she only pays P2 (or 25% of P0), and her quantity demanded will 
be increased to Q2. With decreasing coinsurance rates, quantity demanded will increase 
and the demand curve will rotate outwardly, therefore the demand for health services is 
less elastic.
35
 In other words, lower coinsurance leads to greater use of health services. 
 
Figure 2.2 Health Insurance and Demand for Health Services 
Source: Jacobs P, Rapoport J. The economics of health and medical care. 
Jones & Bartlett Learning; 2004 
In addition, empirical evidence also supports the economic theory of health 
insurance and demand for health services including prescription drugs. The most 
remarkable study is the Health Insurance Experiment conducted by the Rand Corporation 
in 1985.
36
 Individuals were randomly assigned to insurance plans of differing generosity 
with respect to coinsurance (0-95%), then tracked the health care utilizations and 
expenditures.
36





  The study also found that the quantity of health services (including 
prescription drugs) demanded increases with a decrease in coinsurance.
38
 For example, 
the group with free care (0% coinsurance) had more prescription fills than those 
individuals assigned to the groups with 25% and 50% coinsurance. Finally, the results 
indicated that both physician office visits and prescription drug utilization were modestly 
price sensitive, suggesting the demand for prescriptions may be influenced by the price or 
the generosity of insurance plan. 
However, the classic theory of demand for health services was developed for a 
particular single good, and may not hold for multiple goods or services which are either 
complements or substitutes. In the economic model developed by Goldman and 
Philipson,
39
 the demand of a certain service is influenced by the change in the 
coinsurance of other services. This model implies that, the optimal copayment of 
prescription drugs increases with the level of substitutability of other services, such as 
emergency department visits and hospitalization.
39
 For example, if the cost for 
physician’s visits and prescription drugs is increased, inpatient care could be used as a 
substitute for these services, which is also called the “offset” effect. This “offset” effect 
was also observed among elderly Medicare beneficiaries in a recent study conducted by 
Chandra et al. In this study, the author found an increased use of inpatient care in 
response to increased copayments for physician’s offices and prescription drugs.
40
 
2.3 Adapted Model 
ABM has been widely used to explain and predict health service use in health 
economic and policy research.
19
 One remarkable application of the ABM on health policy 













































































co-insurance on demand for health services.
36,37,41,
 Furthermore, ABM includes a wide 
variety of factors influencing healthcare use, such as, demographics, socioeconomics, 
health behaviors, which are critical in understanding the dynamic relationship between 
insurance plan and health outcomes. As mentioned previously the theory of price 
elasticity of demand can also be adapted to ABM to illustrate the relationship between 
drug price and demand for prescriptions and non-drug medical services. Therefore, ABM 
can be applied to this dissertation to explain the effect of Part D plans on the use and 
costs of health services.  
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the adapted version of ABM for this dissertation. When 
applying the ABM to this study, the adapted model focused on three domains: contextual 
characteristics, individual characteristics, and health behavior. Health outcome domain 
was not included in the adapted model, because the outcome measures of this dissertation 
are the healthcare utilizations and medication adherence, which have been covered under 
the health behavior domain. The key independent variable – type of part D plans – was 
considered as one of the individual enabling factors that have direct effects on the health 
behaviors, e.g., medication adherence and use of health services. With lower levels of 
generosity of Part D plans (e.g., PDPs), the demand for prescription drugs will decrease 
as the effect price of prescription drugs increases. This decreased use of prescription 
drugs may lead to lower medication adherence and possibly result in increased use of 
non-drug medical services (e.g., hospitalizations). 
2.3.1 Contextual characteristics 
Several studies identify environmental or regional factors related to healthcare 
delivery and access. For each county code, we included 5 such factors reflecting 
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predisposing and enabling characteristics. Contextual predisposing factors were reflected 
by the education level, income and employment rate in the area. Two variables were used 
to reflect health system capacity, including the number of primary care physicians and 
hospital beds available in an area. Primary care physicians included family physicians, 
non-specialist internal medicine physicians, general practitioners, and general practice 
obstetricians and gynecologists. These factors reflect how health services facilities and 
personnel distributed to provide the services within an area and may influence 
individual’s access to care, e.g., the availability of physicians/hospitals.
29
 
2.3.2 Individual characteristics  
For the individual predisposing factors, demographic factors include age and 
gender, which may be associated with health care use. Social factors were reflected by 
education level, Race/ethnicity, living conditions, and geographic location. Higher levels 
of education may be associated with greater knowledge about care and more positive 
attitude in seeking care.
42
 Race/ethnicity and geographic location have been shown to be 
linked to different treatment patterns for specific conditions. Individual’s social 
connections can also influence the access to care, and were measured by the living 
conditions. Health beliefs can be reflected by the care-seeking attitudes that affect 
individual’s perception of need and use of health services. The measures included how an 
individual seeks care when sick, such as, avoidance of going to see a doctor, keeping to 
himself, visiting a physician as soon as he can. Differences in the attitudes toward 
seeking professional health care have been documented in the published studies. 
Individual enabling factors were measured by income and the effective price of 
health services determined by having health insurance and co-insurance. People with 
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higher levels of income tend to use more health care, with all other factors being equal. 
As mentioned earlier, people purchase more health services as their prices decline. With 
lower percentage of coinsurance, people demand more health care as the effective price is 
lowered. The type of Part D plans, as the key independent variable of this dissertation, 
was included under this domain because it influences the effective price of prescriptions. 
Individual need factors were reflected by both perceived and evaluated needs. 
Perceived needs were reflected by self-perceived health status, self-reported difficulties 
in Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
(IADLs). An individual with higher self-perceived health and function status is associated 
with lower uses of health services. On the other hand, evaluated needs were reflected by 
the presence of chronic conditions diagnosed by health care professionals. 
2.3.3 Health behavior 
Personal health practices were measured as use of tobacco and presence of 
obesity, which are proxy measures of an individual’s lifestyle. For example, an individual 
with normal weight is more likely to have healthy diet and exercise, compared to those 
with obesity.  
This domain also included the primary outcome of interest of this dissertation – 
the actual use of health care (including prescriptions). I assumed that the contextual and 
individual characteristics mentioned above influence the use of health services. Since 
healthcare expenditures are highly correlated with health resource use, and healthcare 





This chapter first reviews the published articles covering the effect of cost-sharing 
on prescription drug use and medication adherence. Later, this chapter reviews the 
literatures regarding the impact of Part D plans on prescription drug and medical services 
uses. In addition, this chapter compares the healthcare utilizations and expenditures 
associated with Medicare Advantage (MA) and Fee-For-Service (FFS) plans, because 
MA-PD and PDP enrollees are mainly enrolled in MA and FFS plans, respectively. 
Finally, this chapter describes the empirical evidence of selection bias in MA plans, 
which may also exist in the selection of MA-PDs vs. PDPs. 
3.1 The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Prescription Drug Use and Medication 
Adherence 
3.1.1 Prescription drug use 
Based on the conceptual framework – Anderson’s behavior model, prescription 
drug coverage is considered an enabling factor that helps individuals to pay for 
prescriptions.
43-45
 Hence, patients may fill more prescriptions as the generosity of the 
drug plans improved, which has been demonstrated in the RAND Elderly Health 
Supplement study.
37,38
  Prescription drug coverage reduced the economic barrier to 
prescription drugs, consequently, the likelihood of filling prescriptions increased with the 
improvement in the generosity of the drug plans.
46
 Similarly, Huh et al. suggested that the 
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probability of any prescription use was 4.5 percent higher among community-dwelling 




In addition, prior findings suggested that increased costs-sharing for prescription 
drugs was associated with reduced use of prescription drugs.
48-52
 The RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment indicated that individuals reduced their health service use when 
they have increased cost-sharing regardless of the effectiveness of the services.
52
 Artz et 
al. also found that improvement in drug coverage generosity leads to increased use of 
outpatient prescription drugs among elderly Medicare beneficiaries.
51
 However, most of 
existing studies accessing the effect of cost-sharing on healthcare utilizations without 
adjusting selection bias into more generous insurance plans.
50,53
 As a result, the 
differences between the two groups might be overestimated.
54-56
 Based on conceptual 
framework and empirical evidence, unmeasured factors, such as, health-seeking attitudes, 
may be related to the choice of insurance plans (e.g., HMOs), but these factors cannot be 
easily measured in observational study. Even though the measurable confounders were 
adjusted in the analysis, it is still very difficult to rule out the possibility of selection bias 
in the observational studies.
57-61
 
3.1.2 Medication adherence 
For medication adherence, recent data demonstrated consistent evidence that 
increased drug costs was the major factor of medication nonadherence.
62
 Among patients 
with chronic diseases, increased cost-sharing for prescription drugs is associated with 
decreased adherence.
63,64
 These findings can be explained using the conceptual 
framework of this dissertation. With lower generosity of drug plans, patients may face 
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higher drug costs and fill less prescriptions, and as a result, patients may have lower 




Furthermore, Cost-Related Nonadherence (CRN) was reported higher among 
Medicare beneficiaries with higher out-of-pocket medication spending. Even though 
there was sufficient evidence supporting the link between CRN and drug costs, it is still 
unclear about the link between drug coverage benefits and medication adherence.
66
 In a 
report based on an analysis of community pharmacy data in 2007, approximately 15% of 
Medicare beneficiaries experiencing a coverage gap stopped taking their medications
67
. 
Tseng et al. surveyed Medicare beneficiaries regarding their medication-taking behavior 
when reaching the coverage gap, and found that they were more likely to reduce the use 
of essential medications but unlikely to discontinue the medication treatment.
68
 
Interestingly, MA enrollees with coverage gap had 5% lower adherence for anti-diabetic 
and antihypertensive drugs, and 8% for antihyperlipidemic drugs.
69
  These findings from 
published studies varied mainly because of the differences on study population, data 
sources, therapeutic drug classes examined, or adherence measures.
70
 Despite the 
inconsistent findings on the CRN associated with prescription benefits, the start of 
Medicare Part D reduced the prevalence of CRN considerablely.
71
 However, there is no 
study comparing the CRN between PDPs and MA-PDs. 
3.2 The Impact of Medicare Part D on Medication Adherence, Healthcare 
Utilizations and Expenditures 
3.2.1 The impact of introducing Medicare Part D 
Medicare Part D was designed to improve the affordability and utilization of 
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necessary prescription drugs. Before the implementation of Part D, Pauly et al. projected 
that Part D might be associated with a 20% increase in the use of prescription drugs for 
Medicare beneficiaries without previous coverage for prescriptions, and a 6% increase for 
those with some coverage.
72
 These estimates have been supported in a growing body of 
studies since the implementation of Part D, with the drug use increasing from 7%-30%.
73-
77
 In addition to the improvement in utilizations, the Out-Of-Pocket (OOP) spending for 
prescription drugs was reduced by 8-35%.
74-77
 By summarizing these findings, Polinski et 
al. concluded that the introduction of Part D contributed to 6-13% increase in the 
utilizations of prescription drugs and 13-18% decrease in OOP spending for 
prescriptions.
78
 As the OOP costs for prescription lowered with the introduction of 
Medicare Part D, CRN has also been reduced among overall Medicare enrollees,
71
 but it 







. Although increases in prescription drug use have 
been recorded after the implementing of Medicare Part D, it is still unclear about the 
impact of different type of Part D plans on the prescription use. Furthermore, several 
studies suggested that the start of Part D reduced the total healthcare utilizations and 
costs, but it is still unknown if these two types of part D plans have different impacts on 
use and costs of health services. 
3.2.2 MA-PDs versus PDPs 
Limited studies compared the PDPs and MA-PDs on healthcare utilizations and 
costs. To my knowledge, the current data focused on the impact of two Part D plans on 
medication adherence.
82,83
 Jung et al. estimated the adherence to statins among Medicare 





 There were small differences in medication adherence 
observed in MA-PD and PDPs, which were unlikely to result in meaningful outcomes in 
clinical settings.
82
  However, this study failed to use national representative samples and 
to control for unobserved confounders. Furthermore, this study only focused on one 
therapeutic drug class–statins–and therefore, the findings lacked generalizability to other 
drug classes or conditions, because beneficiaries taking other medications might 
experience different financial burdens and perceived need, compared to those using 
statins. Another study accessed guideline-recommended diabetes treatments among 
elderly Medicare beneficiaries. The findings indicated that PDPs and MA-PDs had 
similar use of anti-diabetic drugs.
83
 However, individual-level factors influencing 
medication adherence were not controlled in this study.
83
 
In summary, based on the prior review of the existing studies, Medicare Part D 
has increased the utilization of prescription medication and health care spending. The 
Part D plans –mainly MA-PD plans and PDPs– exhibit significant variations on their 
cost-sharing strategies (e.g., copayments), which pose a considerable influence on 
individuals’ financial burden and medication adherence. Increasing findings from recent 
studies indicated the impact of Part D on reducing health care utilizations and 
expenditures, however, the impact of MA-PDs and PDPs remains unclear due to lack of 
published literature. Two recent published studies compared the medication adherence 
between MA-PDs and PDPs using Medicare claims, but reached different conclusions on 
the impact of PDPs on medication adherences. Hence, the effect of PDP on medication 
adherence compared to MA-PDs is still inconclusive. Furthermore, the evidence on CRN 
related to these two plans is still largely lacking. To our best knowledge, there is no study 
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to compare CRN among these two specific types of Part D plans. Despite the 
inconclusive findings on medication adherence, little was known about the impact of 
these two types of part D plans on healthcare utilizations and costs.  
3.3 Managed Care and Healthcare Utilizations and Expenditures 
A large body of literature has examined the impact of managed care on health 
care utilizations and expenditures, access to medical services, quality and satisfaction 
with care received, compared to traditional FFS plans (the Part A and B).
84
 These mixed 
results were observed consistently by Miller and Luft, in the systemic literature reviews 
of previous studies published in the past two decades.
85-87
 Since health care utilizations 
and expenditures are the main focus of this dissertation, this section focuses on the 
published studies evaluating the impact of managed care on health care uses and costs. 
In RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), HMOs have shown significantly 
lower use of hospitals among the working-age population.
88
 However, there were 
concerns that the findings generated from the RAND experiment might not be applicable 
to the elderly (e.g., Medicare enrollees), because the elderly are sicker and are more 
likely to have higher health care costs than their younger counterparts.
89,90
  As expected, 
the empirical evidence on the healthcare use among elderly Medicare beneficiaries is not 
consistent in the existing literatures, particularly for studies comparing HMOs to FFS 
plans.  In the early demonstration studies in the 1990s, HMOs have shown significant 
reductions in their healthcare utilizations and costs compared to FFS plans.
91-94
 Recently, 
more data suggested that the health services use among HMOs and traditional FFS had 
converged. Previous studies showed that both FFS and group Model HMOs have been 
associated with the overuse of health services.
93,94
 However, in a recently published 
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literature review by Keyhani et al., Medicare HMOs and Medicare FFS had similar rates 
of inappropriate coronary angiography on the national level, and rates of carotid 
endarterectomy in New York State, while managed care plans had higher use of non-
recommended antibiotics for the treatment of upper respiratory infection than FFS.
95
 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence supporting which of the health care systems is 
more effective in lowering the use of health services. 
Despite the inconsistent results of the HMO’s impact on the use of overall 
medical services, there was no clear pattern in the evidence for inpatient care.
87
 HMO 
was associated with a lower rate of preventable hospitalizations and overall 
hospitalizations.
96-98
 Fitch et.al. found that Medicare FFS beneficiaries with heart failure 
were associated with higher admission and readmission rates for hospitalizations and 
health care costs.
98
 In a cross-sectional study using the data from Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP-SID) databases, Basu et al. suggested that HMOs reduced the 
preventable hospitalizations for Medicare beneficiaries in four states with the highest 
HMO penetration rates.
96
 Similarly, the evidence of the medical expenditures per capita 
was inconsistent. Total health care costs per enrollee were significantly lower for 
individuals enrolled in HMOs than those who didn’t enroll in HMOs.
99
 However, this 




In addition, there are a large body of studies comparing the quality of care related 
to HMOs and FFS plans. Several studies suggested that MA enrollees tended to receive 
more preventative care.
87,101-103
 However, other studies indicated that MA enrollees were 





 and more likely to be readmitted to hospitals for preventable conditions,
105
 and 
had lower patient satisfaction on medical care,
106
 compared to FFS enrollees. Regarding 
the health outcomes, few studies have demonstrated no difference in survival or 
functional status for the elderly enrolled in HMOs and FFS plans,
101,107-110
 while one 
study showed that HMO enrollees had a greater decline in functional status than FFS 
enrollees.
111
 Furthermore, several studies have also found that HMO enrollees had poorer 
access to specialized services and physician specialist care than those enrolled in FFS 
plans.
112-114
 However, MA plans demonstrated an reduction in racial and socioeconomic 
disparities in the access to care and quality of care. For example, Trivedi et al. reported 
the racial gap had been narrowed for seven Health Plan Employer Data and Information 
Set (HEDIS) measures among MA enrollees from 1997 to 2003.
115
 MA plans also 
successfully reduced the racial and socioeconomic disparities among male Medicare 
beneficiaries,
116
 and ameliorated racial/ethnic disparities in receiving health care.
117
 
Overall, the data is outdated, with few studies included after 2006, providing a 
limited picture of managed care plans since the implementation of Medicare Part D. 
3.4 Favorable Selection in Managed Care Plans 
Since its implementation, the favorable selection of HMOs has been characterized 
in a number of studies, because HMOs have the incentive to reduce overall healthcare 
costs through enrollment of healthier individuals and disenrollment of sicker ones.
118
 In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, HMO enrollees had significantly lower health care 
utilizations prior to enrollment, and lower mortality rates but higher health and functional 
status after enrollment, compared to FFS stayers.
119-126
 Recent data continuously showed 





HMO enrollees had significantly lower severity scores than those for Medicare FFS 
enrollees.
128
 On the other hand, recent data suggested the beneficiaries who dis-enrolled 
from HMOs were sicker and had higher costs than those continuously enrolled in 
HMOs.
119,126,129-133
 All these findings suggested a pattern of selecting healthy and low-
cost beneficiaries into HMOs, resulting in high-cost individuals enrolling in the FFS 
plans. In contrast, some studies indicated that there is no substantial evidence to support 
the selection bias between HMOs and FFS plans. The Price Waterhouse, however, 
suggested that the differences in predicted costs between HMO and FFS were not 
statistically different, based on the analysis using 1992 Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey (MCBS) data.
134
 Similarly, Dowd et al. found that HMO enrollees had a similar 
prevalence of various health conditions than non-enrollees, indicating that the favorable 
selection of healthy patients is not salient among adults aged over 65. 
Given the design of Part D plans, there is an existing concern on potential adverse 
selection among Medicare beneficiaries with chronic diseases,
135
  because heavy users of 
prescription drugs had a strong incentive to enroll in plans with more generous coverage. 
Part D programs have incorporated several features in eliminating this possibly adverse 
selection. First, early enrollment is encouraged to reduce the possibility that healthy 
beneficiaries postpone their enrollment until sick. Second, CMS pays plans by adjusting 
for the enrollee’s characteristics, including diagnosis, age, and sex, and other subsidiary 
factors, such as low-income status and long-term institutionalized status. Despite these 
efforts in reducing the adverse selections of part D plans, published data still suggested 
MA-PD enrollees were healthier and had lower health care costs compared to those 
enrolled in PDPs, when Part D was implemented in 2006.
136,137
 The characteristics of 
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PDP and MA-PD enrollees might have been changed since the introduction of Part D. 
However, data comparing the characteristics between these two specific types of Part D 






RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This chapter includes a description of study design, data sources, selection of 
study sample, measures of independent and dependent variables, statistical analysis, and 
sensitivity analysis. 
4.1 Study Design 
Retrospective cross-sectional study design was used for this dissertation. We 
explored the type of part D plans (PDPs vs. MA-PDs) on health services use as well as 
costs, and medication adherence among elderly Medicare beneficiaries. Since this study 
is a retrospective observational study without random assignment of insurance plans, self-
selection of Part D plans may attribute to selection bias, leading to biased estimates of 
PDPs on outcomes. Instrumental variable analysis was performed to address this concern. 
Since this study is an observational study using administrative claims, and it received 
exemption from the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
review. 
4.2 Data Sources 
In this retrospective study, two data sources were used to test the hypotheses 
mentioned in Chapter 1: Medicare Current Beneficiaries Survey (MCBS; 2006-2010), 
and Area Health Resources Files (AHRF; 2006-2010). Based on the conceptual 
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framework, both individual-level and contextual-level data is necessary for this project. 
MCBS provides the individual-level information on independent variable (type of Part D 
plans), primary outcomes of interest (health services use and costs and medication 
adherence) and covariates at the individual level (demographics, socioeconomics, health 
conditions and health status, and health-seeking attitudes). AHRF data provides the 
county-level covariates that are relevant to health services use (e.g., local availability of 
health care system) and instrumental variable (e.g., PDP penetration rate).  The following 
sections describe the data files and linkage of these data files for further analyses. 
4.2.1 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) is a longitudinal and multi-
purpose survey of nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries, including 
both aged and disabled beneficiaries residing in the community or long-term care 
facilities in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.
138
 MCBS is conducted continuously by Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Department of Health and Human Services. 
MCBS has been previously used in evaluating the impact of HMOs on health care 
utilizations and expenditures compared to Fee-For-Service (FFS) plans.
139,140
 
MCBS employs a multistage stratified random sampling design and a rotating 
panel design. The purpose of this multistage sampling design is to reduce the costs of 
traveling for interviews while maintaining the national representativeness of Medicare 
beneficiaries. In the first stage of sampling, 107 geographic primary sampling units 
(PSUs), which consist of counties or groups of counties, were selected to represent the 
nation. Within PSUs, samples were restricted to address (zip codes) within a total of 
1,163 sub-PSU areas selected using systematic sampling. To better represent the areas of 
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the nation, MCBS added or replaced several PSUs, primarily Western and Southwestern, 
which had experienced major growth in their elderly population, since the 1980 census. 
The survey sample was drawn by systematic random sampling within age strata from an 
enrollment list of Medicare beneficiaries residing in these areas.  Approximately 16,000 
Medicare beneficiaries were interviewed each round, and only 12,000 beneficiaries 
completed all four interviews each calendar year due to rotating panel design.
138,141
 The 




Initial interviews are conducted each fall, and collect information on 
demographics, socioeconomic characteristics and medical conditions. The follow 
interview is divided into rounds three times yearly, to collect information on the use of 
health care services and prescription drugs, health insurance coverage, and sources of 
payment. Data related to the health status is collected in the third round. The annual 
interview lasts around 1 hours, and covers a variety of demographic and behavioral 
questions such as income, assets, living arrangements, satisfactory to health care systems, 
and access to medical care. MCBS interviewed the sampled person directly, but if he/she 
was unable to answer the questions, he/she would be asked to designate a proxy 
respondent, usually a family member or close acquaintance who was familiar with his/her 
care.  All interviewers are trained and retrained, particularly in analyzing insurance 
statements, apportioning payments, and dealing with the stresses of interviewing the 
patients who are chronically ill. Spanish translation is provided for Hispanic persons who 
cannot speak English. 
To avoid the reporting errors in the surveys, survey reports were matched with 
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Medicare claims, and filled in and corrected survey-reported payment amounts with more 
accurate information from bills submitted to and paid by Medicare. Hence, the final 
database consists of data from survey and administrative claims.
142-144
  
MCBS contains two modules – the Cost and Use and the Access to Care modules. 
This study used data from these two modules of MCBS 2006-2010. The data files used 
for this study is presented in Table 5.1. In the Cost and Use module, RIC K file provides 
survey information for each beneficiary, RIC 1 and RIC 2 files provide self or proxy-
reported demographics, socioeconomics, and clinical conditions, RIC 4 files provide self 
or proxy-reported insurance coverage for each beneficiary, RIC IPE, OPE, MPE, DUE, 
and FAE files provide self-reported medical records on an event level. RIC PME files 
provide pharmacy claims from both self-reports and claims. In the Access to Care 
module, RIC 3 files provide information on beneficiaries’ CRN and care-seeking 
attitudes. The key variables used in this study are described in Appendix A. 
Table 4.1 List of Data Files in MCBS 
Module Record Type Contents 
Access to Care RIC 3 Access to Health care 
Cost and Use 
RIC K Key information 
RIC A Administrative identification 
RIC 1 Survey identification 
RIC 2 Survey health status and functioning 
RIC 4 Survey health insurance 
RIC 5 Living conditions 
RIC X Survey cross-sectional weights 
RIC DUE Dental Events 
RIC IPE Inpatient hospital events 
RIC MPE Medical provider events 
RIC OPE Outpatient hospital events 
RIC PME Prescribed medicine events 
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Module Record Type Contents 
RIC IUE Institutional Events 
RIC FAE  Facility Events 
 
4.2.2 Area Health Resource File (AHRF) 
Area Health Resource File (AHRF) is a comprehensive health resource database 
that is administered by Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). AHRF 
collects data for every county in the U.S., and covers more than 50 data sources, such as 
American Medical Association, U.S. Census Bureau. AHRF provides a broad range of 
information on health care providers and facilities, and population characteristics on the 
county level. AHRF is available for public use and released annually. Data from AHRF 
2014-2015 was used for this dissertation to provide information on the contextual factors 
related to health services use, and the instrumental variables (e.g., PDP penetration, % 
white collar jobs). The following table presents the key variables extracted from AHRF 
files and their data sources. 
Table 4.2 Variables and Data Sources in the AHRF 
Variable Data source Year 
Primary physicians 




American Hospital Association 
Annual Survey of Hospitals 
2006-2010 
Per capita income U.S. Department of Commerce 2010 
Number of population U.S. Census Bureau 2010 
Education  
American Community Survey (ACS) 
Summary File, U.S. Census Bureau 
2010 
PDP penetration 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) 
2008-2010 
% white collar worker 
American Community Survey (ACS) 




4.2.3 Linkage of data 
MCBS data files were linked with AHRFs using county codes for each 
beneficiary. The following figure demonstrates the steps involved in pooling the data 











Figure 4.1 Flowchart of Database Preparation 
 
4.3 Study Sample 
4.3.1 Selection criteria 
To assess the effect of PDPs on health care utilization and expenditures, and cost 
related non-adherence among elderly Medicare beneficiaries, the study sample included 
community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries aged 66 and older who enrolled in part D 
plan in 2006-2010.  
The selection criteria for full sample are summarized as follows: 
Inclusion criteria included: (1) aged 66 years and older in each study year.  We 
Beneficiary Summary 
Files (RIC 1, RIC 2, RIC 
3, RIC 4) 
Health Services Use 
Files (RIC IPE, OPE, 
MPE, DUE, and FAE) 
Prescription Drug Events 











included beneficiaries who were aged at least 66 years, to ensure that elderly 
beneficiaries had at least one full-year of Medicare enrollment. Non-elderly beneficiaries 
generally have disabilities or ESRD, and are not representative of Medicare population 
because they have a much different characteristics and pattern of health care utilizations 
than elderly individuals.
145
 (2) resided in the community in each study year. Facility-
dwelling beneficiary were excluded because utilization data incurred in the facility is 
incomplete; and (3) enrolled in Part D plans ̶ either PDPs or MA-PDs ̶ from January 1 
through December 31 in each study year.  
Exclusion criteria included: (1) enrolled in Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI), 
because ESI enrollees cannot enroll in Part D plans at the same time; (2) entitled 
Medicare due to ESRD or disability; and/or (3) died or transferred to hospice services, 




For Aim 3, I applied the same sample selection criteria for Aim 2, but limited the 
study sample to beneficiaries who were diagnosed with type 2 diabetes based on 
self/proxy-reports in the initial interview in more than one visits. Self-reported diagnosis 
of diabetes is considered as the gold standard of identifying diabetic patients when the 
clinical indicators are absent.
148,149
  
4.4 Independent Variables 
4.4.1 Key independent variable 
Key independent variable was the enrollment in PDPs or MA-PDs, which was 
identified from administrative claims. The Part D enrollment status was defined using the 
monthly indicator for part D coverage for the full study year, and was measured as a 
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binary variable equal to 1 if the beneficiary was enrolled in PDPs and 0 otherwise. The 
comparison group of interest was the enrollment in MA-PD plans. 
4.4.2 Other covariates 
Based on the conceptual framework, potential confounders were selected and 
adjusted in this study. The following section describes the measure of covariates. 
Demographic characteristics. Demographic characteristics included age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, living situation, census region and metropolitan status of 
beneficiaries’ residence. Age was categorized into three groups: 65-75 years, 75-85 years, 
and >85 years. Gender was defined as female and male. Race/ethnicity was defined based 
on self-reports, and was grouped as: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, 
and others. Marital status was categorized as: married, widowed, divorced/separated, and 
never married. Living situation was categorized as: living alone, living with spouse, 
living with children, and living with others or non-relatives. Census region was defined 
as Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.  Metropolitan status was categorized as 
metropolitan area and non-metropolitan area. 
Socioeconomic characteristics. Socioeconomic characteristics included education, 
Low Income Subsidy (LIS), and annual income. Education was categorized as: less than 
high school, high school graduate, and some college, bachelor’s degree or more. Annual 
income was grouped as: <$25,000 and ≥$25,000.  
Health conditions. Three measures were used to evaluate the health conditions, 
including self-perceived health status, Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI), and functional 
limitations. For self-perceived health status, beneficiaries were asked to compare their 
general health to other people of the same age, and rate their health as excellent, very 
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good, good, fair, and poor. To estimate CCI, a MCBS-adapted measure was estimated 
using self-reported comorbid conditions, include hypertension, coronary heart disease 
(CHD), congestive heart failure (CHF), stroke, peripheral vascular disease, diabetes, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), any arthritis, osteoporosis, ulcers, liver 
disease, paralysis, dementia, Parkinson, depression, and any mental illness.
150-152
 The CCI 
was categorized as 0, 1-2, 3+ for Aim 1-3.1. Since diabetes is used to calculate CCI, CCI 
was categorized as 1-2 and 3+ for Aim 3.2. 
Beneficiaries were defined as having functional limitations if they responded 
“yes” to the questions about activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental activities 
of daily living (IADLs). The ADLs refer to activities that are related to daily self-care, 
include bathing or showering, dressing, eating, getting in or out of bed or a chair, 
walking, and toileting. The IADLs are the activities that support an independent life style, 
including using the telephone, doing light housework, doing heavy housework, preparing 
meals, shopping for personal items, and managing money. The number of ADLs and 
IADLs was categorized as 0, 1-2, 3+. 
Lifestyle factors. Lifestyle factors included smoking status and Body Mass Index 
(BMI), which was measured using beneficiaries’ self-reports.  Smoking status was 
categorized as never, past, and current smoker.  BMI was calculated from self-reported 
height and weight by using the following formula, and categorized as under or normal 
weight (<24.9 kg/m
2
), overweight (25.0-29.9 kg/m
2








 × 703 
Care-seeking attitudes. Care-seeking attitudes were defined based on 
beneficiaries’ responses to the questions: “You will do just about anything to avoid going 
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to the doctor;” “When you are sick, you try to keep it to yourself;” and “Usually, you go 
to the doctor as soon as you start to feel bad.” Other questions include: “During the past 
year, did you have any health problem or condition about which you think you should 
have seen a doctor or other medical person, but did not?”
154,155
 
Other drug coverage. Other prescription drug coverage was defined based on both 
Medicare administrative records and self-reports. For beneficiaries with other 
prescription drug benefits, they were grouped as public, private, and other coverage. 
Study year. Study years for measuring utilization and spending were classified as 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 to capture changes in practice patterns or policies. 
Contextual factors. Since the availability of health facilities as well as health care 
providers varies by communities, it is necessary to control for the control for environment 
or contextual factors that are related to the health services use.  For each county code, we 
included five factors reflecting economic status, health status, and selected characteristics 
of the local health system. The number of primary physicians per 1,000 capita was used 
to reflect the local availability of primary care, including general family medicine, 
general practice, general internal medicine and general pediatrics. The number of hospital 
beds per 1,000 capita was used to reflect the resource of health care facility. The 
socioeconomic status of the community was reflected by the percent of people in poverty, 
education level and unemployment rate.  
4.5 Dependent Variables 
4.5.1 Health care utilization.  
The annual number of health services use was estimated using self-reports. MCBS 
collect the use of healthcare services in both Medicare claims and surveys. Since it is 
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optional for MA plans to report claims to CMS, using claims solely cannot fully capture 
the utilization data for MA-PD enrollees, leading to inaccurate results.  To address this 
concern, self-reports were used to compare health care utilizations in PDPs and MA-PDs. 
The number of visits was counted for each beneficiary during the study year, and then 
categorized as inpatient, outpatient, medical provider (doctor’s office), and other medical 
services (e.g., home health, hospice care).  
4.5.2 Health care expenditures.  
The annual costs were estimated for total health care spending for all types of 
medical events, including home health, inpatient, medical provider, outpatient, hospice 
care, and prescription drugs. Healthcare expenditures were categorized as (1) all medical 
expenditures; (2) medical expenditures paid by Medicare; (3) Non-Medicare expenditures 
made by public (i.e. Medicaid, VA) and private insurance (i.e. employer-paid coverage 
and Medicare supplement policies); (4) out-of-pocket, including copayments, 
deductibles. In addition, health care expenditures were analyzed separately by service 
category:  inpatient, outpatient, medical provider (doctor’s office), and other medical 
services (e.g., home health, hospice care). 
There are substantial geographic variations on Medicare spending due to the 
differences in operating health care facilities in some areas than others (e.g., wages, 
rents). In addition, the geographic variations were found to be associated with the 
enrollment in Part D plans. For example, MA enrollees were more likely to reside in west 
census region compared to MA-PD enrollees. Failure to account for geographic 
differences in healthcare costs may lead to biased estimates. To adjust for such 
differences, we used the modification of the Geographic Practice Cost Index that was 
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developed for the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.
156,157
  
Furthermore, this dissertation pooled data from 2006 to 2010, and there were 
increased proportions of beneficiaries enrolled in MA-PDs during this study period. 
Considering the elevated rate of general inflation, costs incurred in the later study period 
(e.g., 2010) are higher than those in the earlier study period (e.g., 2006), with other 
factors being constant. Hence, the unadjusted healthcare costs between two groups are 
incomparable if the inflation rate is not adjusted. Medical care component of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used to adjust for this changes in medical costs over 
time,
158,159
 so that the unadjusted costs can better reflect the differences in healthcare 
costs between two types of Part D plans. All costs are reported in 2010 U.S. dollars. 
Table 4.3 Medical Care Component of CPI, 2006-2010 
Year CPI Annual % 
Annual 
Proportion 
2006 201.600 3.226 1.032 
2007 207.342 2.848 1.028 
2008 215.303 3.840 1.038 
2009 214.537 -0.356 0.996 
2010 218.056 1.640 1.016 
 
The following equation represents the formula used to obtain the 2010 U.S. dollar 
values. 
2010 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 2006 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐶𝑃𝐼07 × 𝐶𝑃𝐼08 × 𝐶𝑃𝐼09 ×  𝐶𝑃𝐼10 
=  2006 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ×  1. 082 
4.5.3 Cost-related nonadherence 
Cost-related nonadherence (CRN) was measured based on self/proxy’s reports by 
answering “yes” or “ever” on any of the following questions: “decide not to fill or refill a 
prescription because it was too expensive”; “skipped doses to make the medicine last 
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longer”; “taken smaller doses of a medicine to make the medicine last longer”, and “spent 
less money on food, heat, or other basic needs so that you would have money for 
medicine”.
160
 All four measures of CRN were incorporated in MCBS since 2004, and 
have demonstrated high test-retest reliability
161
 and construct validity.
160,162,163
. 
4.5.4 Medication adherence 
Medication Adherence was evaluated for beneficiaries with type 2 diabetes. Anti-
diabetic medications were identified from MCBS PME files using drug names (both 
generic and brand names), which are summarized in Appendices B. Anti-diabetic 
medications include insulins, metformin, sulfonylureas, thiazolidinediones, dipeptidyl 
peptidase-4 inhibitors, combinations and other oral agents. Based on the widely accepted 
guideline treating diabetes,
164
  medication therapy should be initiated at the time of 
diagnosis of diabetes. Since only beneficiaries who were previously diagnosed with 
diabetes were included in the study sample, they should be prescribed with anti-diabetic 
medications and filled the prescriptions during the whole study year. This approach has 
also been used in the published studies.
146,147
 In addition, we also estimated the adherence 
to anti-hypertensive and antihyperlipidemic drugs (Appendix C&D) 
Proportion of Days Covered (PDC) was calculated as the number of days with 
drugs supplies within a drug class divided by the time from the first fill until the end of 
follow up (December 31) for each panel.  
PDC =  
the number of days with drugs supplies 
the first fill until the end of follow up (December 31)
 × 100% 
There are three major considerations in calculating PDC. First, the overlapping 
days supply were credited under the assumption that beneficiary is finishing the current 
fill before starting the refill prescription.
165
 As shown in the example for prescription fills 
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(Table 4.4), the patient filled a 30-day supply of the drug on 8/25/2011, and that fill 
finished on 9/23/2011. However, the patient refilled early on 9/5/2011, her refill date of 
this fill was adjusted to 9/24/2011, to avoid any overlapping of days supply. Second, any 
prescription fills after the study periods were excluded from the calculation of PDC. For 
example, the patient filled prescription on 12/10/2011 with a 30-day supply, and should 
use them up by 1/8/2012; however, the measurement period ended at 12/31/2011. Hence, 
the 30-day fill was adjusted to reflect a 22-day supply. Third, the leftover medications 
from previous year were considered in estimating PDC. For example, the patient filled a 
30-day supply of prescription on 12/20/2010, which should be used up on 01/19/2011. 
Since the measurement period of PDC starts on 01/01/2011, the medication carried over 
to the next fill won’t be taken in to account.  
Table 4.4 Example of Prescription Fills 






A metformin 12/20/2010 30 0 
A thiazolidinedione 8/25/2011 30 30 
A metformin 9/5/2011 30 30 
A metformin 9/26/2011 30 30 
A metformin 12/10/2011 30 22 
Source: Wang et al. Measuring Medication Adherence with Simple Drug Use and 
Medication Switching. SAS Global Forum 2013. Paper 168-2013. 
Link: http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings13/168-2013.pdf 
As illustrated in Table 4.4, the start of measurement period is defined as the first 
refill in 2011, which is 8/25/2011. The adjusted days of supply are (30+30+30+22) = 112 
days, and there are 129 days from the first refill until the last day of 2011.  Therefore, the 
PDC for the patient in this example is 112/129=86.8%.  
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Beneficiaries was defined as adherent with a PDC≥0.80, whereas non-adherent 
with a PDC<0.80. This cutoff point has been used in numerous literatures, and is a valid 
adherence measure of anti-diabetic drugs using administrative claims data.
166
  
The following table summarizes the dependent and independent variables used in 
this dissertation. 
Table 4.5 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables 





number of visits 
Individual MCBS 
Costs Self-reports, annual costs Individual MCBS 









Self-reports Individual MCBS 
Independent 
Variable 




Age 65-75, 75-85, >85 years Individual MCBS 



























Alone, with spouse, with 




Variable Description Level Source 
Smoking Never, past, current Individual MCBS 
ADLs, IADLs 







of chronic diseases 
Individual MCBS 
CCI Self-reports Individual MCBS 
Self-perceived 
health Status 
Excellent, very good, 
good, fair and poor 
Individual MCBS 
BMI 







Self-reports and claims Individual MCBS 
Care-seeking 
attitudes 




Continuous variable County AHRF 
Number of 
hospital beds 
Continuous variable County AHRF 
Per capita 
income 
Continuous variable County AHRF 
Education  Continuous variable County AHRF 
PDP penetration 
rate 
Continuous variable County AHRF 
SPAP Dummy variable State AHRF 
% white collar 
worker 
Continuous variable County AHRF 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); AHRF, Area 
Health Resource Files; SPAP, State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs; PDC, 
Proportion of Days Covered; PDP, Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Plan; MSA, 
Metropolitan Statistical Area; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of 
daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, 
walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living; BMI, body 
mass index. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
Univariate and bivariate analyses were conducted to describe and compare 
beneficiaries’ baseline characteristics. Multivariable analyses were performed to control 
for potential confounders. Cross-sectional weights were applied to adjust for the complex 
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survey design of the MCBS. Most data analysis was carried out using SAS version 9.4 
(SAS Institute, Cary, NC). Model specification tests were performed using STATA 
(Version 14.0).  
4.6.1 Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to compare beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and 
MA-PD plans in their baseline characteristics of age, gender, race, education, marital 
status, living conditions, census region, metropolitan statistical area, annual income, 
health status, IADLs/ADLs status, chronic diseases, BMI, smoking status. Significant 
differences in continuous variables were assessed using independent two-group t-tests. 
Chi-squared tests were used for categorical variables. Based on the recommendation in 
the MCBS technical documentation, cross-sectional weights were applied in the analysis 
to obtain the national estimates. 
4.6.2 Multivariable regression analysis 
In the naive model, the choice of part D plans was assumed to be exogenous, that 
is, there is no omitted variable that is related to both the choice of part D plans and 
outcomes (e.g., health services use and costs, adherence).  
For Aim 2, generalized linear models (GLMs) were executed to estimate the 
association between choice of Part D plans and use and costs of health services.  Health 
care cost and use data is usually right-hand skewed with inconsistent variance, indicating 
the violation of the assumption of ordinary least squares regression (OLS)-normality and 
homoscedasticity.
167,168
 However, GLM loose the assumptions of OLS. Furthermore, the 
use of transformations improves the normality of data, but the back transformation to the 
original scales may yield biased estimates on the original scale if the error term is 
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heteroskedastic, which is very common for health cost data. In addition, back transform 
raises the concern on the interpretation of the results,
169
 because results from analysis 
using transformed scales cannot provide inferences about population mean costs, which 
are the primary interest of this study.
170
 While the link function in GLM directly 
estimates on the original scales, which don’t require back transformation. Therefore, 
generalized linear models were used in this dissertation to correct for the possible skewed 
distribution of health care cost and use data. 
For Aim 3.1, since the occurrence of cost-related nonadherence (yes vs. no) is a 
binary variable, multivariable logistic regression was used to investigate the association 
between type of Part D plans and CRN.  
For Aim 3.2, multivariable linear regression was used to access the association 
between type of Part D plans and PDC, which was treated as a continuous variable. Since 
being adherent (PDC≥0.80) a binary variable, multivariable logistic regression was used 
to investigate the effect of Part D plans on medication adherence, after adjusting the 
potential confounders mentioned earlier. 
The following section describes the multivariable regression analysis carried out 
for Naïve models. 
Aim 2.1 Health care utilizations  
In this study, the utilization of healthcare was counted as the number of 
hospitalizations, visits to outpatient and medical providers (e.g., physician’s office), and 
number of prescription fills. Hence, utilization data can be considered as count data, 
which has three statistical properties: (1) to be non-negative; (2) to have excessive zero 
outcomes; and (3) to have a skewed distribution.
171
 Poisson regression model is 
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commonly applied for count data. A key assumption of the Poisson model is that the 
mean and the variance of count data are equal. Overdispersion exists when the observed 
variance is larger than the assumed variance (or mean). Failure in taking into account 
overdispersion may lead to biased estimates by underestimating the variability of the 
data.
172
 Currently, two major approaches can be used to handle overdispersion in count 
data: (1) to introduce a dispersion parameter in the Poisson regression (i.e. dscale in 
SAS); (2) to perform modified count model by introducing other probability distribution 
to control for dispersion, e.g., the negative binomial.
173
 In addition, for data with 
excessive zeros, the zero-inflated models, such as zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) 
138,173-175
, 
zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB),
173,176












Figure 4.2 Flow Chart of Selecting Preferred Models for Healthcare Count Data 
 
To select the most appropriate modified count model, three specification tests 
Overdispersion? 
-Deviance/DF 

















- Vuong test 
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were performed: normality test, overdispersion, and Vuong test. The flow chart of 
choosing a regression model is shown in Figure 4.2. First, the distribution of data was 
checked graphically and by using normality tests (e.g., kurtosis). Second, the 
overdispersion of use data was then accessed by comparing of the deviance to the df in 
the Poisson regression model, and using a likelihood-ratio (LR) test. If Deviance / df is 
away from 1, then overdispersion may present. LR test compares the likelihood in the 
negative binomial (NB) specification against the Poisson model specification. When LR 




LR =  −2[LL (Poisson)  −  LL (negative binomial ] 
Third, considering the possibility of zero values in the use data, I used the Vuong 
test for non-nested models to access whether the excess zero values will result in the 
rejection of standard count model against the zero-inflated count model.
179
 If z-test is 
significant, indicating that the zero-inflated model is preferred. 
Based on the Figure 4.2, the preferred models for healthcare utilizations were 
selected. However, it is still possible that there were slight differences in the results 
obtained from different models. In the sensitivity analysis, I also compared the estimates 
from different count models, including Poisson, scaled Poisson, ZIP, NB, and ZINB. 
The naive GLM used to examine health care utilizations is indicated in Equation 
below. Specifically, the dependent variable represents the annual number of health 
services, g(use) represents the function of use data (e.g., log). the key independent 
variable is the type of part D plans. Equation was applied to both PDP and MA-PD 
groups, measuring the health care utilizations relative to the type of Part D plans. 
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Therefore, β1 is the estimate of the effect of the PDPs on health care utilizations 
compared to MA-PDs, controlling for the observed covariates. A Wald test of β1<0 was 
used to test Hypothesis 3.1: PDP enrollees had higher expenditures of medical care than 
MA-PD enrollees 
𝑔{𝐸(𝑢𝑠𝑒)} = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +
 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
Aim 2. Health care expenditures 
Given the highly skewed distributions of cost data, GLM with gamma distribution 
and log link was performed to estimate the association between type of Part D plans and 
health care expenditures. The transformation of cost data and GLM distribution were 
determined based on the statistical tests. First, the possible transformation of the cost data 
was chosen based on the results Box-Cox procedure.   
λ Suggested Distribution 
-1 Inverse 
0 Logarithm 




Second, the GLM distribution was determined by using the modified Park test on 
the raw-scaled residuals to select a distribution, given a particular link function (e.g., log 
in the first step). The rule states that the distribution family was chosen based on the 
relationship between raw-scaled variance and the raw-scaled prediction.
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λ Suggested Distribution 





λ Suggested Distribution 
3 Inverse Gaussian or Wald 
 
To handle the excessive zero-values, a small positive value ($0.01) was assigned 
to beneficiaries without costs to avoid dropping them from the analyses. GLM adjusted 
for potential confounders mentioned above. 
The naive GLM used to examine health care spending is indicated as Equation: 
𝑔{𝐸(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)} = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +
 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
Specifically, the dependent variable represents the annual health care costs in a 
certain year, g(cost) represents the function of cost and use data (e.g., log). the key 
independent variable is the type of part D plans. Equation was applied to both PDP and 
MA-PD groups, measuring the health care expenditures relative to the type of Part D 
plans. Therefore, β1 is the estimate of the effect of the PDPs on health care expenditures 
compared to MA-PDs, controlling for the observed covariates. A Wald test of β1<0 was 
used to test Aim 3.2: PDP enrollees had higher expenditures of medical care than MA-PD 
enrollees. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑠𝑒)
1−𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑠𝑒)
)  = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +  𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
Where P (Incurred cost or use) is the probability of having resource use or cost. In 
this specification, Part D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an individual enrolled in 
PDPs, and 0 if the individual enrolled in MA-PDs. Demo-socioeconomics includes age, 
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gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, living conditions, education, annual income, 
metropolitan status and census region; Health includes Charlson’s comorbidity index, 
self-perceive health status and ADLs/IADLs functional status; Lifestyle includes BMI 
and smoking status; Attitudes is a vector that indicates self-reported attitudes towards 
seeking care and access to care; Year is a dummy variable indicating year (the target 
survivorship year) in which utilization and spending were measured. 
Aim 3.1 Cost-Related Nonadherence (CRN) 
Multivariable logistic regression was carried out to estimate the Odds Ratio (OR) 
of CRN. The dependent variable was a dummy variable, which was equal to 1 if an 




)  = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +
 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
Where P (CRN) is the probability of having CRN. In this specification, Part D is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if an individual enrolled in PDPs, and 0 if the individual 
enrolled in MA-PDs. Demo-socioeconomics includes age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital 
status, living conditions, education, annual income, metropolitan status and census 
region; Health includes Charlson’s comorbidity index, self-perceive health status and 
ADLs/IADLs functional status; Lifestyle includes BMI and smoking status; Attitudes is a 
vector that indicates self-reported attitudes towards seeking care and access to care; Year 
is a dummy variable indicating year (the target survivorship year) in which utilization and 




Aim 3.2 Medication Adherence 
A multivariable linear regression was used to evaluate PDCs between 
beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and MA-PDs. PDC is a continuous variable; Part D is the 
key independent variable; other covariates in the model include demo-socioeconomics, 
health, lifestyle, attitudes, and year. The model used to evaluate PDC and choice of Part 
D plans is shown in as below: 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +  𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖 
Beneficiaries were defined as adherent with a PDC≥0.80, whereas non-adherent 
with a PDC<0.80. Multivariable logistic regression was modeled to estimate the Odds 
Ratio (OR) of being adherence (PDC≥0.80). The dependent variable was a dummy 
variable, which was equal to 1 if an individual were adherent to the drug treatment, and 0 




) = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +  𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖   
4.6.3 Instrumental variable approach 
The covariate-adjusted GLMs are not able to address the possibility that the key 
explanatory variable-choice of part D plans-may be endogenous either because of 
unobserved confounders or reverse causality. As demonstrated in Figure 4.3, the 
unobserved confounders (U), such as an individual’s preference and perceived demand 
for health care services, may influence both the choice of part D (X) and the outcomes 
(Y), indicating that the choice of part D plans is endogenous due to the correlation 
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between X and the error term (u) in the specification of the traditional OLS regression 
model in Equation below. The variations on x are correlated with not only the changes in 
y, but also the changes in the error term u, suggesting that X is endogenous. The 
endogeneity of X results in biased and inconsistent estimates of β1, therefore, the 
estimates from traditional regression is biased when accessing the effect of PDPs on 
health care utilization and expenditures and medication adherence.  
𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝑢 
To address the problem of endogeneity, the instrumental variable (IV) approach 
was implemented. Figure 4.3 demonstrates how an IV works. Given an IV (Z) is 
associated with X, but is not correlated with unobserved confounders (U) and outcome 
(Y), IV can focus on the variations on X that is uncorrelated with U and discard the 
changes in X that may bias the OLS estimates. Hence, IV provides a consistent estimate 
of coefficient β1. Although the IV approach is appealing, it is difficult of find a valid IV. 
The validity of an IV relies on three assumptions: (1) the independence assumption 
assumes that the IV is not correlated with observed confounders; (2) the non-zero casual 
effect of IV required that an IV is highly correlated with the endogenous variable (X); 
and (3) the exclusion restrict states the IVs are not directly associated with the changes in 
outcome variable (Y). For assumption of non-zero casual effect of IV on endogenous 
variable, the strength of association between IV and X was tested using the traditional 
rule of thumb the IV was a strong instrument if the F-statistic was greater than 10.
181
 A 
partial or weak correlation between the IV and endogenous variable indicates that the 
instrument is a weak IV, leading to biased and inconsistent estimates, incorrect size for 
test of significance, and incorrect confidence intervals.
181
 Since more than 1 instruments 
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were used in the analysis, overidentification tests were performed to access if the 
instruments are valid. However, the third assumption of IV, which is the exclusion 









Figure 4.3 Instrumental Variable 
The two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) estimator was employed because it 
provides a consistent estimates for data with non-linear distribution.
182
 The traditional 
linear instrumental variable estimator, two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator and two-
stage predictor substitution (2SPS), may result in biased estimates when applied to 
nonlinear models.
182,183




In the first-stage of 2SRI, auxiliary (reduced-form) regressions was estimated for 
the endogenous variable by regressing on at least one IV. The results from the first stage 
were used to estimate the predicted values for the endogenous variables and calculate 
residuals. The second-stage regression was then conducted for the outcome of interest by 














and residuals from the auxiliary equations.
182
  
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 = 𝑀{𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +
 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽8𝐼𝑉}  + 𝜖𝑖  
The second-stage regression was conducted for the outcome of interest by 
including the endogenous variables, and predicted values for the endogenous variables 
and residuals from the auxiliary equations.
182
 
𝑔{𝐸(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑠𝑒)} = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷 + 𝛽2𝜀
2𝑆𝑅𝐼+𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
𝛽4𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 +
 𝛽7𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟    
Where ε
2SRI
 is the residual from first stage of IV, controlling for the endogeneity 
of choice of Part D plans due to selection bias or unobserved confounders. Other 
specification is similar to Naïve model. If β2 is statistically significant, the choice of part 
D is considered as endogenous; If β2 is not statistically significant, there is no enough 
evidence to suggest the endogeneity if Part D plan. 
The choice of IVs (Z) was guided by published research on the effect of HMOs 
on health outcomes and expenditures. State-level instrument (SPAP) and county-level 
instrument (PDP penetration and % white collar worker) were used in this dissertation, 
because they are related to the plan choices, but not directly related the study outcomes. 
Beneficiaries are more likely to enroll in PDPs if they reside in a county with higher 
number of PDP plans or lower average premiums for PDP plans, but the market share or 
the premiums of PDP plans don’t directly influence the health care use and cost. Hence, 
the selected IVs meet the assumptions conceptually.
135
 Furthermore, statistical 
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specification tests indicated that the IVs meet the independence and the non-zero casual 
effect of IV. The results for IV specification tests are shown in Chapter 5. 
4.6.4 Reporting results 
Since both Naïve models and IV approach were carried out, the results were 
reported based on the existence of endogeneity of independent variable related to each 
outcomes of interest. If the key independent variable–type of Part D plans–is endogenous 
to the outcome variables (e.g., healthcare utilizations, costs), then the estimates from IV 
approach would be reported in the results chapter. On the other hand, if the type of part D 
plans is not endogenous, the results from naïve models would be reported.  
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the robustness of the results, two sensitivity analyses were carried out.  
Sensitivity Analysis 1. In the main analysis, beneficiaries with LIS were excluded 
from the study sample, because LIS provides more generous drug benefits compared to 
Part D plans, including both PDPs and MA-PDs. As described in Chapter 1, the 
copayment for generics is as low as $2 per prescription for beneficiaries with LIS, while 
Part D beneficiaries generally have a copayment of $10 for generic prescriptions. To 
account for the effects of LIS, two sensitivity analyses were conducted to compare the 
outcomes stratified by the presence of LIS. 
Sensitivity Analysis 2. Beneficiaries with other drug coverage were excluded 
from the analysis. Self-reports were used to collect utilization and cost data, to account 
for the possibility of filling prescriptions outside of Medicare. However, the additional 
drug benefits may still influence the drug use. In the sensitivity analysis, beneficiaries 
with other drug benefits were excluded from the analysis. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 3. Since income is an important factor influencing the health 
care utilizations and cost. The impact of PDPs on healthcare utilizations and costs were 
examined by stratifying the levels of incomes. 
Sensitivity Analysis 4. Patients with chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes) may have 
different patterns in using healthcare compared to the general population. In the 
sensitivity analysis, the impact of PDPs among diabetic patients was examined, to better 








This chapter presents the results of this dissertation. The first section of this 
chapter contains results for sample size and descriptive analysis for Aim 1. Later, section 
2 and 3 shows the results of health care use (Aim 2.1) and costs (Aim 2.2). Section 4 
focuses on the results of cost-related non-adherence (Aim 3.1).  Section 5 displays the 
sample selection, descriptive analysis, and results of medication adherence among 
Medicare beneficiaries with type 2 diabetes (Aim 3.2). Section 6 presents the results for 
sensitivity analysis. 
5.1 Results for Aim 1. Baseline Characteristics 
The following section describes the study sample, including sample size, 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, health conditions and health behaviors, 
health attitudes, and environment factors. This section also presents the predictors of 
enrollment in PDP plans among elderly Medicare beneficiaries. 
5.1.1 Sample selection 
The master datasets after merging MCBS files included 45,427 individuals who 
participated in the MCBS in 2006-2010. The initial sample size was 35,912 community-
dwelling Medicare beneficiaries aged 66 years older who were not entitled Medicare due 
to ESRD and disabilities. A total of 17,477 individuals enrolled in Part D plans were 





























































individuals were excluded due to the enrollment in the employer sponsored insurance 
(ESI), 147 individuals were dropped due to lack of full-year data, and 10 individuals were 
dropped due to the missing data on self-reported measures, such as education, income, 
BMI. The final sample size for PDP group was 10,010. In the MA-PD group, 173 
beneficiaries were excluded due to their enrollment in ESI, 126 individuals were  
excluded from the sample due to lack of full-year data, and 10 individuals were dropped 
due to missing data on self-reports. The final sample size is 6,356 in MA-PD group.  
Figure 5.1 demonstrate the sample selection flow chart for Aim 1&2 and Aim3.1 in this 
dissertation. 
5.1.2 Demo-socioeconomic and clinical characteristics 
The demo-socioeconomic characteristics and health conditions between PDPs vs. 
MA-PDs were compared in Table 5.1. PDP enrollees were older (aged 85+ years, 14.6% 
vs. 11.8%; p=0.0003), were more likely to be female (64.3% vs. 57.1%; p<0.0001), and 
non-Hispanic white (79.3% vs. 74.6%; p<0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees. 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs were less likely to be married (47.2% vs. 55.0%; 
p<0.0001), but more likely to be living alone (36.2% vs. 29.5%; p<0.0001). PDP 
enrollees had lower education level (more than high school, 31.6% vs. 35.8%; p<0.0001) 
than MA-PD enrollees, while PDP enrollees had lower annual income (more than 
$25,000, 31.6% vs. 35.8%; p<0.0001), and were more likely to receive low income 
subsidy (32.1% vs. 15.7%; p<0.0001). Beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs were less likely to 
live in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (68.0% vs. 92.9%; p<0.0001) and west census 
region (16.0% vs. 34.4%; p<0.0001). Compared to beneficiaries enrolled in MA-PDs, 
PDP enrollees were more likely to have other prescription drug coverage (19.5% vs. 
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12.7%; p<0.0001). Specifically, PDP enrollees were more likely to have public 
prescription drug coverage (15.9% vs. 9.8%) and private or self-purchased prescription 
drug coverage (3.6% vs. 2.9%).  
Compared to beneficiaries enrolled in MA-PDs, PDP enrollees had lower self-
perceived health status (excellent health, 14.1% vs. 16.6%; very good health, 28.7% vs. 
32.3%; good health, 34.0% vs. 32.7%; fair health, 17.5% vs. 14.7%; poor health, 5.7% 
vs. 3.7%; p<0.0001). In addition, PDP enrollees were more likely to have more than 4 
chronic conditions (19.3% vs. 15.0%; p<0.0001), with Charlson Comorbidity Index 
(CCI) scores ≥ 3 (43.3% vs. 38.3%; p<0.0001), with three or more Activities of daily 
living (ADLs) disabilities (9.3% vs. 6.2%; p<0.0001), and with three or more 
Instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) limitations (8.3% vs. 4.9%; p<0.0001).  
Beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs were less likely to have a history of smoking 
(44.9% vs. 40.1%; p=0.0003), compared to MA-PD enrollees. In addition, PDP enrollees 
were less likely to visit physicians when they felt sick (27.4% vs. 23.7%; p=0.002), but 
were more likely to have the same physicians for more than five years (57.8% vs. 52.0%; 
p<0.0001). 
Table 5.1 Demo-Socioeconomic Characteristics and Health Conditions 
among Medicare Beneficiaries 
Characteristics 














      
0.0003 
 










  >85 1869 14.6   983 11.8     
Sex 
      
<.0001 
 












































 Non-Hispanic Others 586 6.1   253 4.3     
Marriage 
      
<.0001 
 














  Never married 341 3.5   161 2.6     
Living conditions 
      
<.0001 
 































 >high school 2918 31.6   2215 35.8     
Annual income  
      
<.0001 
 






≥$25,000 3757 40.5   2919 47.6     
LIS 
      
<.0001 
 






Yes 3414 32.1   1062 15.7     
MSA 
      
<.0001 
 






Yes 6451 68.0   5852 92.9     
Census region 
      
<.0001 
 














  West 1486 16.0   2103 34.4     
















 Private/self-purchased 349 3.6   173 2.9     
Self-perceived health 
status       
<.0001 
 





































Number of chronic 
conditions       
<.0001 
 









 4+ 2035 19.3   986 15.0     
CCI 
      
<.0001 
 









  3+ 4464 43.3   2485 38.3     
ADLs 
      
<.0001 
 









  3+ 1016 9.3   425 6.2     
IADLs 
      
<.0001 
 




























 ≥30.0 2586 26.8   1485 24.4     
Smoking 
      
0.0003 
 









  Current 916 9.6   587 9.8     
Care-seeking attitudes 
       
 








Visit a physician as soon 




















  Same physician>5 years 5824 57.8   3313 52.0   <.0001 
a. Percentages were calculated with national weights; p-value was obtained from Rao-
Scott Chi-Square tests 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of 
daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, 
walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including 
using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking 
medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, 
calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
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5.1.3  Environment factors 
Table 5.2 shows environmental and healthcare system factors among beneficiaries 
enrolled in PDPs and MA-PDs. PDP enrollees were more likely to reside in the counties 
with lower number of primary physicians per 1,000 capita (0.70 vs. 0.75; p<0.0001), but 
higher number of hospital beds per 1,000 capita (3.15 vs. 3.05, p=0.030). In addition, 
compared to MA-PD enrollees, PDP enrollees were more likely to live in the counties 
with higher percentage of population below poverty line (16.50% vs. 16.14%; p<0.0001), 
and higher unemployment rate (6.57% vs. 6.49%; p<0.0001), and lower percentage of 
percentage of college graduates (25.75% vs. 29.18%; p<0.0001). 











Number of primary 








Number of hospital beds 























Primary Care includes general family medicine, general practice, general internal 
medicine and general pediatrics. 
Abbreviations: std, standard deviation. 
5.1.4  Predictors of enrollment in PDPs 
When examining the predictors associated with enrolling in PDPs, results indicate 
that beneficiaries’ demo-socioeconomic characteristics and clinical conditions were 
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associated with their enrollments in PDPs compared to MA-PDs (Table 5.3). 
Beneficiaries aged 85 years and older were more likely to enroll in PDPs compared to 
those aged 65-75 (Odds Ratio [OR]=1.17; 95% Confidence Interval [CI]=1.01-1.35). 
Compared to male beneficiaries, female beneficiaries were more likely to enroll in PDPs 
(OR=1.19; 95% CI=1.05-1.36). Non-Hispanic blacks were less likely to enroll in PDPs 
than non-Hispanic whites (OR=0.49; 95% CI=0.38-0.64). Enrollment in PDPs was 
associated with having college educations (OR=1.25; 95% CI=1.09-1.44), having annual 
income≥$25,000 (OR=1.28; 95% CI=1.12-1.47), having LIS (OR=3.14; 95% CI=2.61-
3.78), and living in Midwest (OR=1.73; 95% CI=1.23-2.43) or south census regions 
(OR=2.12; 95% CI=1.47-3.06). Enrollment in PDPs was associated with having CCI 
scores ≥3 (OR=1.20; 95% CI=1.01-1.42) and being obese (OR=1.14; 95% CI=1.00-1.30), 
but was not associated with self-perceived health status, ADLs and number of chronic 
conditions.  
Table 5.3 Predictors of Enrollment in PDPs among Elderly Medicare 
Beneficiaries 
Characteristics OR 95% CI p-value 
Age, years 
   
 
65-75 Ref – – 
 
75-85 0.90 (0.80-1.00) 0.055 
 >85 1.17 (1.01-1.35) 0.035 
Sex 
   
 
Male Ref – – 
 
Female 1.19 (1.05-1.36) 0.010 
Race/ethnicity 
   
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref – – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.49 (0.38-0.64) <.0001 
 
Hispanics 0.69 (0.54-0.88) 0.003 
 Non-Hispanic others 1.39 (1.13-1.72) 0.002 
Marriage 
   
 
Married Ref – – 
 
Widowed 1.49 (1.11-1.99) 0.008 
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Characteristics OR 95% CI p-value 
 
Divorced/separated 1.11 (0.81-1.53) 0.500 
  Never married 1.65 (1.13-2.41) 0.010 
Living conditions 
   
 
Alone Ref – – 
 
With spouse 1.06 (0.79-1.41) 0.710 
 
With children 0.82 (0.70-0.97) 0.020 





< High school 1.15 (0.96-1.38) 0.138 
 
High school/GED Ref – – 
 > High school 1.25 (1.09-1.44) 0.002 
Annual income      
 
 
< $25,000 Ref – – 
 
≥ $25,000 1.28 (1.12-1.47) 0.0004 
LIS 
   
 
Yes 3.14 (2.61-3.78) <.0001 
 
No Ref – – 
MSA 
   
 
Yes 0.18 (0.11-0.28) <.0001 
 
No Ref – – 
Census region 
   
 
Northeast Ref – – 
 
Midwest 1.73 (1.23-2.43) 0.002 
 
South 2.12 (1.47-3.06) <.0001 
  West 0.72 (0.51-1.00) 0.051 




None Ref – – 
 
Public 0.88 (0.78-0.99) 0.040 
 Private/self-purchased 0.85 (0.71-1.03) 0.095 
Self-perceived health status 
   
 
Excellent Ref – – 
 
Very good 1.01 (0.86-1.18) 0.914 
 
Good 1.10 (0.94-1.29) 0.251 
 
Fair 1.09 (0.89-1.35) 0.408 
 
Poor 1.15 (0.86-1.53) 0.344 
Number of chronic conditions 
   
 
0-1 Ref – – 
 
2-4 0.98 (0.85-1.14) 0.819 
 4+ 0.89 (0.74-1.07) 0.223 
CCI 
   
 
None Ref – – 
 
1-2 1.18 (1.02-1.37) 0.030 
  3+ 1.20 (1.01-1.42) 0.039 




Characteristics OR 95% CI p-value 
 
None Ref – – 
 
1-2 0.95 (0.83-1.09) 0.467 
  3+ 1.11 (0.91-1.35) 0.302 
IADLs     
 
 
None Ref – – 
 
1-2 1.11 (0.97-1.27) 0.136 







<25.0 Ref – – 
 
25.0-29.9  1.11 (0.99-1.24) 0.066 
 ≥30.0 1.14 (1.00-1.30) 0.046 
Smoking 
   
 
Never Ref – – 
 
Past 1.52 (1.26-1.84) <.0001 
  Current 1.52 (1.12-2.07) 0.007 
Care-seeking attitudes 
   
 
Avoid going to a physician 
   
 
  Yes 1.08 (0.95-1.23) 0.234 
   No Ref – – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
  
 
  Yes 0.98 (0.89-1.08) 0.684 
   No Ref – – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
  
 
  Yes 0.93 (0.81-1.07) 0.302 
   No Ref – – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
   
 
  Yes 0.99 (0.88-1.11) 0.857 
   No Ref – – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
   
 
  Yes 1.28 (1.14-1.43) <.0001 
   No Ref – – 
Environment factors 
   
 
Number of primary physicians 0.73 (0.35-1.52) 0.393 
 
Number of hospital beds  1.06 (0.97-1.16) 0.181 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.96 (0.92-0.99) 0.016 
 
Unemployment rate  1.00 (0.89-1.14) 0.956 
 
Education higher than high school 1.00 (0.97-1.03) 0.940 
Study year 
   
 
2006 Ref – – 
 
2007 1.68 (1.51-1.88) <.0001 
 
2008 1.49 (1.28-1.73) <.0001 
 
2009 1.28 (1.10-1.49) 0.002 
 
2010 1.73 (1.46-2.05) <.0001 
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Characteristics OR 95% CI p-value 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, 
Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in 
and out of a chair, walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of 
daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, 
laundry, traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters 
independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided 
by height in meters squared. 
 
5.2 Results for Aim 2.1: Healthcare Utilizations 
The following section presents the model specification tests and selections of 
preferred multivariable models for each outcomes of interest, and the results of health 
care services use, including the descriptive statistics and multivariable regression 
analysis. 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.4 shows bivariate results regarding the use of health services between 
PDP enrollees and MA-PD enrollees. Compared to MA-PD enrollees, PDP enrollees 
were significantly more likely to have inpatient (15.79% vs. 12.82%; p<0.0001) and 
outpatient care (66.35% vs. 63.89%; p=0.001), but were less likely to visit doctor’s office 
(96.74% vs. 97.36%; p=0.025). In addition, PDP enrollees had significantly higher 
annual average number of visits to hospitals (0.22 vs. 0.17; p<0.0001), outpatient settings 
(2.84 vs. 2.11; p<0.0001), doctor’s office (17.02 vs. 11.77; p<0.0001), and prescription 
fills (39.83 vs. 32.30; p<0.0001). 
Table 5.4 Unadjusted Healthcare Utilizations among Elderly Beneficiaries 
enrolled in PDPs vs. MA-PDs 




   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 1581 (15.79%) 815 (12.82%) <.0001 
 
82 




Numbers of visits, mean ± 
std 
0.22 ± 0.59 0.17 ± 0.50 <.0001 
Outpatient 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 6642 (66.35%) 4061 (63.89%) 0.001 
  
Numbers of visits, mean ± 
std 
2.84 ± 2.73 2.11 ± 5.46 <.0001 
Medical providers 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 9684 (96.74%) 6188 (97.36%) 0.025 
  
Numbers of visits, mean ± 
std 
17.02 ± 19.17 11.77 ± 17.56 <.0001 
Other medical services 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 61 (0.61%) 161 (2.53%) <.0001 
  
Numbers of visits, mean ± 
std 
0.01 ± 0.09 0.03 ± 0.19 <.0001 
Prescriptions (claims) 
   
 
Patients with RX fills, n (%) 9501 (94.92%) 6093 (95.86%) 0.368 
  Numbers of fills, mean ± std 39.83 ± 32.55 32.30 ± 29.00 <.0001 
a. Other Medical services include hospice and home health. 
Abbreviations: std, standard deviation. 
 
5.2.2 Naïve Model: Healthcare Utilizations 
Based on the specification tests in Appendix E, zero-inflated negative binomial 
models were used for number of hospitalizations, other medical services, and 
prescriptions, while negative binomial models were modelled for the number of 
outpatient and physician’s office visits.
173,176
  The dependent variable is the annual 
number of health service use, and the key independent variable is the type of part D 
plans.  
Naïve model: results for healthcare utilizations 
Table 5.5 summarizes the results for the effects of PDP on health care utilizations 
from naïve model. For easier interpretation, Incidence Rate (IR), which was calculated 
using the equation (e
coefficient
), is also described in Table 5.6 below. IR can be interpreted 
as multiplicative effects on the expected outcome measures. Thus, for example, holding 
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beneficiaries’ socio-demographic and clinical characteristics constant, the estimated 
expected number of hospitalizations is e
0.04
=1.04 times as high in the PDP group as in a 
comparable MA-PD group. The results indicate that PDP enrollees had similar likelihood 
of using inpatient care (IR=1.04, p=0.36) and other medical services (IR=0.99, p=0.950), 
but had 21% higher likelihood of using outpatient care (p<0.0001), and 42% higher in 
physician’s office (p<0.0001), and 3% higher in prescription drugs (p=0.007), compared 
to MA-PD enrollees.   
The results also reveal various demo-socioeconomics and clinical factors that 
were significantly associated with the use of health services. As shown in Table 5.5, 
ADLs and number of chronic conditions were associated with the use of inpatient care. 
For use of outpatient care, the statistically significant factors include age, race/ethnicity, 
living conditions, education, annual income, MSA and census region, self-perceived 
health status, number of chronic conditions, ADLs, IADLs, smoking and care-seeking 
attitudes. For the doctor’s office visits, the statistically significant factors include age, 
sex, race/ethnicity, living conditions, education, annual income, LIS status, MSA, having 
other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, ADLs, 
IADLs, BMI, smoking, and care-seeking attitudes. For the use of prescription drugs, the 
statistically significant factors include age, sex, race/ethnicity, living conditions, LIS 
status, census region, having other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of 
chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and 




Table 5.5 Naïve Model: Effects of PDPs on the Utilizations of Healthcare Services 
Characteristics 
















Part D enrollment 
               
 
PDPs 0.04 1.04 0.360 0.19 1.21 <.0001 0.35 1.42 <.0001 -0.01 0.99 0.950 0.03 1.03 0.007 
  MA-PDs Ref Ref – Ref Ref –  Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
               
 
65-75 Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 0.02 1.03 0.555 0.04 1.04 0.060 0.06 1.07 <.0001 -0.02 0.98 0.903 0.06 1.06 <.0001 
  >85 0.00 1.00 0.935 -0.08 0.92 0.007 -0.02 0.98 0.431 0.02 1.02 0.947 0.08 1.08 <.0001 
Sex 
               
 
Male Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
  Female 0.03 1.03 0.524 0.04 1.04 0.112 0.16 1.17 <.0001 0.07 1.07 0.695 0.08 1.08 <.0001 
Race/ethnicity 
               
 
Non-Hispanic 
White Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic 
Black -0.02 0.98 0.754 -0.11 0.89 0.003 -0.32 0.73 <.0001 -0.13 0.87 0.681 -0.08 0.92 <.0001 
 
Hispanics 0.00 1.00 0.955 -0.14 0.87 0.0004 -0.13 0.87 <.0001 -0.19 0.83 0.507 0.00 1.00 0.881 
  
Non-Hispanic 
others -0.08 0.92 0.340 -0.005 1.00 0.920 -0.17 0.85 <.0001 -0.12 0.89 0.736 -0.03 0.97 0.279 
Marriage 
               
 
Married Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.01 1.01 0.927 0.11 1.12 0.110 0.07 1.07 0.158 0.14 1.15 0.808 -0.05 0.95 0.181 
 
Divorced/Separated 0.04 1.04 0.756 0.12 1.13 0.105 0.09 1.09 0.092 0.09 1.10 0.880 -0.07 0.93 0.090 
  Never married -0.12 0.89 0.529 0.09 1.10 0.274 0.09 1.09 0.151 0.05 1.05 0.945 -0.03 0.97 0.480 
Living condition 
               
 
Alone Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.05 1.05 0.707 0.11 1.12 0.117 0.13 1.14 0.007 0.18 1.19 0.770 -0.10 0.91 0.013 
 
With children 0.05 1.05 0.365 -0.08 0.92 0.014 -0.04 0.96 0.088 0.04 1.04 0.848 -0.04 0.97 0.055 
  With others 0.07 1.07 0.379 -0.01 0.99 0.780 0.11 1.11 0.001 0.10 1.11 0.731 -0.001 1.00 0.979 
Education level 
              
 
< high school 0.04 1.00 0.502 -0.01 0.99 0.837 -0.10 0.90 <.0001 -0.0002 1.00 0.999 0.02 1.02 0.192 
 























  >high school -0.01 0.99 0.850 0.05 1.05 0.026 0.14 1.15 <.0001 0.05 1.05 0.789 -0.01 0.99 0.571 
Annual income  
               
 
<$25,000 Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
  >$25,000 -0.02 0.98 0.711 0.14 1.15 <.0001 0.10 1.11 <.0001 0.01 1.01 0.943 0.003 1.00 0.845 
LIS 
               
 
Yes -0.013 1.00 0.802 -0.05 0.95 0.071 -0.15 0.86 <.0001 -0.02 0.98 0.913 0.22 1.25 <.0001 
  No Ref –   Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
MSA 
               
 
Yes Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
  No -0.04 0.96 0.488 -0.26 0.77 <.0001 0.10 1.11 <.0001 -0.08 0.92 0.781 -0.02 0.98 0.329 
Census region 
               
 
Northeast Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest -0.06 0.94 0.340 -0.08 0.93 0.013 0.002 1.00 0.950 -0.13 0.88 0.602 0.09 1.09 <.0001 
 
South 0.02 1.02 0.770 -0.28 0.76 <.0001 0.02 1.02 0.398 -0.02 0.98 0.927 0.13 1.14 <.0001 
  West -0.06 0.94 0.347 -0.16 0.85 <.0001 -0.01 0.99 0.582 -0.02 0.98 0.932 -0.02 0.98 0.351 
Other RX coverage 
               
 
None Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Public -0.04 0.96 0.441 0.01 1.01 0.698 -0.06 0.94 0.013 -0.10 0.91 0.693 0.12 1.13 <.0001 
  
Private/self-
purchased -0.06 0.94 0.584 -0.01 0.99 0.818 -0.06 0.94 0.128 -0.07 0.93 0.843 0.03 1.03 0.278 
Self-perceived Health Status 
               
 
Excellent Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.02 1.02 0.841 0.01 1.01 0.786 0.08 1.09 <.0001 -0.09 0.91 0.802 0.19 1.21 <.0001 
 
Good 0.03 1.04 0.648 0.10 1.11 0.001 0.21 1.23 <.0001 -0.06 0.94 0.860 0.33 1.39 <.0001 
 
Fair 0.06 1.06 0.477 0.21 1.23 <.0001 0.29 1.34 <.0001 -0.07 0.93 0.851 0.43 1.54 <.0001 
  Poor 0.1 1.1 0.286 0.14 1.15 0.006 0.28 1.32 <.0001 -0.13 0.88 0.749 0.45 1.57 <.0001 
Number of chronic condition 
               
 
0-1 Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
2-4 0.09 1.1 0.129 0.04 1.04 0.172 0.09 1.10 <.0001 -0.06 0.94 0.794 0.30 1.36 <.0001 
  4+ 0.16 1.18 0.027 0.10 1.10 0.008 0.25 1.28 <.0001 -0.05 0.95 0.857 0.54 1.72 <.0001 
CCI 
               
 
None Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
1-2 -0.02 0.98 0.792 0.14 1.15 <.0001 0.19 1.20 <.0001 0.17 1.18 0.565 0.13 1.14 <.0001 
























               
 
None Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
1-2 0.05 1.05 0.316 0.10 1.11 <.0001 0.19 1.21 <.0001 0.07 1.07 0.718 0.07 1.08 <.0001 
  3+ 0.15 1.16 0.010 0.17 1.18 <.0001 0.36 1.43 <.0001 -0.02 0.98 0.918 0.13 1.14 <.0001 
IADL 
               
 
None Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
1-2 0.01 1.01 0.790 0.10 1.11 <.0001 0.17 1.18 <.0001 0.13 1.13 0.463 0.05 1.06 <.0001 
  3+ -0.04 0.96 0.455 0.07 1.07 0.074 0.11 1.11 <.0001 0.06 1.06 0.806 0.06 1.06 0.012 
BMI, kg/m2 
               
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  -0.01 0.99 0.786 0.02 1.02 0.344 0.03 1.03 0.053 -0.04 0.96 0.840 0.09 1.09 <.0001 
  ≥30.0 0.004 1.00 0.934 0.02 1.02 0.331 0.05 1.05 0.006 0.03 1.03 0.885 0.13 1.14 <.0001 
Smoking 
               
 
Never Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Past 0.05 1.05 0.200 -0.01 0.99 0.489 0.01 1.01 0.477 0.03 1.03 0.841 -0.001 1.00 0.918 
  Current 0.08 1.09 0.248 -0.09 0.91 0.013 -0.16 0.85 <.0001 -0.10 0.91 0.763 -0.04 0.96 0.042 
Care-seeking attitude 
               
 
Avoid going to a physician 
              
 
  Yes -0.03 0.97 0.530 -0.10 0.91 0.0001 -0.23 0.80 <.0001 -0.03 0.97 0.861 -0.10 0.91 <.0001 
 
  No Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
              
 
  Yes 0.02 1.02 0.684 0.08 1.09 0.0001 0.11 1.12 <.0001 -0.03 0.97 0.853 0.07 1.08 <.0001 
 
  No Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
              
 
  Yes -0.02 0.98 0.702 0.10 1.10 0.0002 0.15 1.16 <.0001 0.15 1.16 0.416 0.05 1.05 0.003 
 
  No Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when 
sick 
               
 
  Yes 0.01 1.01 0.906 -0.03 0.97 0.183 -0.01 0.99 0.365 0.06 1.06 0.749 -0.02 0.98 0.072 
 
  No Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
              
 
  Yes -0.03 0.97 0.431 -0.005 1.00 0.800 0.04 1.04 0.004 0.01 1.01 0.922 -0.02 0.98 0.168 
    No Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
























Number of primary 
physicians 0.04 1.04 0.766 0.104 1.11 0.083 0.21 1.24 <.0001 -0.26 0.77 0.663 -0.03 0.97 0.394 
 
Number of hospital 
beds  -0.002 1.00 0.878 0.0004 1.00 0.948 -0.02 0.98 <.0001 0.01 1.01 0.844 0.01 1.01 <.0001 
 
Percent under 
Poverty -0.001 1.00 0.772 0.003 1.00 0.250 0.003 1.00 0.170 0.00 1.00 0.883 0.005 1.00 0.005 
 
Unemployment 
rate  0.004 1.00 0.786 -0.02 0.98 0.020 -0.03 0.97 <.0001 0.01 1.01 0.920 -0.02 0.98 <.0001 
  
Education higher 
than high school -0.0002 1.00 0.952 0.004 1.00 0.067 -0.003 1.00 0.017 0.01 1.01 0.694 -0.004 1.00 0.001 
Study year 
               
 
2006 Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – Ref Ref – 
 
2007 -0.006 0.99 0.920 -0.03 0.97 0.388 0.01 1.01 0.712 -0.0004 1.00 0.999 -0.02 0.99 0.431 
 
2008 -0.06 0.94 0.331 -0.02 0.98 0.608 -0.02 0.98 0.448 0.03 1.03 0.898 -0.01 0.99 0.490 
 
2009 -0.05 0.95 0.401 -0.02 0.98 0.482 -0.02 0.98 0.319 -0.05 0.95 0.836 -0.04 0.96 0.061 
  2010 -0.03 0.97 0.659 0.06 1.07 0.053 0.02 1.02 0.357 -0.01 0.99 0.973 -0.04 0.97 0.072 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity 
Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, 
Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and 





5.2.3 IV model: healthcare utilizations 
First stage of IV model 
Table 5.6 shows the distributions of the instrumental variables used in the first-
stage 2SRI model. Compared to MA enrollees, PDP enrollees were more likely to reside 
in the counties with higher PDP penetration rate (42.57% vs. 32.76%; p<0.0001), and 
states offering State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs for the elderly (35.12% vs. 
29.22%; p<0.0001), while PDP enrollees were less likely to live in the counties with 
higher percentage of white collar job (56.15% vs. 60.76%; p<0.0001). 
Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics for IVs of Study Sample  
Instruments PDPs MA-PDs p-value 
PDP penetration rate, 
mean±std 
42.57 ± 11.45 32.76 ± 9.23 <.0001 
%white collar job, 
mean±std 
56.15 ± 9.84 60.76 ± 7.41 <.0001 
SPAP, n (%) 3516 (35.12%) 1852 (29.22%) <.0001 
Abbreviations: std, standard deviation; SPAP, State Pharmaceutical 
Assistance Programs 
 
In the first stage of IV model, prohibit regression model was used to estimate the 
probability of enrolling in PDPs compared to MA-PDs. The statistical significant 
predictors of enrolling in PDPs include age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, living 
conditions, education, income, LIS status, MSA, census region, having other RX 
coverage, number of chronic conditions, CCI, IADLs, BMI, care-seeking attitudes, 
environment factors, and calendar year. The first stage of 2SRI estimation is presented in 




Table 5.7 Aim 2&Aim 3.1: The First Stage of IV Estimation  
Characteristics Coefficient SE p value 
Instruments 
   
 
PDP penetration rate 0.06 0.002 <.0001 
 
% White collar job -0.01 0.005 <.0001 
 
SPAP 0.09 0.04 0.050 
Age, years 
   
 
65-75 Ref – – 
 
75-85 -0.04 0.02 0.094 
 >85 0.12 0.04 0.001 
Sex 
   
 
Male Ref – – 
 





Non-Hispanic White Ref – – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.50 0.04 <.0001 
 
Hispanics -0.21 0.04 <.0001 
 Non-Hispanic others 0.15 0.05 0.004 
Marriage 
   
 
Married Ref – – 
 
Widowed 0.19 0.08 0.011 
 
Divorced/separated 0.05 0.08 0.500 
  Never married 0.27 0.10 0.006 
Living conditions 
   
 
Alone Ref – – 
 
With spouse -0.01 0.08 0.938 
 
With children -0.10 0.04 0.006 





< high school 0.02 0.04 0.538 
 
High school/GED Ref – – 
 >high school 0.16 0.03 <.0001 
Annual income        
 
<$25,000 Ref – – 
 
≥$25,000 0.16 0.03 <.0001 
LIS 
   
 
Yes 0.72 0.04 <.0001 
 
No Ref – – 
MSA 
   
 
Yes Ref – – 
 
No -0.63 0.05 <.0001 
Census region 
   
 
Northeast Ref – – 
 
Midwest 0.23 0.04 <.0001 
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South 0.42 0.05 <.0001 
  West 0.04 0.05 0.464 




None Ref – – 
 
Public 0.29 0.04 <.0001 
 Private/self-purchased 0.38 0.07 <.0001 
Self-perceived health status 
   
 
Excellent Ref – – 
 
Very good -0.002 0.03 0.947 
 
Good 0.05 0.03 0.168 
 
Fair 0.04 0.04 0.385 
 
Poor 0.07 0.07 0.307 
Number of chronic conditions 
   
 
0-1 Ref – – 
 
2-4 -0.02 0.03 0.442 
 4+ -0.08 0.04 0.066 
CCI 
   
 
None Ref – – 
 
1-2 0.10 0.03 0.003 
  3+ 0.13 0.04 0.001 
ADLs     
 
 
None Ref – – 
 
1-2 -0.02 0.03 0.450 
  3+ 0.07 0.05 0.155 
IADLs     
 
 
None Ref – – 
 
1-2 0.07 0.03 0.017 







<25.0 Ref – – 
 
25.0-29.9  0.04 0.03 0.090 
 ≥30.0 0.08 0.03 0.004 
Smoking 
   
 
Never Ref – – 
 
Past -0.03 0.02 0.229 
  Current -0.04 0.04 0.350 
Care-seeking attitudes 
   
 
Avoid going to a physician 
   
 
  Yes 0.02 0.03 0.503 
   No Ref – – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
   
 
  Yes 0.01 0.02 0.821 
   No Ref – – 
 
Worry about health more than 
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others 
 
  Yes -0.06 0.03 0.059 
   No Ref – – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
   
 
  Yes 0.005 0.03 0.847 
   No Ref – – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
   
 
  Yes 0.11 0.02 <.0001 
   No Ref – – 
Environment factors 
   
 
Number of primary physicians -0.02 0.08 0.818 
 
Number of hospital beds  -0.02 0.01 0.015 
 
Percent under Poverty -0.03 0.00 <.0001 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.05 0.01 <.0001 
  Education higher than high school 0.0001 0.004 0.970 
Calendar year 
   
 
2006 Ref – – 
 
2007 0.31 0.04 <.0001 
 
2008 0.25 0.04 <.0001 
 
2009 0.16 0.04 <.0001 
 
2010 0.34 0.04 <.0001 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SPAP, 
State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs; SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily 
living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, 
walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, 
including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, 
traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, 
body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters 
squared. 
 
To test the assumption of IV, several model specification tests were performed 
(Table 5.8). First, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests were performed to access whether 
endogeneity exists between type of Part D plans and outcome measures. The results 
indicate that type of Part D plan is endogenous for all the use data, only except the 
number of hospitalizations. Second, since multiple instruments were used in this analysis, 
Hansen's tests of overidentifying were performed to evaluate the validity of instruments. 
The results indicate that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the instruments are valid. 
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Third, the F statistics for instruments is greater than 10, suggesting that the instruments 
are not weak. 













(p = 0.23) 
1.23 










(p = 0.03) 
5.50 





(p = 0.83) 
1.62 




(p = 0.0003) 
2.84 
(p = 0.24) 
13.91 
 
Second stage of IV models: healthcare utilizations 
Table 5.9 summarizes the results for the effects of PDP on health care utilizations 
in 2SRI models. For easier interpretation, Incidence Rate (IR), which was calculated 
using the equation (e
coefficient
), is also presented in Table 5.10 below. The results indicate 
that PDP enrollees had similar likelihood of filling prescription drugs (IR=1.05, 
p=0.161). However, PDP enrollees had 47% higher likelihood of using outpatient care 
(IR=1.47, p<0.0001), 39% higher likelihood of visiting physician’s office (IR=1.39, 
p<0.0001), while 85% lower likelihood in using other medical services (IR=0.15, 
p=0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees.   
 
 
Table 5.9 IV Model: Effects of PDPs on the Healthcare Utilizations 
Characteristics 
Outpatient   Physician's office     Prescriptions 
Est. IR p value   Est. IR p value     Est. IR p value 
Residual from 1st stage -0.21 0.81 0.002   0.02 1.02 0.684     -0.02 0.98 0.608 
Part D enrollment 
            
 
PDPs 0.38 1.47 <.0001 
 
0.33 1.39 <.0001 
  
0.05 1.05 0.161 
 MA-PDs Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –     Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
            
 
65-75 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 0.04 1.04 0.047 
 
0.06 1.07 <.0001 
  
0.06 1.06 0.000 
  >85 -0.09 0.91 0.004   -0.02 0.98 0.453     0.08 1.08 0.000 
Sex 
            
 
Male Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 Female 0.03 1.03 0.181   0.16 1.17 <.0001     0.08 1.08 <.0001 
Race/ethnicity 
            
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.09 0.92 0.025 
 
-0.32 0.73 <.0001 
  
-0.08 0.92 0.000 
 
Hispanics -0.13 0.88 0.001 
 
-0.13 0.87 <.0001 
  
0.00 1.00 0.906 
  Non-Hispanic others -0.01 0.99 0.765   -0.17 0.85 <.0001     -0.03 0.97 0.260 
Marriage 
            
 
Married Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.10 1.11 0.131 
 
0.07 1.07 0.156 
  
-0.05 0.95 0.173 
 
Divorced/separated 0.12 1.13 0.102 
 
0.09 1.09 0.091 
  
-0.07 0.93 0.088 
  Never married 0.09 1.09 0.323   0.09 1.09 0.146     -0.04 0.96 0.462 
Living conditions 
            
 
Alone Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.11 1.12 0.102 
 
0.13 1.14 0.007 
  
-0.10 0.91 0.013 
 
With children -0.08 0.93 0.020 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.078 
  
-0.03 0.97 0.059 
  With others 0.00 1.00 0.929   0.11 1.11 0.001     0.00 1.00 0.994 
Education level 
            
 
< high school -0.01 0.99 0.819 
 
-0.10 0.90 <.0001 
  
0.02 1.02 0.197 
 
High school/GED Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  







Outpatient   Physician's office     Prescriptions 
Est. IR p value   Est. IR p value     Est. IR p value 
  >high school 0.04 1.05 0.051   0.14 1.15 <.0001     -0.01 0.99 0.532 
Annual income  
            
 
<$25,000 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
  ≥$25,000 0.13 1.14 <.0001   0.10 1.11 <.0001     0.002 1.00 0.878 
LIS 
            
 
Yes -0.09 0.92 0.005 
 
-0.15 0.86 <.0001 
  
0.22 1.25 <.0001 
 No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –     Ref Ref – 
MSA 
            
 
Yes Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 No -0.20 0.82 <.0001   0.10 1.10 0.0001     -0.01 0.99 0.629 
Census region 
            
 
Northeast Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest -0.10 0.91 0.003 
 
0.00 1.00 0.891 
  
0.08 1.09 <.0001 
 
South -0.31 0.74 <.0001 
 
0.02 1.02 0.362 
  
0.13 1.14 <.0001 
  West -0.14 0.87 <.0001   -0.02 0.98 0.545     -0.02 0.98 0.404 
Other RX coverage 
            
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Public 0.00 1.00 0.898 
 
-0.06 0.95 0.017 
  
0.12 1.13 <.0001 
  Private/self-purchased -0.04 0.97 0.522   -0.06 0.94 0.150     0.03 1.03 0.317 
Self-perceived health status 
            
 
Excellent Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.00 1.00 0.900 
 
0.08 1.09 0.000 
  
0.19 1.21 <.0001 
 
Good 0.10 1.10 0.003 
 
0.21 1.23 <.0001 
  
0.33 1.39 <.0001 
 
Fair 0.20 1.22 <.0001 
 
0.29 1.34 <.0001 
  
0.43 1.54 <.0001 
  Poor 0.13 1.14 0.010   0.28 1.32 <.0001     0.45 1.57 <.0001 
Number of chronic conditions 
            
 
0-1 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
4-Feb 0.04 1.04 0.168 
 
0.09 1.09 <.0001 
  
0.30 1.36 <.0001 
  4+ 0.10 1.11 0.005   0.24 1.28 <.0001     0.54 1.72 <.0001 
CCI 
            
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  







Outpatient   Physician's office     Prescriptions 
Est. IR p value   Est. IR p value     Est. IR p value 
 
2-Jan 0.14 1.15 0.000 
 
0.19 1.21 <.0001 
  
0.13 1.14 <.0001 
  3+ 0.31 1.36 <.0001   0.32 1.38 <.0001     0.11 1.11 <.0001 
ADLs 
            
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.11 1.11 <.0001 
 
0.19 1.21 <.0001 
  
0.07 1.08 <.0001 
  3+ 0.16 1.18 <.0001   0.36 1.43 <.0001     0.13 1.14 <.0001 
IADLs 
            
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.10 1.10 <.0001 
 
0.17 1.18 <.0001 
  
0.05 1.06 0.000 
  3+ 0.06 1.06 0.138   0.11 1.11 0.0001     0.06 1.06 0.014 
BMI, kg/m2 
            
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  0.02 1.02 0.411 
 
0.03 1.03 0.051 
  
0.09 1.09 <.0001 
  ≥30.0 0.02 1.02 0.401   0.05 1.05 0.006     0.13 1.14 <.0001 
Smoking 
            
 
Never Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Past -0.01 0.99 0.651 
 
0.01 1.01 0.485 
  
0.00 1.00 0.939 
  Current -0.09 0.91 0.016   -0.16 0.85 <.0001     -0.04 0.96 0.044 
Care-seeking attitudes 
            
 
Avoid going to a physician 
            
 
  Yes -0.10 0.91 <.0001 
 
-0.23 0.80 <.0001 
  
-0.10 0.91 <.0001 
   No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –     Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
           
 
  Yes 0.08 1.09 <.0001 
 
0.11 1.12 <.0001 
  
0.07 1.08 <.0001 
   No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –     Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
           
 
  Yes 0.10 1.10 <.0001 
 
0.15 1.16 <.0001 
  
0.05 1.05 0.003 
   No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –     Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
            
 
  Yes -0.03 0.97 0.191 
 
-0.02 0.99 0.344 
  
-0.02 0.98 0.065 







Outpatient   Physician's office     Prescriptions 
Est. IR p value   Est. IR p value     Est. IR p value 
 
Same physician>5 years 
            
 
  Yes -0.01 0.99 0.571 
 
0.04 1.04 0.004 
  
-0.02 0.98 0.142 
   No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –     Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
            
 
Number of primary physicians 0.10 1.11 0.084 
 
0.21 1.23 <.0001 
  
-0.03 0.98 0.489 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.00 1.00 0.799 
 
-0.02 0.98 <.0001 
  
0.01 1.01 0.001 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.00 1.00 0.070 
 
0.00 1.00 0.207 
  
0.00 1.00 0.005 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.02 0.98 0.024 
 
-0.03 0.97 <.0001 
  
-0.02 0.98 <.0001 
  
Education higher than high 
school 0.00 1.00 0.055   0.00 1.00 0.017     0.00 1.00 0.001 
Calendar year 
            
 
2006 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
2007 -0.05 0.95 0.150 
 
0.01 1.01 0.591 
  
-0.02 0.98 0.398 
 
2008 -0.03 0.97 0.304 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.559 
  
-0.01 0.99 0.462 
 
2009 -0.03 0.97 0.316 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.385 
  
-0.04 0.96 0.059 
 
2010 0.05 1.05 0.177 
 
0.03 1.03 0.281 
  
-0.04 0.96 0.064 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, 
getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using 
telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters 
independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. In the 2SRI Model, the instrumental variables are the county-level PDP penetration, percent of white collar job and State 






The results also reveal various demo-socioeconomics and clinical factors that 
were significantly associated with the use of health services. As shown in Appendix F 
(Table F.6-Table F.9), for the use of outpatient care, the statistically significant factors 
include age, race/ethnicity, living conditions, annual income, LIS status, MSA and census 
region, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, 
smoking, BMI, and care-seeking attitudes. For the physician’s office visits, the 
statistically significant factors include age, sex, race/ethnicity, living conditions, 
education, annual income, LIS status, MSA, having other RX coverage, self-perceived 
health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADL, BMI, smoking, care-
seeking attitudes and environment factors. For the fill of prescriptions, the significant 
factors include age, sex, race/ethnicity, living conditions, LIS status, MSA, census region, 
having other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, 
CCI, ADLs, IADLs, BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. 
5.3 Results for Aim 2.2: Healthcare Expenditures 
The following section presents the model specification tests and selections of 
preferred multivariable models for each outcomes of interest, and the results of health 
care services costs, including the descriptive statistics and multivariable regression 
analysis. 
5.3.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.10 presents bivariate results regarding healthcare costs between PDP 
enrollees and MA-PD enrollees. Compared to MA-PDs, PDPs were associated with 
higher costs for inpatient care ($1996.9 vs. $1711.4; p=0.015), outpatient care ($921.1 vs. 
$663.9; p<0.0001), physician’s office ($2559.2 vs. $1663.1; p<0.0001) and prescription 
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drugs ($3140.8 vs. $2319.7; p<0.0001), but had lower costs for other medical services 
($29.3 vs. $143.8; p<0.0001). As a result, PDP group had statistically higher costs for all-
type of medical services ($5506.5 vs. $4182.2; p<0.0001) and total healthcare costs 
($8647.3 vs. $6501.8; p<0.0001). 
Among different sources of payments, for Medicare spending, PDPs had similar 
costs for inpatient ($1700.8 vs. $1531.4; p=0.091) and outpatient care (614.3 vs. 545.6; 
p=0.152), compared to MA-PDs. For out-of-pocket spending, PDP enrollees had similar 
OOP costs for all medical services ($878.4 vs. 844.5; p=0.546), compared to MA-PDs. 
However, PDPs were associated with higher spending from public and private insurance. 
Table 5.10 Unadjusted Healthcare Costs among Elderly Beneficiaries  
Outcome measures 
PDPs   MA-PDs   P-
value Mean Std.   Mean Std.   
Hospitalization 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 1996.9 6881.0   1711.4 7518.0   0.015 
Outpatient 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 921.1 3264.4   663.9 3572.0   <.0001 
Medical providers 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 2559.2 4105.6   1663.1 4040.3   <.0001 
Others 
       
 



























PDPs   MA-PDs   P-
value Mean Std.   Mean Std.   
All medical services 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 5506.5 10168.4   4182.2 10549.6   <.0001 
Prescriptions drugs 
       
 























 Total costs, $ 3140.8 3764.2   2319.7 2972.4  <.0001 
Total Healthcare 
       
 























 Total costs, $ 8647.3 11426.0   6501.8 11460.7  <.0001 
 
5.3.2 Naïve model: healthcare expenditures 
The following section presents the results for healthcare costs, including results 
from both naïve models and IV models 
Naïve model: results for healthcare expenditures 
Based on the specification tests in Appendix E, GLM models with gamma 
distribution and log link were used to estimate the effects of PDPs on healthcare costs 
among elderly Medicare beneficiaries. 
Table 5.11 presents the results for the effects of PDP on healthcare expenditures 
from naïve model. The results indicate that PDPs had 15% higher costs for inpatient care 
(IR=1.15 p=0.021), 12% higher costs for outpatient care (IR=1.12, p=0.012), 50% higher 
costs for physician’s office (IR=1.50, p<0.0001), but similar costs for other medical 
services (IR=1.02, p=0.912), Consequently, PDP enrollees 26% higher costs for all 
 
 





















Part D enrollment 
               
 
PDPs 0.14 1.15 0.021 
 
0.11 1.12 0.012 
 
0.41 1.50 <.0001 
 
-2.90 0.06 <.0001 
  MA-PDs Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
               
 
65-75 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 0.12 1.13 0.061 
 
0.02 1.02 0.723 
 
0.12 1.13 <.0001 
 
0.21 1.23 0.027 
  >85 0.02 1.03 0.793   -0.27 0.77 <.0001   0.00 1.00 0.988   2.18 8.86 <.0001 
Sex 
               
 
Male Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  Female -0.21 0.81 0.002   0.02 1.02 0.660   0.09 1.09 0.0003   -0.79 0.46 <.0001 
Race/ethnicity 
               
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.13 0.88 0.248 
 
-0.27 0.77 0.001 
 
-0.39 0.68 <.0001 
 
-0.12 0.88 0.381 
 
Hispanics -0.04 0.96 0.750 
 
-0.35 0.71 <.0001 
 
-0.08 0.93 0.056 
 
0.41 1.50 0.016 
  Non-Hispanic others -0.24 0.79 0.070   -0.42 0.65 <.0001   -0.34 0.71 <.0001   -2.38 0.09 <.0001 
Marriage 
               
 
Married Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.23 1.26 0.239 
 
0.02 1.02 0.892 
 
0.13 1.14 0.061 
 
1.36 3.91 <.0001 
 
Divorced/separated -0.02 0.99 0.941 
 
-0.03 0.98 0.862 
 
0.11 1.11 0.166 
 
1.25 3.49 <.0001 
  Never married -0.40 0.67 0.115   -0.11 0.90 0.529   0.06 1.06 0.534   2.81 16.53 <.0001 
Living conditions 
               
 
Alone Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.18 1.20 0.351 
 
0.13 1.14 0.360 
 
0.17 1.19 0.016 
 
0.88 2.42 0.000 
 
With children 0.25 1.29 0.006 
 
0.020 1.02 0.752 
 
0.04 1.04 0.256 
 
-1.14 0.32 <.0001 
  With others 0.12 1.13 0.355   0.06 1.06 0.529   0.11 1.11 0.021   0.52 1.68 0.003 
Education level 
               
 
< high school -0.09 0.91 0.291 
 
-0.09 0.92 0.161 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.004 
 
-0.77 0.46 <.0001 
 
High school/GED Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 



























  >high school 0.11 1.11 0.122   -0.03 0.97 0.520   0.20 1.22 <.0001   -0.29 0.75 0.000 
Annual income  
               
 
<$25,000 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  ≥$25,000 -0.11 0.90 0.116   0.23 1.26 <.0001   0.12 1.12 <.0001   -0.65 0.52 <.0001 
LIS                               
 
Yes -0.17 0.84 0.038 
 
-0.06 0.94 0.300 
 
-0.24 0.79 <.0001 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.261 
  No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
MSA 
               
 
Yes Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  No 0.06 1.06 0.476   -0.54 0.58 <.0001   0.03 1.03 0.306   -1.60 0.20 <.0001 
Census region 
               
 
Northeast Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest -0.11 0.90 0.273 
 
-0.03 0.97 0.675 
 
0.01 1.01 0.701 
 
-1.08 0.34 <.0001 
 
South -0.26 0.77 0.007 
 
-0.06 0.95 0.388 
 
0.02 1.02 0.600 
 
-0.73 0.48 <.0001 
  West -0.31 0.73 0.002   -0.20 0.82 0.004   -0.16 0.85 <.0001   -0.05 0.96 0.757 
Other RX coverage 
               
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Public 0.00 1.00 0.964 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.575 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.269 
 
0.46 1.58 0.003 
  Private/self-purchased -0.11 0.89 0.479   0.19 1.20 0.095   0.05 1.06 0.356   0.25 1.29 0.199 
Self-perceived health status 
               
 
Excellent Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.18 1.20 0.042 
 
0.07 1.07 0.259 
 
0.06 1.06 0.075 
 
1.15 3.15 <.0001 
 
Good 0.47 1.60 <.0001 
 
0.28 1.32 <.0001 
 
0.20 1.22 <.0001 
 
1.88 6.56 <.0001 
 
Fair 0.74 2.10 <.0001 
 
0.40 1.49 <.0001 
 
0.28 1.32 <.0001 
 
3.21 24.83 <.0001 
  Poor 1.03 2.81 <.0001   0.25 1.29 0.023   0.31 1.37 <.0001   4.12 61.46 <.0001 
Number of chronic conditions 
              
 
0-1 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
4-Feb 0.37 1.44 <.0001 
 
0.15 1.16 0.066 
 
0.13 1.14 <.0001 
 
-0.18 0.83 0.105 
  4+ 0.73 2.08 <.0001   0.38 1.47 <.0001   0.23 1.26 <.0001   0.31 1.36 0.059 
CCI 




























None Ref – 
  
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.40 1.50 <.0001 
 
0.24 1.28 <.0001 
 
0.19 1.21 <.0001 
 
2.58 13.18 <.0001 
  3+ 0.43 1.54 <.0001   0.32 1.38 0.000   0.36 1.43 <.0001   1.36 3.89 <.0001 
ADLs 
               
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.30 1.35 0.0001 
 
0.26 1.29 0.020 
 
0.23 1.26 <.0001 
 
0.54 1.72 <.0001 
  3+ 0.59 1.81 <.0001   0.34 1.40 0.029   0.49 1.63 <.0001   1.18 3.25 <.0001 
IADLs 
               
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.15 1.17 0.038 
 
0.09 1.09 0.100 
 
0.26 1.29 <.0001 
 
1.31 3.72 <.0001 
  3+ 0.10 1.10 0.426   -0.05 0.95 0.523   0.15 1.16 0.001   1.58 4.84 <.0001 
BMI, kg/m2 
               
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  -0.06 0.94 0.338 
 
0.07 1.08 0.113 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.497 
 
-0.09 0.92 0.346 
  ≥30.0 0.09 1.10 0.207   0.01 1.01 0.897   0.01 1.01 0.669   -1.04 0.35 <.0001 
Smoking 
               
 
Never Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Past 0.20 1.22 0.002 
 
0.01 1.01 0.823 
 
0.08 1.09 0.000 
 
0.29 1.34 0.001 
  Current -0.05 0.95 0.629   -0.13 0.88 0.072   -0.16 0.86 0.000   1.17 3.22 <.0001 
Care-seeking attitudes 
               
 
Avoid going to a physician 
              
 
  Yes -0.21 0.81 0.003 
 
-0.13 0.88 0.010 
 
-0.20 0.82 <.0001 
 
0.44 1.55 0.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel 
bad 
              
 
  Yes 0.15 1.16 0.014 
 
0.12 1.13 0.004 
 
0.08 1.09 0.000 
 
-0.54 0.58 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others  
                           
 
  Yes 0.12 1.13 0.141 
 
0.29 1.34 0.143 
 
0.14 1.15 <.0001 
 



























    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick                               
 
  Yes 0.10 1.11 0.110 
 
-0.004 1.00 0.935 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.07 
 
-1.39 0.25 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
               
 
  Yes -0.05 0.95 0.347 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.615 
 
0.05 1.06 0.009 
 
-0.13 0.88 0.066 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref –     Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
               
 
Number of primary 
physicians -0.57 0.57 0.004 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.237 
 
0.00 1.00 0.953 
 
-2.20 0.11 <.0001 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.01 1.01 0.631 
 
0.01 1.01 0.284 
 
0.00 1.00 0.984 
 
0.02 1.03 0.420 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.01 1.01 0.074 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.057 
 
0.00 1.00 0.660 
 
-0.09 0.91 <.0001 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.03 0.97 0.255 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.630 
 
-0.04 0.96 <.0001 
 
-0.32 0.73 <.0001 
  
Education higher than 
high school 0.01 1.01 0.082   0.01 1.01 0.006   0.001 1.00 0.580   0.08 1.08 <.0001 
Calendar year 
               
 
2006 Ref Ref – 
 




Ref Ref – 
 
2007 0.03 1.03 0.767 
 
0.17 1.18 0.014 
 
0.06 1.06 0.108 
 
-0.39 0.68 0.001 
 
2008 0.02 1.02 0.842 
 
0.11 1.12 0.099 
 
0.12 1.13 0.001 
 
0.95 2.59 <.0001 
 
2009 -0.01 0.99 0.892 
 
0.03 1.03 0.670 
 
0.10 1.11 0.005 
 
0.43 1.54 0.0004 
 
2010 -0.05 0.95 0.592   0.25 1.29 0.0003   0.05 1.05 0.221   1.18 3.25 <.0001 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson 
Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using the 
toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking 
medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, annual costs of health care services (including prescription drugs) 







Table 5.11 Naïve Model: Effects of PDPs on the Healthcare Expenditures (Continued)  
Characteristics 
All Med. Services   Prescriptions   Total Healthcare 
Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p value 
Part D enrollment 
           
 
PDPs 0.230 1.26 <.0001 
 
0.17 1.19 <.0001 
 
0.22 1.25 <.0001 
  MA-PDs Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
           
 
65-75 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 0.10 1.10 0.0001 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.406 
 
0.05 1.05 0.005 
  >85 -0.04 0.96 0.234   -0.05 0.95 0.077   -0.06 0.94 0.016 
Sex 
           
 
Male Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  Female -0.03 0.97 0.335   0.10 1.11 <.0001   0.01 1.01 0.6120 
Race/ethnicity 
           
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.24 0.79 <.0001 
 
-0.20 0.82 <.0001 
 
-0.23 0.80 <.0001 
 
Hispanics -0.08 0.93 0.083 
 
-0.07 0.94 0.059 
 
-0.07 0.93 0.016 
  Non-Hispanic others -0.30 0.74 <.0001   -0.06 0.94 0.129   -0.19 0.83 0.002 
Marriage 
           
 
Married Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.16 1.17 0.045 
 
0.01 1.01 0.854 
 
0.09 1.09 0.087 
 
Divorced/separated 0.05 1.05 0.545 
 
-0.03 0.97 0.674 
 
0.02 1.02 0.703 
  Never married -0.13 0.88 0.197   -0.04 0.96 0.618   -0.08 0.92 0.228 
Living conditions 
           
 
Alone Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.19 1.20 0.019 
 
0.01 1.01 0.831 
 
0.11 1.11 0.043 
 
With children 0.13 1.14 0.001 
 
0.020 1.02 0.612 
 
0.07 1.08 0.003 
  With others 0.13 1.14 0.012   0.05 1.05 0.236   0.08 1.08 0.026 
Education level 
           
 
< high school -0.12 0.89 0.001 
 
0.00 1.00 0.988 
 
-0.06 0.94 0.007 
 
High school/GED Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 








All Med. Services   Prescriptions   Total Healthcare 
Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p value 
Annual income  
           
 
<$25,000 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  ≥$25,000 0.08 1.08 0.008   0.12 1.13 <.0001   0.08 1.08 0.000 
LIS                       
 
Yes -0.18 0.83 <.0001 
 
0.23 1.26 <.0001 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.415 
  No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
MSA 
           
 
Yes Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  No -0.08 0.93 0.026   0.05 1.05 0.062   -0.04 0.96 0.117 
Census region 
           
 
Northeast Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest -0.06 0.94 0.135 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.448 
 
-0.05 0.95 0.045 
 
South -0.13 0.88 0.001 
 
0.03 1.03 0.329 
 
-0.08 0.93 0.003 
  West -0.25 0.78 <.0001   -0.12 0.89 0.000   -0.21 0.81 <.0001 
Other RX coverage 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Public -0.02 0.98 0.549 
 
0.23 1.26 <.0001 
 
0.07 1.07 0.007 
  Private/self-purchased 0.06 1.06 0.357   0.13 1.14 0.009   0.08 1.09 0.050 
Self-perceived health status 
           
 
Excellent Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.10 1.10 0.005 
 
0.27 1.32 <.0001 
 
0.15 1.16 <.0001 
 
Good 0.30 1.35 <.0001 
 
0.42 1.53 <.0001 
 
0.33 1.40 <.0001 
 
Fair 0.47 1.60 <.0001 
 
0.59 1.80 <.0001 
 
0.50 1.65 <.0001 
  Poor 0.59 1.80 <.0001   0.66 1.93 <.0001   0.60 1.81 <.0001 
Number of chronic conditions 
           
 
0-1 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
4-Feb 0.18 1.20 <.0001 
 
0.31 1.36 <.0001 
 
0.22 1.24 <.0001 
  4+ 0.39 1.48 <.0001   0.54 1.72 <.0001   0.42 1.53 <.0001 
CCI 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.28 1.32 <.0001 
 
0.24 1.27 <.0001 
 








All Med. Services   Prescriptions   Total Healthcare 
Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p value 
  3+ 0.44 1.56 <.0001   0.29 1.34 <.0001   0.36 1.43 <.0001 
ADLs 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.26 1.30 <.0001 
 
0.05 1.05 0.045 
 
0.18 1.20 <.0001 
  3+ 0.49 1.64 <.0001   0.10 1.10 0.009   0.35 1.42 <.0001 
IADLs 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.18 1.20 <.0001 
 
0.11 1.12 <.0001 
 
0.15 1.16 <.0001 
  3+ 0.11 1.11 0.027   0.15 1.17 0.000   0.11 1.12 0.001 
BMI, kg/m2 
           
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  -0.04 0.96 0.122 
 
0.09 1.10 <.0001 
 
0.00 1.00 0.971 
  ≥30.0 -0.01 0.99 0.861   0.10 1.11 <.0001   0.03 1.03 0.187 
Smoking 
           
 
Never Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Past 0.10 1.11 0.0002 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.732 
 
0.05 1.06 0.001 
  Current -0.12 0.89 0.004   -0.13 0.88 0.000   -0.10 0.90 0.000 
Care-seeking attitudes 
           
 
Avoid going to a physician 
           
 
  Yes -0.19 0.83 <.0001 
 
-0.21 0.81 <.0001 
 
-0.18 0.84 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
          
 
  Yes 0.11 1.11 <.0001 
 
0.10 1.10 <.0001 
 
0.10 1.11 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than 
others                       
 
  Yes 0.16 1.17 <.0001 
 
0.09 1.10 0.000 
 
0.12 1.13 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick                       
 
  Yes 0.00 1.00 0.977 
 
-0.010 0.99 0.723 
 
-0.01 1.00 0.781 








All Med. Services   Prescriptions   Total Healthcare 
Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p-value   Est. IR p value 
 
Same physician>5 years 
           
 
  Yes 0.00 1.00 0.951 
 
0.01 1.01 0.594 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.508 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
           
 
Number of primary physicians -0.21 0.81 0.005 
 
0.00 1.00 0.997 
 
-0.13 0.88 0.008 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.00 1.00 0.643 
 
0.00 1.00 0.623 
 
0.00 1.00 0.523 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.01 1.01 0.103 
 
0.01 1.01 0.017 
 
0.01 1.01 0.008 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.04 0.96 0.000 
 
0.00 1.00 0.693 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.001 
  
Education higher than high 
school 0.01 1.01 0.010   0.00 1.00 0.260   0.005 1.00 0.003 
Calendar year 
           
 
2006 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2007 0.05 1.05 0.238 
 
0.02 1.02 0.536 
 
0.04 1.04 0.144 
 
2008 0.08 1.08 0.051 
 
0.04 1.05 0.155 
 
0.07 1.07 0.012 
 
2009 0.03 1.03 0.427 
 
0.15 1.16 <.0001 
 
0.08 1.08 0.003 
 
2010 0.05 1.05 0.189   0.12 1.13 0.0001   0.08 1.09 0.002 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, 
Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, 
walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, 
housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as 
weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, annual costs of health care services (including 







medical services (IR=1.26, p<0.0001). Additionally, PDPs were associated with 20% 
higher in prescription drugs (IR=1.20, p<0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees.  As a 
result, PDP enrollees had 25% higher healthcare expenditures than MA-PD enrollees 
(IR=1.25, p<0.0001). 
The results also reveal various demo-socioeconomics and clinical factors that 
were significantly associated with the healthcare expenditures. The costs of outpatient 
care were associated with various factors, including race/ethnicity, annual income, MSA, 
CCI, ADLs, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, ADLs, IADLs, 
and care-seeking attitudes. For costs of outpatient care, the statistically significant factors 
include age, race/ethnicity, annual income, MSA, census region, self-perceived health 
status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, self-perceived health status, number of 
chronic conditions, ADLs, and care-seeking attitudes. For the costs of doctor’s office 
visits, the statistically significant factors include age, Race/Ethnicity, living conditions, 
education, annual income, LIS status, census region, self-perceived health status, number 
of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, smoking, care-seeking attitudes and 
environment factors. For the costs of other medical services, the statistically significant 
factors include age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, living conditions, education, 
income, MSA, census region, having other RX coverage, number of chronic conditions, 
CCI, ADLs, IADLs, BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For 
the costs of all type of medical services, the statistically significant factors include age, 
race/ethnicity, marriage, living conditions, education, annual income, income, LIS status, 
MSA, census region, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, 
ADLs, IADLs, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For the costs of 
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prescription drugs, the statistically significant factors include sex, race/ethnicity, 
education, annual income, LIS status, census region, having other RX coverage, self-
perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, BMI, 
smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For the total healthcare costs 
(including both medical services and prescription drugs, the statistically significant 
factors include age, race/ethnicity, living conditions, education, LIS status, annual 
income, census region, having other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of 
chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and 
environment factors. 
5.3.3 IV Model: results for healthcare expenditures 
First stage of IV 
To test the assumption of IV, several model specification tests were performed 
(Table 5.12). First, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests were performed to access whether 
endogeneity exists between type of Part D plans and outcome measures. The results for 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that type of Part D plan is endogenous for the 
outcome measures, only except the costs for other medical services. Second, since 
multiple instruments were used in this analysis, Hansen's tests of overidentifying were 
performed to evaluate the validity of instruments. The results indicate that we cannot 
reject the hypotheses that the instruments are valid. Third, the F statistics for instruments 
is greater than 10, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. 





























(p = 0.11) 13.91 
Medical Providers 
5.83 
(p = 0.016) 
3.66 




(p = 0.78) 
2.70 




(p = 0.015) 
4.02 
(p = 0.13) 13.91 
Pharmacy claims 
2.00 
(p = 0.016) 
0.46 
(p = 0.79) 13.91 
Total Health costs 
5.62 
(p = 0.018) 
2.40 
(p = 0.31) 13.91 
 
Second stage of IV model: healthcare expenditures 
Table 5.13 summarizes the results for the effects of PDP on health care costs in 
2SRI models. The results indicate that PDP enrollees had similar costs for inpatient care 
(IR=1.37, p=0.074) than MA-PD enrollees. However, PDP enrollees had 48% higher 
costs for outpatient care (IR=1.48, p=0.001), 54% higher costs of physician’s office 
(IR=1.54, p<0.0001), and 18% higher costs of prescription drugs (IR=1.18, p=0.004), 
compared to MA-PD enrollees. Consequently, PDPs was associated with 39% higher 
costs for medical services (IR=1.39, p<0.0001) and 30% higher costs for healthcare 
(IR=1.30, p<0.0001) 
The results also reveal various demo-socioeconomics and clinical factors that 
were significantly associated with the healthcare expenditures. As shown in Table 5.13, 
for the costs of inpatient care, the statistically significant factors include age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, living conditions, LIS status, census region, self-perceived health status, 
number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, smoking, care-seeking attitudes and 
 
 
Table 5.13 IV Model: Effects of PDPs on the Healthcare Expenditures 
Characteristics 
Hospital   Outpatient   Physician's office 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p value 
Residual from 1st stage -0.19 0.82 0.295   -0.31 0.73 0.013   -0.03 0.97 0.675 
Part D enrollment 
           
 
PDPs 0.31 1.37 0.074 
 
0.39 1.48 0.001 
 
0.43 1.54 <.0001 
  MA-PDs Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
           
 
65-75 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 0.11 1.12 0.050 
 
0.02 1.02 0.695 
 
0.12 1.13 <.0001 
  >85 0.01 1.01 0.901   -0.28 0.75 <.0001   0.00 1.00 0.972 
Sex 
           
 
Male Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  Female -0.22 0.81 0.001   0.01 1.01 0.759   0.09 1.09 0.0002 
Race/ethnicity 
           
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.10 0.91 0.329 
 
-0.23 0.80 0.002 
 
-0.39 0.68 <.0001 
 
Hispanics -0.02 0.98 0.821 
 
-0.33 0.72 <.0001 
 
-0.08 0.93 0.057 
  Non-Hispanic others -0.26 0.78 0.035   -0.43 0.65 <.0001   -0.34 0.71 <.0001 
Marriage 
           
 
Married Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.23 1.26 0.185 
 
0.01 1.01 0.958 
 
0.13 1.14 0.056 
 
Divorced/separated -0.01 0.99 0.949 
 
-0.04 0.97 0.790 
 
0.10 1.11 0.155 
  Never married -0.41 0.66 0.073   -0.13 0.88 0.406   0.06 1.06 0.533 
Living conditions 
           
 
Alone Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.20 1.22 0.274 
 
0.13 1.14 0.318 
 
0.17 1.19 0.012 
 
With children 0.26 1.30 0.002 
 
0.030 1.03 0.653 
 
0.04 1.04 0.243 
  With others 0.13 1.14 0.256   0.06 1.07 0.430   0.11 1.12 0.017 
Education level 
           
 
< high school -0.10 0.91 0.232 
 
-0.10 0.91 0.094 
 
-0.15 0.86 <.0001 
 
High school/GED Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 








Hospital   Outpatient   Physician's office 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p value 
  >high school 0.10 1.11 0.097   -0.04 0.96 0.392   0.20 1.22 <.0001 
Annual income  
           
 
<$25,000 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  ≥$25,000 -0.12 0.88 0.053   0.22 1.24 <.0001   0.12 1.12 <.0001 
LIS                       
 
Yes -0.21 0.81 0.012 
 
-0.12 0.89 0.044 
 
-0.25 0.78 <.0001 
  No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
MSA 
           
 
Yes Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  No 0.12 1.12 0.232   -0.45 0.64 <.0001   0.04 1.04 0.261 
Census region 
           
 
Northeast Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest -0.12 0.89 0.173 
 
-0.05 0.95 0.418 
 
0.01 1.01 0.745 
 
South -0.28 0.75 0.002 
 
-0.10 0.91 0.116 
 
0.02 1.02 0.667 
  West -0.30 0.74 0.001   -0.17 0.85 0.012   -0.16 0.85 <.0001 
Other RX coverage 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Public -0.02 0.98 0.835 
 
-0.06 0.94 0.349 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.231 
  Private/self-purchased -0.13 0.88 0.370   0.15 1.16 0.151   0.05 1.05 0.374 
Self-perceived health status 
           
 
Excellent Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.17 1.19 0.036 
 
0.07 1.07 0.224 
 
0.06 1.06 0.071 
 
Good 0.45 1.57 <.0001 
 
0.27 1.31 <.0001 
 
0.20 1.22 <.0001 
 
Fair 0.73 2.08 <.0001 
 
0.39 1.48 <.0001 
 
0.28 1.32 <.0001 
  Poor 1.03 2.79 <.0001   0.25 1.28 0.015   0.31 1.37 <.0001 
Number of chronic conditions 
           
 
0-1 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
4-Feb 0.35 1.42 <.0001 
 
0.04 1.04 0.452 
 
0.13 1.14 <.0001 
  4+ 0.73 2.07 <.0001   0.16 1.17 0.030   0.23 1.26 <.0001 
CCI 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 








Hospital   Outpatient   Physician's office 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p value 
 
2-Jan 0.42 1.52 <.0001 
 
0.37 1.46 <.0001 
 
0.19 1.21 <.0001 
  3+ 0.44 1.56 <.0001   0.69 2.00 <.0001   0.36 1.43 <.0001 
ADLs 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.30 1.35 <.0001 
 
0.24 1.28 <.0001 
 
0.23 1.25 <.0001 
  3+ 0.56 1.76 <.0001   0.31 1.37 <.0001   0.49 1.63 <.0001 
IADLs 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.14 1.15 0.035 
 
0.08 1.08 0.109 
 
0.26 1.29 <.0001 
  3+ 0.09 1.10 0.404   -0.08 0.93 0.322   0.15 1.16 0.001 
BMI, kg/m2 
           
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  -0.07 0.93 0.254 
 
0.07 1.07 0.106 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.472 
  ≥30.0 0.08 1.08 0.249   0.00 1.00 0.932   0.01 1.01 0.670 
Smoking 
           
 
Never Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Past 0.19 1.21 0.001 
 
0.02 1.02 0.636 
 
0.08 1.09 0.000 
  Current -0.05 0.95 0.600   -0.13 0.88 0.053   -0.16 0.86 <.0001 
Care-seeking attitudes 
           
 
Avoid going to a physician 
           
 
  Yes -0.21 0.81 0.001 
 
-0.13 0.88 0.006 
 
-0.20 0.82 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
         
 
  Yes 0.16 1.17 0.005 
 
0.13 1.14 0.001 
 
0.08 1.09 0.000 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than 
others                       
 
  Yes 0.12 1.13 0.094 
 
0.30 1.35 <.0001 
 
0.13 1.14 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick                       
 
  Yes 0.11 1.11 0.064 
 
- 0.99 0.863 
 








Hospital   Outpatient   Physician's office 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p value 
0.010 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
           
 
  Yes -0.06 0.94 0.219 
 
-0.03 0.97 0.451 
 
0.05 1.06 0.009 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
           
 
Number of primary physicians -0.59 0.55 0.001 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.206 
 
0.01 1.01 0.929 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.01 1.01 0.628 
 
0.01 1.01 0.367 
 
0.00 1.00 0.958 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.02 1.02 0.029 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.187 
 
0.00 1.00 0.598 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.03 0.97 0.216 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.517 
 
-0.04 0.96 <.0001 
  Education higher than high school 0.01 1.01 0.040   0.01 1.01 0.003   0.001 1.00 0.585 
Calendar year 
           
 
2006 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2007 0.02 1.02 0.796 
 
0.14 1.15 0.034 
 
0.06 1.06 0.115 
 
2008 0.02 1.02 0.865 
 
0.08 1.09 0.190 
 
0.12 1.13 0.000 
 
2009 -0.01 0.99 0.884 
 
0.01 1.01 0.867 
 
0.10 1.10 0.004 
 
2010 -0.06 0.94 0.504   0.22 1.25 0.0010   0.04 1.04 0.229 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, 
Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in 
and out of a chair, walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, 
shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters 
independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. In the 2SRI Model, the instrumental variables are the county-level PDP penetration, percent of white collar job and State 










Table 5.13 IV Model: Effects of PDPs on the Healthcare Expenditures (Continued) 
Characteristics 





Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
Residual from 1st stage -0.11 0.89 0.154   0.01 1.01 0.816   -0.06 0.94 0.31 
Part D enrollment 
           
 
PDPs 0.33 1.39 <.0001 
 
0.16 1.18 0.004 
 
0.27 1.30 <.0001 
  MA-PDs Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
           
 
65-75 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 0.10 1.10 0.0001 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.334 
 
0.06 1.06 0.004 
  >85 -0.05 0.95 0.183   -0.05 0.95 0.054   -0.05 0.95 0.065 
Sex 
           
 
Male Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  Female -0.03 0.97 0.252   0.10 1.11 <.0001   0.02 1.02 0.306 
Race/ethnicity 
           
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.23 0.80 <.0001 
 
-0.21 0.81 <.0001 
 
-0.22 0.80 <.0001 
 
Hispanics -0.07 0.93 0.112 
 
-0.07 0.93 0.037 
 
-0.07 0.93 0.025 
  Non-Hispanic others -0.30 0.74 <.0001   -0.06 0.94 0.103   -0.19 0.83 <.0001 
Marriage 
           
 
Married Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.15 1.17 0.044 
 
0.01 1.01 0.846 
 
0.09 1.10 0.108 
 
Divorced/separated 0.05 1.05 0.546 
 
-0.03 0.97 0.644 
 
0.02 1.02 0.726 
  Never married -0.13 0.87 0.170   -0.04 0.96 0.592   -0.08 0.92 0.270 
Living conditions 
           
 
Alone Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.19 1.21 0.015 
 
0.01 1.01 0.820 
 
0.11 1.12 0.049 
 
With children 0.13 1.14 0.0004 
 
0.01 1.01 0.600 
 
0.07 1.07 0.009 
  With others 0.13 1.14 0.008   0.04 1.05 0.233   0.09 1.09 0.022 
Education level 
           
 
< high school -0.12 0.89 0.001 
 
0.00 1.00 0.962 
 
-0.07 0.93 0.006 
 
High school/GED Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 













Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
  >high school 0.12 1.13 <.0001   0.11 1.12 <.0001   0.12 1.13 <.0001 
Annual income  
           
 
<$25,000 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  ≥$25,000 0.07 1.07 0.014   0.12 1.13 <.0001   0.09 1.09 0.000 
LIS                       
 
Yes -0.20 0.81 <.0001 
 
0.22 1.25 <.0001 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.173 
  No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
MSA 
           
 
Yes Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
  No -0.04 0.96 0.282   0.05 1.05 0.114   -0.02 0.98 0.527 
Census region 
           
 
Northeast Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest -0.07 0.94 0.088 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.439 
 
-0.05 0.95 0.074 
 
South -0.14 0.87 0.0002 
 
0.03 1.03 0.274 
 
-0.08 0.92 0.005 
  West -0.24 0.79 <.0001   -0.12 0.88 <.0001   -0.20 0.82 <.0001 
Other RX coverage 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Public -0.03 0.97 0.413 
 
0.23 1.26 <.0001 
 
0.07 1.07 0.015 
  Private/self-purchased 0.05 1.05 0.449   0.14 1.15 0.004   0.07 1.08 0.126 
Self-perceived health status 
           
 
Excellent Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.10 1.10 0.006 
 
0.27 1.31 <.0001 
 
0.16 1.18 <.0001 
 
Good 0.29 1.34 <.0001 
 
0.42 1.53 <.0001 
 
0.35 1.42 <.0001 
 
Fair 0.47 1.59 <.0001 
 
0.58 1.79 <.0001 
 
0.51 1.67 <.0001 
  Poor 0.59 1.80 <.0001   0.66 1.93 <.0001   0.61 1.84 <.0001 
Number of chronic conditions 
           
 
0-1 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
4-Feb 0.18 1.19 <.0001 
 
0.31 1.36 <.0001 
 
0.23 1.26 <.0001 
  4+ 0.39 1.48 <.0001   0.54 1.72 <.0001   0.44 1.55 <.0001 
CCI 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 













Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
2-Jan 0.28 1.32 <.0001 
 
0.24 1.28 <.0001 
 
0.26 1.29 <.0001 
  3+ 0.44 1.56 <.0001   0.30 1.35 <.0001   0.38 1.46 <.0001 
ADLs 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.26 1.30 <.0001 
 
0.05 1.05 0.028 
 
0.18 1.20 <.0001 
  3+ 0.49 1.63 <.0001   0.10 1.10 0.004   0.35 1.42 <.0001 
IADLs 
           
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-Jan 0.17 1.19 <.0001 
 
0.11 1.12 <.0001 
 
0.15 1.17 <.0001 
  3+ 0.10 1.11 0.033   0.16 1.17 <.0001   0.12 1.12 0.001 
BMI, kg/m2 
           
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  -0.04 0.96 0.098 
 
0.09 1.10 <.0001 
 
0.00 1.00 0.854 
  ≥30.0 -0.01 0.99 0.747   0.10 1.11 <.0001   0.03 1.03 0.183 
Smoking 
           
 
Never Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Past 0.10 1.11 <.0001 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.711 
 
0.06 1.06 0.002 
  Current -0.12 0.89 0.004   -0.13 0.88 <.0001   -0.12 0.89 0.000 
Care-seeking attitudes 
           
 
Avoid going to a physician 
           
 
  Yes -0.19 0.83 <.0001 
 
-0.21 0.81 <.0001 
 
-0.20 0.82 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
         
 
  Yes 0.11 1.11 <.0001 
 
0.10 1.10 <.0001 
 
0.11 1.11 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than 
others                       
 
  Yes 0.16 1.17 <.0001 
 
0.09 1.10 0.000 
 
0.14 1.15 <.0001 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick                       
 
  Yes 0.00 1.00 0.922 
 
-0.01 0.99 0.635 
 













Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
 
Est. IR p-value 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
           
 
  Yes -0.01 0.99 0.796 
 
0.01 1.01 0.574 
 
0.00 1.00 0.855 
    No Ref Ref –   Ref Ref –   Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
           
 
Number of primary physicians -0.21 0.81 0.003 
 
0.00 1.00 0.964 
 
-0.13 0.87 0.014 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.00 1.00 0.712 
 
0.00 1.00 0.563 
 
0.00 1.00 0.685 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.01 1.01 0.047 
 
0.01 1.01 0.013 
 
0.01 1.01 0.010 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.04 0.96 0.000 
 
0.00 1.00 0.662 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.003 
  Education higher than high school 0.01 1.01 0.007   0.00 1.00 0.243   0.01 1.00 0.007 
Calendar year 
           
 
2006 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2007 0.04 1.04 0.316 
 
0.02 1.02 0.430 
 
0.04 1.04 0.192 
 
2008 0.07 1.07 0.070 
 
0.05 1.05 0.100 
 
0.07 1.07 0.024 
 
2009 0.03 1.03 0.463 
 
0.15 1.17 <.0001 
 
0.08 1.08 0.006 
 
2010 0.05 1.05 0.257   0.12 1.13 <.0001   0.08 1.09 0.006 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson 
Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, 
walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, 
housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, 
calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. In the 2SRI Model, the instrumental variables are the county-level PDP penetration, percent of white collar job and State 









environment factors. For the costs of outpatient care, the statistically significant factors 
include age, race/ethnicity, annual income, LIS status, MSA and census region, CCI, 
ADLs, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, care-
seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For the costs for doctor’s office visits, the 
statistically significant factors include age, sex, race/ethnicity, living conditions, 
education, annual income, LIS status, census region, self-perceived health status, number 
of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, smoking, care-seeking attitudes and 
environment factors. For the costs of total medical services, the statistically significant 
factors include age, race/ethnicity, marital status, living conditions, education, annual 
income, LIS status, census region, self-perceived health status, number of chronic 
conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, smoking, care-seeking attitudes and environment factors. 
For the costs of prescription drugs, the statistically significant factors include sex, 
race/ethnicity, education, annual income, LIS status, census region, having other RX 
coverage, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, 
BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes and environment factors. For the total healthcare 
costs (including both medical services and prescription drugs, the statistically significant 
factors include age, race/ethnicity, living conditions, education, annual income, census 
region, having other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of chronic 
conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment 
factors. 
5.4 Results for Aim 3.1: CRN & Affordability 
The following section presents the results of cost-related nonadherence (CRN) 
and medication affordability, including the descriptive statistics, multivariable regression 
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analysis, and IV. 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.14 shows the bivariate analysis of CRN and medication affordability 
among PDPs and MA-PDs. There were no significant differences in the prevalence of 
CRN between beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and MA-PDs (12.1% vs. 11.1%; p=0.150), 
However, PDPs had higher prevalence of spending less on basic needs than MA-PDs 
(5.3% vs. 4.2%; p=0.030).  In addition, PDP enrollees had higher prevalence of using 
generic drugs (52.1% vs. 47.6%; p=0.003), obtaining free samples from the doctors 
(44.4% vs.36.4%; p<0.0001), and comparing pharmacies (17.7% vs. 14.1%; p=0.002), 
but had lower prevalence of using mail orders (16.7% vs. 22.9%; p<0.0001), compared to 
MA-PD enrollees.  
Table 5.14 CRN and Affordability among Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries 
Outcome Measures 



















Cost reduction strategies 
       
 























a. Percentages were calculated with national weights; p-value was obtained from Rao-Scott 
Chi-Square tests. 
 
5.4.2  Naïve model: CRN 
Table 5.17 demonstrates the results for the effect of PDPs on Medication 
affordability. For the purpose of easier interpretation, the following tables display Odds 
Ratio (OR), which was calculated using the equation (e
coefficient
), and the p-value of the 
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effects of PDP on the healthcare costs. 
After adjusting for demo-socioeconomic and clinical characteristics, the adjusted 
OR of having CRN among PDP enrollees was 1.00 (p=0.991), compared to MA-PD 
enrollees. The results also reveal that the likelihood of CRN was associated with various 
factors, including age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, annual income, LIS, census region, 
other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, 
ADLs, IADLs, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. 
There was no significant difference in the likelihood of spending less on basic 
needs between PDPs and MA-PDs (Table 5.17). The results also reveal that the 
likelihood of CRN was associated with various factors, including age, race/ethnicity, 
annual income, census region, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, 
ADLs, IADLs, BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. 












Part D enrollment 
       
 
PDPs -0.001 1.00 0.991 
 
-0.03 0.968 0.710 
 
MA-PDs Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
Age, years 
       
 
65-75 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
75-85 -0.30 0.74 <.0001 
 
-0.25 0.78 0.003 
 
>85 -0.85 0.43 <.0001 
 
-0.69 0.50 <.0001 
Sex 
       
 
Male Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Female 0.23 1.25 0.0002 
 
0.09 1.10 0.3135 
Race/ethnicity 
       
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.29 1.34 0.001 
 
0.41 1.50 0.001 
 
Hispanics 0.09 1.09 0.384 
 
0.06 1.06 0.699 
 
Non-Hispanic others 0.33 1.39 0.003 
 
0.25 1.29 0.110 
Marriage 
       
 
Married Ref Ref – 
 















Widowed 0.11 1.11 0.571 
 
0.01 1.01 0.979 
 
Divorced/Separated 0.38 1.46 0.055 
 
0.14 1.16 0.597 
 
Never married -0.11 0.89 0.646 
 
-0.17 0.84 0.609 
Living conditions 
       
 
Alone Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
With spouse 0.21 1.23 0.273 
 
-0.06 0.94 0.824 
 
With children -0.11 0.90 0.209 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.185 
 
With others 0.02 1.02 0.869 
 
-0.06 0.94 0.676 
Education level 
       
 
< high school -0.01 0.99 0.931 
 
0.11 1.12 0.260 
 
High school/GED Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
>high school 0.14 1.15 0.028 
 
0.11 1.12 0.270 
Annual income 
       
 
<$25,000 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
≥$25,000 -0.34 0.71 <.0001 
 
-0.65 0.52 <.0001 
LIS 
       
 
Yes -0.42 0.66 <.0001 
 
-0.05 0.95 0.609 
 
No Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
MSA 
       
 
Yes Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
No 0.04 1.04 0.638 
 
0.20 1.22 0.079 
Census region 
       
 
Northeast Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Midwest 0.28 1.33 0.003 
 
0.25 1.29 0.076 
 
South 0.40 1.50 <.0001 
 
0.52 1.68 0.000 
 
West 0.15 1.16 0.121 
 
0.09 1.10 0.544 
Other RX coverage 
       
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Public -0.16 0.85 0.064 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.187 
 
Private/self-purchased -0.39 0.68 0.021 
 
0.14 1.15 0.554 
Self-perceived health status 
       
 
Excellent Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Very good 0.27 1.31 0.005 
 
0.10 1.10 0.558 
 
Good 0.37 1.45 0.000 
 
0.24 1.28 0.121 
 
Fair 0.33 1.39 0.002 
 
0.49 1.63 0.004 
 
Poor 0.69 1.99 <.0001 
 
0.60 1.83 0.002 
Number of chronic conditions 
       
 
0-1 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
2-4 0.24 1.27 0.003 
 
0.20 1.22 0.111 
 
4+ 0.37 1.45 0.0002 
 
0.54 1.71 0.0004 
CCI 
       
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
1-2 0.18 1.19 0.040 
 















3+ 0.18 1.20 0.059 
 
0.26 1.29 0.096 
ADLs 
       
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
1-2 0.29 1.33 <.0001 
 
0.26 1.29 0.007 
 
3+ 0.15 1.16 0.151 
 
0.40 1.49 0.002 
IADLs 
       
 
None Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
1-2 0.30 1.35 <.0001 
 
0.20 1.22 0.031 
 
3+ 0.20 1.22 0.059 
 
0.24 1.28 0.070 
BMI, kg/m2 
       
 
<25.0 Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9 -0.001 1.00 0.987 
 
-0.019 0.981 0.843 
 
≥30.0 0.02 1.02 0.806 
 
0.19 1.21 0.049 
Smoking 
       
 
Never Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Past 0.06 1.07 0.264 
 
-0.20 0.82 0.018 
 
Current 0.09 1.09 0.322 
 
0.18 1.19 0.155 
Care-seeking attitude 
       
 
Avoid going to a physician 
      
 
Yes 0.29 1.34 <.0001 
 
0.24 1.27 0.009 
 
No Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
    
 
Yes -0.12 0.88 0.031 
 
0.16 1.17 0.055 
 
No Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
    
 
Yes 0.36 1.43 <.0001 
 
0.69 2.00 <.0001 
 
No Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
       
 
Yes 0.24 1.26 <.0001 
 
0.29 1.33 0.001 
 
No Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
      
 
Yes -0.07 0.93 0.171 
 
-0.08 0.93 0.315 
 
No Ref Ref – 
 
Ref Ref – 
Environment factors 
       
 
Number of primary 
physicians -0.17 0.84 0.295 
 
-0.31 0.73 0.194 
 
Number of hospital beds 0.03 1.03 0.043 
 
0.07 1.07 0.005 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.002 1.00 0.788 
 
-0.033 0.967 0.002 
 
Unemployment rate -0.05 0.95 0.022 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.575 
 
Education higher than high 
school -0.002 1.00 0.653 
 
-0.021 0.980 0.007 
Calendar year 
       
 
2006 Ref Ref – 
 















2007 -0.11 0.89 0.192 
 
0.21 1.24 0.097 
 
2008 -0.23 0.80 0.009 
 
0.08 1.08 0.561 
 
2009 -0.18 0.84 0.039 
 
-0.18 0.83 0.182 
 
2010 -0.15 0.86 0.092 
 
0.02 1.02 0.857 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes 
bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using the toilet; 
IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing 
food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters 
independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in 
meters squared. 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. 
 
5.4.3 IV model: CRN 
First Stage of IV 
To test the assumption of IV, several model specification tests were performed. 
As shown in Table 5.16, the results for Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that type of 
Part D plan is endogenous for medication affordability (p = 0.035), but not for CRN 
(p=0.23). Second, since multiple instruments were used in this analysis, Hansen's tests of 
overidentifying were performed to evaluate the validity of instruments. The results 
indicate that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the instruments are valid (CRN, p=0.49; 
Affordability, p=0.78). Third, the F statistics for instruments is 13.91, which is greater 
than 10, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. 
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 0.48 




Table 5.17 shows that PDP enrollees had 69% higher likelihood of spending less 
on basic needs (OR=1.69, p=0.042). The results also reveal that the likelihood of CRN 
was associated with various factors, including age, race/ethnicity, annual income, MSA, 
census region, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, ADLs, IADLs, 
BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. 
Table 5.17 IV Model: Effect of PDPs on Medication Affordability 
Characteristics Estimate SE OR 
p-
value 
Residual from the first stage -0.63 0.27 0.54 0.022 
Part D enrollment 
    
 
PDPs 0.52 0.258 1.69 0.042 
  MA-PDs Ref – Ref – 
Age, years 
    
 
65-75 Ref – Ref – 
 
75-85 -0.24 0.09 0.79 0.006 
 
>85 -0.70 0.13 0.50 <.0001 
Sex 
    
 
Male Ref – Ref – 
 
Female 0.08 0.09 1.08 0.4167 
Race/ethnicity 
    
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref – Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.48 0.13 1.61 0.0001 
 
Hispanics 0.10 0.14 1.10 0.505 
  Non-Hispanic others 0.22 0.16 1.24 0.167 
Marriage 
    
 
Married Ref – Ref – 
 
Widowed -0.02 0.26 0.98 0.937 
 
Divorced/separated 0.14 0.27 1.15 0.618 
  Never married -0.21 0.34 0.81 0.532 
Living conditions 
    
 
Alone Ref – Ref – 
 
With spouse -0.06 0.27 0.94 0.829 
 
With children -0.15 0.12 0.86 0.205 
  With others -0.04 0.15 0.96 0.798 
Education level 
    
 
< high school 0.11 0.10 1.11 0.297 
 
High school/GED Ref – Ref – 
  >high school 0.09 0.10 1.09 0.361 
Annual income  
    
 
<$25,000 Ref – Ref – 
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Characteristics Estimate SE OR 
p-
value 
  ≥$25,000 -0.67 0.11 0.51 <.0001 
LIS 
    
 
Yes -0.15 0.11 0.86 0.164 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
MSA 
    
 
Yes Ref – Ref – 
  No 0.36 0.13 1.43 0.007 
Census region 
    
 
Northeast Ref – Ref – 
 
Midwest 0.19 0.14 1.21 0.185 
 
South 0.43 0.14 1.54 0.002 
  West 0.14 0.15 1.15 0.364 
Other RX coverage 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Public -0.19 0.12 0.82 0.095 
  Private/self-purchased 0.07 0.23 1.07 0.762 
Self-perceived health status 
    
 
Excellent Ref – Ref – 
 
Very good 0.09 0.16 1.09 0.594 
 
Good 0.23 0.16 1.26 0.136 
 
Fair 0.49 0.17 1.63 0.004 
 
Poor 0.59 0.20 1.81 0.002 
Number of chronic conditions 
    
 
0-1 Ref – Ref – 
 
2-4 0.20 0.13 1.22 0.116 
  4+ 0.55 0.15 1.72 0.0004 
CCI 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.19 0.14 1.21 0.182 
  3+ 0.24 0.15 1.27 0.128 
ADLs 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.26 0.10 1.29 0.007 
  3+ 0.38 0.13 1.47 0.003 
IADLs 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.18 0.09 1.20 0.050 




    
 
<25.0 Ref – Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  -0.03 0.09 0.97 0.750 
  ≥30.0 0.18 0.10 1.20 0.059 
Smoking 
    
 
Never Ref – Ref – 
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Past -0.19 0.09 0.83 0.028 
  Current 0.19 0.12 1.21 0.123 
Care-seeking attitudes 
    
 
Avoid going to a physician 
    
 
  Yes 0.23 0.09 1.26 0.010 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
    
 
  Yes 0.16 0.08 1.17 0.053 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
    
 
  Yes 0.69 0.09 1.99 <.0001 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
    
 
  Yes 0.29 0.09 1.33 0.001 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
    
 
  Yes -0.10 0.08 0.91 0.208 
    No Ref – Ref – 
Environment factors 
    
 
Number of primary physicians -0.30 0.24 0.74 0.214 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.06 0.02 1.06 0.009 
 
Percent under Poverty -0.03 0.01 0.97 0.008 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.02 0.03 0.98 0.605 
  Education higher than high school -0.02 0.01 0.98 0.009 
Calendar year 
    
 
2006 Ref – Ref – 
 
2007 0.17 0.13 1.18 0.202 
 
2008 0.03 0.13 1.03 0.806 
 
2009 -0.21 0.14 0.81 0.134 
  2010 -0.02 0.14 0.98 0.876 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities 
of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a 
chair, walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, 
including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, 
taking medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass 
index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. In the 2SRI Model, the instrumental variables are the county-level PDP penetration, 
percent of white collar job and State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs for seniors 
in each study year.  
5.5 Results for Aim 3.2: Medication Adherence among Diabetic Beneficiaries 
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socioeconomic characteristics, health conditions, and medication adherence among 
Medicare beneficiaries diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. 
5.5.1 Study sample 
The study sample for Aim 3.2 was limited to individuals in Aim 2 with diagnoses 
of type 2 diabetes. After excluding individual without diabetes, the final sample size was  
1,968 individuals in PDP group, and 1,234 in MA-PD group. The following figure 5.2 
demonstrate the sample selection flow chart for Aim 3.2 in this dissertation. 
5.5.1.1. Demo-socioeconomic and clinical characteristics 
The demo-socioeconomic characteristics and health conditions between PDPs vs. 
MA-PDs were compared in Table 5.18. PDP enrollees were more likely to be female 
(60.8% vs. 54.2%; p=0.010), non-Hispanic black (10.0% vs. 13.4%; p<0.0001), 
compared to MA-PD enrollees. Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs were less likely 
to be married (45.1% vs. 53.9%; p=0.001), and more likely to be living alone (35.4% vs. 
28.1%; p=0.007). PDP enrollees had lower education levels (more than high school or  
 GED, 25.8% vs. 29.5%; p=0.039) than MA-PD enrollees, while PDP enrollees had lower 
annual income (more than $25,000, 34.2% vs. 41.2%; p=0.005), and were more likely to 
receive low income subsidy (41.4% vs. 22.5%; p<0.0001). Beneficiaries enrolled in 
PDPs were less likely to live in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (67.3% vs. 91.9%; 
p<0.0001) and west census region (15.4% vs. 21.3%; p<0.0001). Compared to 
beneficiaries enrolled in MA-PDs, PDP enrollees were more likely to have other 
prescription drug coverage (19.5% vs. 12.7%; p=0.019). Specifically, PDP enrollees were 
more likely to have public prescription drug coverage (19.1% vs. 13.1%).  
Compared to beneficiaries enrolled in MA-PDs, PDP enrollees had lower self-
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perceived health status (excellent health, 6.6% vs. 8.3%; very good health, 20.5% vs. 
28.3%; good health, 37.7% vs. 36.6%; fair health, 25.2% vs. 20.6%; poor health, 10.0% 
vs. 6.2%; p<0.0001). However, PDP enrollees were more likely to have more than 4 
chronic conditions (42.4% vs. 31.1%; p<0.0001), with Charlson Comorbidity Index 
scores ≥ 3 (76.6% vs. 67.1%; p=0.0001), with three or more Activities of daily living 
(ADLs) disabilities (14.2% vs. 9.3%; p=0.001), and with three or more Instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs) limitations (11.4% vs. 9.8%; p<0.0001). Finally, PDP 
enrollees were more likely to have the same physicians for more than five years (59.9% 
vs. 51.4%; p=0.003). 
Table 5.18 Demo-Socioeconomic Characteristics and Health Conditions 
among Diabetic Beneficiaries 
Characteristics 











      
0.488 
 





75-85 817 38.9 
 
524 40.4 
    >85 261 10.4   143 8.8    
Sex 
      
0.010 
 

































  Non-Hispanic Others 126 7.1   55 4.4     
Marriage 
      
0.001 
 














  Never married 62 3.4   25 2.1     
Living conditions 
      
0.007 
 















































  >high school 458 25.8   356 29.5     










≥$25,000 619 34.2   490 41.2    
LIS 











Yes 862 41.4   288 22.5    
MSA 
      
<.0001 
 








67.3   
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9 
91.9     
Census region 
      
<.0001 
 














  West 250 14.3   377 32.0     





















  Private/self-purchased 45 2.3   27 2.5     
Self-perceived health status 
      
<.0001 
 




















Poor 201 10.0   77 6.2     
Number of chronic conditions 
      
<.0001 
 












  4+ 847 42.4   389 31.1     
CCI 
      
0.0001 
 






































  3+ 287 14.2   126 9.3     





































  ≥30.0 821 42.8   483 40.5     
Smoking 
      
0.130 
 









  Current 173 9.4   115 9.3     
Care-seeking attitudes 
       
 



























  Same physician>5 years 
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1 
59.9   647 51.4   0.003 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); MSA, Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, 
includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and 
using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, 
shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking medication, and 
managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in 
kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
a. Percentages were calculated with national weights, p-value was obtained from Rao-Scott 
Chi-Square tests 
 
5.5.1.2. Environment factors 
Table 5.19 shows environmental and healthcare system factors among diabetic 
beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and MA-PDs. PDP enrollees were more likely to reside in 
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the county with similar number of primary physicians per 1,000 capita (0.68 vs. 0.73; 
p=0.540), but live in the county with higher number of hospital beds per 1,000 capita (3.1 
vs. 3.1; p<0.0001). In addition, compared to MA-PD enrollees, PDP enrollees were more 
likely to live in the county with higher percentage of population below poverty line 
(16.8% vs. 16.7%; p<0.0001), and higher unemployment rate (6.7% vs. 6.6%; p=0.004), 
and lower percentage of college graduates (25.1% vs. 28.5%; p<0.0001). 
Table 5.19 Environment Factors among Diabetic Beneficiaries 
Characteristics 
PDPs   MA-PDs   
p-value 
mean std   mean std   




0.68 0.02   0.73 0.01    0.540 
Number of hospital beds per 
1,000 capita 
3.1 0.1   3.1 0.1    <.0001 
Percent under poverty, % 16.8 0.4   16.7 0.3    <.0001 
Unemployment rate, % 6.7 0.2   6.6 0.1    0.004 
Education higher than high 
school, % 
25.1 0.6   28.5 0.6    <.0001 
a. Primary Care includes general family medicine, general practice, general internal 
medicine and general pediatrics. 
Abbreviations: std, standard deviation. 
5.5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.20 describes compares self-reported medication use among diabetic 
beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and MA-PDs. The proportion of PDP enrollees with at 
least 1 prescription was similar to MA-PD enrollees. However, PDP enrollees had higher 
mean number of fills for anti-diabetic drugs (11.57 vs. 10.27, p=0.001), antihypertensive 






Table 5.20 Self-Reported Medication Use among Diabetic Beneficiaries 
Outcome Measures PDPs MA-PDs p-value 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1675 (85.11%) 1076 (87.20%) 0.100 





With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1799 (91.41%) 1145 (92.79%) 0.160 





With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1365 (69.36%) 886 (71.80%) 0.14 
 
No. of fills, mean±std 6.65±7.83 5.48±5.92 <.0001 
 
Table 5.21 compares medication use and adherence measured by pharmacy 
claims. The proportion of PDP enrollees with at least 1 prescription was similar to MA-
PD enrollees. However, PDP enrollees had higher mean number of fills for anti-diabetic 
drugs (9.77 vs. 8.88, p=0.002), antihypertensive drugs (15.72 vs. 13.75, p<0.0001), and 
antihyperlipidemic drugs (5.49 vs.4.55, p<0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees. 
Medication adherence measured by PDC was similar among PDP and MA-PD enrollees, 
however, PDP enrollees were more likely to be adherent (PDC≥0.80) to anti-diabetic 
drugs (34.96% vs. 29.90%, p=0.001), antihypertensive drugs (41.19% vs. 34.76%, 
p=0.002), and antihyperlipidemic drugs (23.88% vs. 16.86%, p<0.0001). 
Table 5.21 Claims-Based Medication Use and Adherence among Diabetic 
Beneficiaries 
Outcome Measures PDPs MA-PDs p-value 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1632 (82.93%) 1041 (84.36%) 0.288 
 
No. of fills, mean ± std 9.77±8.01 8.88±7.60 0.002 
 
PDC, mean ± std 0.59±0.32 0.58±0.31 0.372 
  PDC≥0.80, n (%) 688 (34.96%) 359 (29.09%) 0.001 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1758 (89.33%) 1120 (90.76%) 0.191 
 
No. of fills, mean ± std 15.72±12.23 13.75±11.81 <.0001 
 
PDC, mean ± std 0.66±0.28 0.64±0.28 0.156 
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Outcome Measures PDPs MA-PDs p-value 
  PDC≥0.80, n (%) 791 (41.19%) 429 (34.76%) 0.002 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1328 (67.48%) 847 (68.64%) 0.494 
 
No. of fills, mean ± std 5.49±5.93 4.55±4.75 <.0001 
 
PDC, mean ± std 0.45±0.37 0.43±0.35 0.192 
  PDC≥0.80, n (%) 470 (23.88%) 208 (16.86%) <.0001 
Abbreviations: std, standard deviation; PDC, Proportion of Days Covered.  
 
5.5.3 Naïve Model: Medication Adherence 
Table 5.22 presents the results for the effects of PDPs on medication adherence. 
Since PDC is continuous variable with normal distribution, OLS was used to model the 
effects of PDPs on Medication adherence (PDC) among elderly beneficiaries. As shown 
in Table 5.22, compared to MA-PDs, PDP enrollees had similar PDC to anti-diabetic 
drugs and antihyperlipidemic drugs, but had 2.7% lower PDC of antihypertensive drugs 
(p=0.016). Table 23 shows the likelihood of being adherent (PDC≥0.80) to drug 
treatments among diabetic beneficiaries. PDP enrollees had similar likelihood of being 
adherent to anti-diabetic drugs (OR=1.01, p=0.883) and antihypertensive drugs 
(OR=0.91, p=0.313), and antihyperlipidemic drugs (OR=1.21, p=0.069). 
The results also reveal that medication adherence to anti-diabetic drugs was associated 
with various factors. For adherence to anti-diabetic drugs, the statistically significant 
factors included race/ethnicity, marital status, living conditions, LIS, self-perceived 
health status, BMI, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For adherence to 
antihypertensive drugs, the statistically significant factors included age, race/ethnicity, 
living conditions, LIS, having other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of 
chronic conditions, BMI, smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For 
adherence to antihyperlipidemic drugs, the statistically significant factors included age, 
 
 
Table 5.22 Naïve Model: Effects of PDPs on Medication Adherence (PDC) 
Characteristics 
Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value 
Part D enrollment 
           
 
PDPs -0.003 0.01 0.846 
 
-0.027 0.01 0.016 
 
0.0003 0.01 0.983 
  MA-PDs Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
Age, years 
           
 
65-75 Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
75-85 0.01 0.01 0.580 
 
0.02 0.01 0.059 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.009 
  >85 -0.03 0.02 0.172   0.05 0.02 0.003   -0.10 0.02 <.0001 
Sex 
           
 
Male Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 Female -0.02 0.01 0.215   0.03 0.01 0.029   0.02 0.02 0.210 
Race/ethnicity 
   
 
   
 
   
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.02 0.02 0.324 
 
0.04 0.02 0.036 
 
-0.08 0.02 0.0003 
 
Hispanics 0.05 0.02 0.024 
 
-0.03 0.02 0.061 
 
0.01 0.02 0.805 
  Non-Hispanic others 0.02 0.03 0.357   0.02 0.02 0.391   0.003 0.03 0.924 
Marriage 
           
 
Married Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Widowed -0.09 0.04 0.024 
 
-0.04 0.03 0.245 
 
-0.06 0.05 0.175 
 
Divorced/Separated -0.08 0.04 0.061 
 
-0.02 0.04 0.632 
 
-0.06 0.05 0.245 
  Never married -0.01 0.05 0.813   -0.03 0.04 0.463   0.03 0.06 0.650 
Living conditions 
           
 
Alone Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
With spouse -0.08 0.04 0.046 
 
-0.03 0.03 0.422 
 
-0.04 0.05 0.411 
 
With children -0.04 0.02 0.031 
 
-0.04 0.02 0.011 
 
-0.01 0.02 0.617 
  With others -0.01 0.02 0.726   -0.01 0.02 0.571   0.03 0.03 0.252 
Education level 
           
 
< high school 0.03 0.02 0.051 
 
0.02 0.01 0.246 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.309 
 
High school/GED Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 








Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value 
Annual income  
           
 
<$25,000 Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 >$25,000 -0.02 0.02 0.157   0.00 0.01 0.808   0.004 0.02 0.827 
LIS 
           
 
Yes 0.05 0.02 0.001 
 
0.05 0.01 0.0002 
 
0.06 0.02 0.001 
 No Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
MSA 
           
 
Yes Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 No -0.02 0.02 0.368   0.01 0.01 0.334   0.02 0.02 0.348 
Census region 
           
 
Northeast Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Midwest 0.03 0.02 0.176 
 
0.02 0.02 0.157 
 
0.02 0.02 0.342 
 
South -0.02 0.02 0.218 
 
0.02 0.02 0.222 
 
0.02 0.02 0.351 
  West -0.03 0.02 0.141   0.00 0.02 0.878   0.002 0.02 0.926 
Other RX coverage 
           
 
None Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Public -0.03 0.02 0.1 
 
0.03 0.01 0.019 
 
0.01 0.02 0.560 
  Private/self-purchased -0.01 0.04 0.728   0.01 0.03 0.747   -0.03 0.04 0.458 
Self-perceived health Status 
           
 
Excellent Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Very good 0.05 0.02 0.040 
 
0.06 0.02 0.005 
 
0.06 0.03 0.022 
 
Good 0.05 0.02 0.045 
 
0.05 0.02 0.007 
 
0.04 0.03 0.098 
 
Fair 0.04 0.02 0.069 
 
0.08 0.02 0.0002 
 
0.05 0.03 0.098 
  Poor 0.04 0.03 0.179   0.09 0.03 0.001   0.06 0.03 0.105 
Number of chronic conditions 
           
 
0-1 Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
2-3 0.03 0.03 0.213 
 
0.28 0.02 <.0001 
 
0.09 0.03 0.003 
  4+ 0.04 0.03 0.202   0.33 0.02 <.0001   0.10 0.03 0.004 
CCI 
           
 
1-2 Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 








Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value 
ADLs 
           
 
None Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
1-2 0.015 0.01 0.286 
 
-0.003 0.01 0.821 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.183 
  3+ -0.004 0.02 0.856   -0.03 0.02 0.109   -0.01 0.02 0.661 
IADLs 
           
 
None Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
1-2 -0.03 0.01 0.058 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.108 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.210 




           
 
<25.0 Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
25.0-29.9  0.04 0.02 0.005 
 
0.04 0.01 0.001 
 
0.02 0.02 0.192 
  ≥30.0 0.08 0.02 <.0001   0.04 0.01 0.001   0.03 0.02 0.104 
Smoking 
           
 Never Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Past -0.01 0.01 0.370 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.024 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.154 
  Current 0.03 0.02 0.147   -0.04 0.02 0.025   -0.03 0.02 0.177 
Care-seeking attitudes 
           
 
Avoid going to a physician 
          
 
  Yes -0.01 0.01 0.577 
 
-0.01 0.01 0.639 
 
-0.05 0.02 0.005 
   No Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
          
 
  Yes -0.02 0.01 0.188 
 
-0.01 0.01 0.554 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.127 
   No Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
          
 
  Yes 0.02 0.01 0.178 
 
0.001 0.01 0.964 
 
0.04 0.02 0.034 
   No Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
           
 
  Yes -0.01 0.01 0.312 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.082 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.281 
   No Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
          
 
  Yes 0.03 0.01 0.008 
 
0.02 0.01 0.014 
 








Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value   Est. SE p-value 
    No Ref – –   Ref – –   Ref – – 
Environment factors 
           
 
Number of primary physicians -0.04 0.04 0.333 
 
0.03 0.03 0.369 
 
-0.01 0.04 0.725 
 
Number of hospital beds  0.003 0.004 0.435 
 
0.0001 0.003 0.983 
 
-0.0003 0.004 0.952 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.003 0.002 0.029 
 
0.001 0.001 0.422 
 
0.0004 0.002 0.831 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.01 0.005 0.234 
 
-0.01 0.004 0.047 
 
-0.01 0.005 0.299 
  Education higher than high school 0.002 0.001 0.133   -0.001 0.001 0.318   0.003 0.001 0.024 
Calendar year 
           
 
2006 Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
Ref – – 
 
2007 -0.03 0.02 0.179 
 
0.01 0.02 0.398 
 
0.01 0.02 0.571 
 
2008 -0.03 0.02 0.086 
 
-0.01 0.02 0.721 
 
0.04 0.02 0.104 
 
2009 -0.06 0.02 0.001 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.337 
 
0.05 0.02 0.032 
  2010 -0.06 0.02 0.002   -0.01 0.02 0.438   0.06 0.02 0.006 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson 
Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using the 
toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking 
medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 

















Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
Part D enrollment 
              
 
PDPs 0.01 0.09 1.01 0.883 
 
-0.09 0.09 0.91 0.313 
 
0.19 0.11 1.21 0.069 
 
MA-PDs Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
Age, years 
              
 
65-75 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
75-85 -0.13 0.09 0.88 0.149 
 
-0.03 0.09 0.97 0.733 
 
-0.06 0.10 0.94 0.557 
 
>85 -0.3 0.14 0.74 0.036 
 
0.19 0.14 1.21 0.154 
 
-0.25 0.17 0.78 0.132 
Sex 
              
 
Male Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Female -0.29 0.1 0.75 0.003 
 
-0.03 0.09 0.97 0.743 
 
-0.13 0.11 0.88 0.241 
Race/ethnicity 
              
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.05 0.14 0.96 0.743 
 
0.08 0.13 1.09 0.524 
 
-0.17 0.16 0.84 0.277 
 
Hispanics 0.14 0.14 1.15 0.324 
 
-0.01 0.14 0.99 0.935 
 
0.18 0.16 1.20 0.267 
 
Non-Hispanic others 0.47 0.17 1.61 0.007 
 
0.18 0.17 1.20 0.299 
 
0.16 0.20 1.17 0.421 
Marriage 
              
 
Married Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Widowed -0.49 0.27 0.61 0.071 
 
-0.18 0.28 0.84 0.522 
 
-0.21 0.32 0.81 0.506 
 
Divorced/Separated -0.37 0.28 0.69 0.19 
 
0.01 0.29 1.01 0.978 
 
-0.03 0.33 0.97 0.922 
 
Never married -0.13 0.35 0.88 0.712 
 
0.25 0.35 1.28 0.477 
 
0.39 0.39 1.48 0.317 
Living conditions 
              
 
Alone Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
With spouse -0.55 0.28 0.57 0.044 
 
-0.16 0.28 0.85 0.565 
 
-0.11 0.32 0.90 0.739 
 
With children -0.31 0.13 0.74 0.015 
 
-0.22 0.12 0.80 0.068 
 
-0.17 0.15 0.85 0.247 
 
With others -0.27 0.17 0.77 0.114 
 
0.002 0.16 1.00 0.988 
 
0.04 0.19 1.04 0.839 
Education level 
              
 
< high school 0.17 0.11 1.18 0.124 
 
0.13 0.11 1.14 0.235 
 
-0.01 0.12 0.99 0.930 
 
High school/GED Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
>high school -0.01 0.10 0.99 0.944 
 
0.09 0.10 1.09 0.382 
 













Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
Annual income 
              
 
<$25,000 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
>$25,000 -0.23 0.11 0.79 0.033 
 
-0.14 0.11 0.87 0.189 
 
-0.01 0.13 0.99 0.964 
LIS 
              
 
Yes 0.52 0.11 1.69 <.0001 
 
0.32 0.11 1.38 0.002 
 
0.37 0.12 1.45 0.003 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
MSA 
              
 
Yes Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
No -0.16 0.12 0.85 0.196 
 
-0.12 0.12 0.89 0.329 
 
-0.25 0.14 0.78 0.064 
Census region 
              
 
Northeast Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Midwest 0.22 0.14 1.24 0.122 
 
0.19 0.14 1.21 0.172 
 
0.24 0.16 1.28 0.125 
 
South -0.13 0.14 0.88 0.338 
 
0.13 0.13 1.13 0.345 
 
0.07 0.16 1.08 0.645 
 
West -0.47 0.15 0.62 0.002 
 
-0.34 0.15 0.71 0.021 
 
-0.39 0.18 0.68 0.028 
Other RX coverage 
              
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Public -0.05 0.12 0.95 0.687 
 
0.36 0.12 1.43 0.002 
 
0.28 0.13 1.32 0.039 
 
Private/self-purchased 0.02 0.27 1.02 0.954 
 
0.03 0.26 1.03 0.923 
 
0.27 0.29 1.31 0.354 
Self-perceived health status 
             
 
Excellent Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Very good 0.06 0.17 1.06 0.714 
 
0.61 0.18 1.85 0.001 
 
0.34 0.20 1.41 0.096 
 
Good 0.09 0.16 1.09 0.603 
 
0.50 0.17 1.65 0.003 
 
0.20 0.20 1.22 0.322 
 
Fair 0.14 0.18 1.15 0.428 
 
0.61 0.18 1.85 0.001 
 
0.17 0.21 1.18 0.431 
 
Poor -0.03 0.22 0.97 0.902 
 
0.67 0.22 1.96 0.002 
 
0.12 0.25 1.13 0.627 
Number of chronic conditions 
              
 
0-1 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
2-3 0.05 0.19 1.05 0.783 
 
0.91 0.21 2.49 <.0001 
 
0.31 0.23 1.36 0.186 
 
4+ 0.07 0.21 1.07 0.739 
 
1.08 0.23 2.94 <.0001 
 
0.31 0.25 1.36 0.227 
CCI 
              
 
1-2 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
3+ -0.10 0.11 0.91 0.356 
 
-0.06 0.10 0.95 0.587 
 













Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
ADLs 
              
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.08 0.1 1.09 0.399 
 
0.07 0.10 1.07 0.474 
 
-0.02 0.11 0.98 0.832 
 
3+ -0.05 0.15 0.95 0.746 
 
-0.08 0.14 0.92 0.566 
 
-0.03 0.16 0.97 0.873 
IADLs 
              
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 -0.02 0.1 0.98 0.849 
 
-0.05 0.10 0.95 0.592 
 
0.19 0.11 1.21 0.097 
 
3+ 0.13 0.15 1.14 0.388 
 
-0.02 0.15 0.98 0.895 
 
0.29 0.17 1.34 0.082 
BMI, kg/m2 
              
 
<25.0 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9 0.02 0.11 1.02 0.830 
 
0.01 0.10 1.01 0.936 
 
0.02 0.12 1.02 0.883 
 
≥30.0 0.23 0.11 1.26 0.032 
 
-0.12 0.11 0.88 0.241 
 
-0.03 0.12 0.97 0.813 
Smoking 
              
 
Never Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Past -0.11 0.09 0.9 0.239 
 
-0.12 0.09 0.88 0.161 
 
-0.23 0.10 0.79 0.023 
 
Current -0.06 0.15 0.94 0.673 
 
-0.30 0.15 0.74 0.047 
 
-0.22 0.17 0.80 0.212 
Care-seeking attitudes 
              
 
Avoid going to a physician 
             
 
Yes 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.322 
 
0.03 0.10 1.03 0.735 
 
-0.06 0.11 0.94 0.590 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
           
 
Yes -0.11 0.09 0.9 0.196 
 
-0.14 0.08 0.87 0.092 
 
-0.06 0.10 0.94 0.527 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
            
 
Yes 0.05 0.1 1.05 0.648 
 
0.07 0.10 1.08 0.448 
 
0.08 0.11 1.09 0.469 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
             
 
Yes -0.18 0.09 0.84 0.053 
 
-0.23 0.09 0.79 0.009 
 
-0.07 0.10 0.93 0.515 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
             
 
Yes 0.15 0.08 1.16 0.061 
 
0.03 0.08 1.03 0.718 
 













Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
 
Est. SE OR p-value 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
Environment factors 
              
 
Number of primary 
physicians 0.05 0.25 1.06 0.831 
 
0.002 0.25 1.00 0.993 
 
0.05 0.28 1.05 0.869 
 
Number of hospital 
beds -0.01 0.03 0.99 0.737 
 
0.01 0.03 1.01 0.643 
 
-0.01 0.03 0.99 0.735 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.264 
 
0.02 0.01 1.02 0.109 
 
0.02 0.01 1.02 0.116 
 
Unemployment rate -0.1 0.03 0.9 0.002 
 
-0.15 0.03 0.86 <.0001 
 
-0.13 0.04 0.88 0.001 
 
Education higher than 
high school -0.01 0.01 0.99 0.315 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.98 0.012 
 
0.00 0.01 1.00 0.850 
Calendar year 
              
 
2006 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
2007 -0.15 0.14 0.86 0.269 
 
0.05 0.13 1.05 0.701 
 
0.04 0.16 1.04 0.795 
 
2008 -0.28 0.13 0.76 0.037 
 
-0.16 0.13 0.85 0.210 
 
0.06 0.16 1.07 0.686 
 
2009 -0.51 0.14 0.6 0.000 
 
-0.26 0.13 0.77 0.049 
 
0.12 0.16 1.12 0.471 
 
2010 -0.47 0.14 0.62 0.001 
 
-0.38 0.14 0.69 0.006 
 
0.18 0.16 1.20 0.254 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson 
Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using 
the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking 
medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters 
squared. 
a. These results are adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, the OR of adherence was estimated using logistic regression 
models. 









race/ethnicity, LIS, self-perceived health status, care-seeking attitudes, and environment 
factors. 
5.5.4 IV model: medication adherence 
First Stage of IV Model 
Table 5.26 shows the distributions of the instrumental variables used in the first-
stage 2SRI models. Compared to MA enrollees, PDP enrollees were more likely to reside 
in the counties with higher PDP penetration rate (43.02% vs. 33.58%), and states offering 
State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs for the elderly (34.55% vs. 31.52%). PDP 
enrollees were less likely to live in the counties with higher percentage of white collar job 
(55.70% vs. 60.13%), but it didn’t reach statistical significance (p=0.0795). 
Table 5.24 Descriptive Statistics for Instrumental Variables of Diabetic 
Beneficiaries  
Instruments PDPs MA-PDs p-value 
PDP penetration rate,  
mean ± std 
43.02 ± 11.28 33.58 ± 9.42 <.0001 
Percent white collar job,  
mean ± std 
55.70 ± 9.75 60.13 ± 7.70 <.0001 
State Pharmaceutical Assistance 
Programs for seniors, n (%) 
680 (34.55%)  389 (31.52%) 0.0795 
Abbreviations: std, standard deviation; PDC, Proportion of Days Covered.  
 
In the first stage of 2SRI, prohibit regression model was used to estimate the 
probability of enrolling in PDPs compared to MA-PDs. The statistical significant 
predictors of enrolling in PDPs include PDP penetration rate, % white collar job, 
race/ethnicity, living conditions, annual income, LIS status, MSA, census region, having 
other RX coverage, number of chronic conditions, self-perceived health status, CCI, 
IADLs, BMI, care-seeking attitudes, environment factors, and calendar year. The first 
stage of 2SRI estimation is presented in Tables 5.25 below. 
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Table 5.25 The First Stage of IV Estimation: Medication Adherence 
Characteristics Estimate SE OR p-value 
Instruments 
   
 
 
PDP penetration rate 0.06 0.00 1.06 <.0001 
Age, years 
    
 
65-75 Ref – Ref – 
 
75-85 -0.05 0.06 0.96 0.432 
 
>85 0.04 0.09 1.04 0.685 
Sex 
    
 
Male Ref – Ref – 
 
Female 0.05 0.06 1.05 0.429 
Race/ethnicity 
    
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref – Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.65 0.09 0.52 <.0001 
 
Hispanics -0.30 0.09 0.74 0.001 
  Non-Hispanic others 0.09 0.13 1.10 0.458 
Marriage 
    
 
Married Ref – Ref – 
 
Widowed 0.14 0.18 1.15 0.422 
 
Divorced/separated -0.06 0.19 0.94 0.737 
  Never married 0.17 0.23 1.18 0.474 
Living conditions 
    
 
Alone Ref – Ref – 
 
With spouse -0.11 0.18 0.90 0.556 
 
With children -0.02 0.08 0.98 0.790 
  With others -0.25 0.11 0.78 0.029 
Education level 
    
 
< high school -0.05 0.08 0.95 0.484 
 
High school/GED Ref – Ref – 
  >high school 0.07 0.06 1.08 0.259 
Annual income  
    
 
<$25,000 Ref – Ref – 
  ≥$25,000 0.24 0.07 1.27 0.0003 
LIS 
    
 
Yes 0.93 0.08 2.53 <.0001 
 
No Ref – Ref – 
MSA 
    
 
Yes Ref – Ref – 
  No -0.58 0.10 0.56 <.0001 
Census region 
    
 
Northeast Ref – Ref – 
 
Midwest 0.23 0.08 1.26 0.007 
 
South 0.59 0.09 1.80 <.0001 
  West -0.05 0.09 0.96 0.609 
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Characteristics Estimate SE OR p-value 
Other RX coverage 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Public 0.31 0.08 1.37 0.0002 
  Private/self-purchased 0.18 0.17 1.19 0.308 
Self-perceived health status 
    
 
Excellent Ref – Ref – 
 
Very good -0.23 0.10 0.80 0.030 
 
Good 0.02 0.10 1.02 0.878 
 
Fair 0.14 0.11 1.16 0.194 
 
Poor 0.22 0.15 1.24 0.159 
Number of chronic conditions 
    
 
0-1 Ref – Ref – 
 
2-4 0.09 0.10 1.09 0.389 
  4+ 0.04 0.12 1.04 0.730 
CCI 
    
 
0-2 Ref – Ref – 
  3+ 0.17 0.06 1.18 0.010 
ADLs 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.09 0.06 1.10 0.145 
  3+ 0.12 0.10 1.13 0.212 
IADLs 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.05 0.07 1.05 0.486 




    
 
<25.0 Ref – Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  0.06 0.07 1.06 0.368 
  ≥30.0 0.05 0.07 1.05 0.504 
Smoking 
    
 
Never Ref – Ref – 
 
Past 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.935 
  Current -0.05 0.10 0.96 0.638 
Care-seeking attitudes 
    
 
Avoid going to a physician 
    
 
  Yes -0.01 0.07 0.99 0.841 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Visit a physician as soon as feel bad 
    
 
  Yes -0.07 0.06 0.94 0.234 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
    
 
  Yes -0.15 0.07 0.86 0.023 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
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Characteristics Estimate SE OR p-value 
 
  Yes -0.02 0.06 0.98 0.685 
    No Ref – Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
    
 
  Yes 0.17 0.05 1.19 0.001 
    No Ref – Ref – 
Environment factors 
    
 
Number of primary physicians 0.49 0.17 1.63 0.005 
 
Number of hospital beds  -0.05 0.02 0.95 0.005 
 
Percent under Poverty -0.05 0.01 0.95 <.0001 
 
Unemployment rate  0.0001 0.02 1.00 0.996 
  Education higher than high school -0.01 0.01 0.99 0.025 
Calendar year 
    
 
2006 Ref – Ref – 
 
2007 0.26 0.09 1.30 0.003 
 
2008 0.16 0.09 1.18 0.057 
 
2009 0.09 0.09 1.09 0.328 
  2010 0.28 0.09 1.33 0.002 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard 
error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; ADLs, 
Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and 
out of a chair, walking, and using the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily 
living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, 
traveling, taking medication, and managing financial matters independently; BMI, 
body mass index, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters 
squared. 
To test the assumption of IV, several model specification tests were performed 
(Table 5.28). The results for Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that type of Part D plan 
is exogenous for the medication adherence measured in PDC, but endogenous for being 
adherent (PDC≥0.80). Second, since multiple instruments were used in this analysis, 
Hansen's tests of overidentifying were performed to evaluate the validity of instruments. 
However, the three instruments, which include county-level PDP penetration, percent of 
white collar job and State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs for seniors in each study 
year, were not valid. The results for overidentification tests indicate that we can only use 
one instrument, which is the PDP penetration rate. Third, the F statistics for instruments 
is greater than 10, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. 
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(p = 0.10) 
3.83 




(p = 0.47) 
0.34 




(p = 0.28) 
8.35 




(p = 0.011) 
7.32 




(p = 0.005) 
0.34 




(p = 0.037) 
6.75 
(p = 0.034) 16.38 
 
Table 5.27 describes the results for the effect of PDPs on the likelihood of being 
adherent (PDC≥0.80) in the IV. Since PDC are not endogenous, and it was not estimated 
in the IV. Compared to MA-PDs, PDP enrollees had lower likelihood of using anti-
diabetic drugs (OR=0.51, p=0.050). PDPs also were associated with lower likelihood of 
being adherent to antihypertensive drugs (OR=0.72, p=0.309) and antihyperlipidemic 
drugs (OR=0.91, p=0.806), but didn’t reach statistically significance.  The results also 
reveal that medication adherence to anti-diabetic drugs was associated with various 
factors, including age, sex, race/ethnicity, living conditions, annual income, LIS, census 
region, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For adherence to 
antihypertensive drugs, the statistically significant factors included LIS, census region, 
 
 
Table 5.27 IV Model: Effects of PDPs on Medication Adherence  
Characteristics 
Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value 
Residual from the first stage -0.61 0.29 0.54 0.037   -0.22 0.28 0.8 0.442   -0.26 0.34 0.77 0.448 
Part D enrollment 
    
 
    
 
    
 
PDPs -0.67 0.34 0.51 0.050 
 
-0.33 0.33 0.72 0.309 
 
-0.10 0.39 0.91 0.806 
  MA-PDs Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
Age, years 
    
 
    
 
    
 
65-75 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
75-85 -0.11 0.09 0.89 0.217 
 
-0.03 0.09 0.97 0.753 
 
-0.06 0.10 0.95 0.587 
  >85 -0.31 0.15 0.74 0.035  0.19 0.14 1.21 0.171  -0.26 0.17 0.77 0.123 
Sex 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Male Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 Female -0.30 0.10 0.74 0.002  -0.04 0.09 0.97 0.702  -0.13 0.11 0.88 0.221 
Race/ethnicity 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Non-Hispanic White Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Non-Hispanic Black -0.49 0.27 0.61 0.070 
 
0.13 0.14 1.13 0.382 
 
-0.13 0.17 0.88 0.465 
 
Hispanics -0.37 0.29 0.69 0.190 
 
0.01 0.15 1.01 0.926 
 
0.21 0.17 1.24 0.209 
  Non-Hispanic others -0.15 0.35 0.86 0.662  0.17 0.17 1.19 0.319  0.15 0.20 1.16 0.445 
Marriage 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Married Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Widowed -0.17 0.28 0.84 0.530 
 
-0.17 0.28 0.84 0.530 
 
-0.21 0.32 0.81 0.509 
 
Divorced/Separated 0.01 0.29 1.01 0.974 
 
0.01 0.29 1.01 0.974 
 
-0.03 0.33 0.97 0.924 
  Never married 0.24 0.35 1.28 0.487  0.24 0.35 1.28 0.487  0.39 0.39 1.47 0.327 
Living conditions 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Alone Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
With spouse -0.53 0.28 0.59 0.057 
 
-0.15 0.28 0.86 0.596 
 
-0.10 0.32 0.91 0.768 
 
With children -0.31 0.13 0.73 0.014 
 
-0.22 0.12 0.81 0.077 
 
-0.16 0.15 0.85 0.259 
  With others -0.21 0.17 0.81 0.210  0.02 0.16 1.02 0.890  0.06 0.19 1.06 0.751 
Education level 
              
 
< high school 0.16 0.11 1.17 0.153 
 
0.12 0.11 1.13 0.255 
 
-0.02 0.12 0.98 0.895 
 
High school/GED Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 








Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value 
  >high school 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.999   0.09 0.1 1.09 0.379   0.02 0.12 1.02 0.886 
Annual income  
    
 
    
 
    
 
<$25,000 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 >$25,000 -0.26 0.11 0.77 0.020  -0.15 0.11 0.86 0.160  -0.02 0.13 0.98 0.896 
LIS                             
 
Yes 0.41 0.12 1.51 0.001 
 
0.28 0.12 1.32 0.020 
 
0.32 0.14 1.38 0.021 
 No Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
MSA 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Yes Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 No 0.01 0.14 1.01 0.952  0.06 0.14 1.06 0.660  0.19 0.16 1.21 0.236 
Census region 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Northeast Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Midwest 0.17 0.14 1.19 0.217 
 
0.17 0.14 1.19 0.217 
 
0.23 0.16 1.26 0.157 
 
South -0.21 0.14 0.81 0.147 
 
0.1 0.14 1.11 0.452 
 
0.05 0.16 1.05 0.774 
  West -0.39 0.15 0.68 0.012  -0.31 0.15 0.73 0.040  -0.35 0.18 0.70 0.052 
Other RX coverage                             
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Public -0.05 0.12 0.96 0.702 
 
0.36 0.12 1.43 0.002 
 
0.28 0.13 1.32 0.039 
  Private/self-purchased 0.04 0.27 1.04 0.897  0.03 0.26 1.03 0.910  0.28 0.29 1.32 0.341 
Self-perceived health status 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Excellent Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Very good 0.07 0.17 1.08 0.666 
 
0.62 0.18 1.86 0.000 
 
0.35 0.20 1.42 0.089 
 
Good 0.07 0.17 1.08 0.654 
 
0.49 0.17 1.64 0.004 
 
0.19 0.20 1.21 0.336 
 
Fair 0.11 0.18 1.12 0.529 
 
0.6 0.18 1.82 0.001 
 
0.15 0.21 1.17 0.470 
  Poor -0.06 0.22 0.94 0.791  0.66 0.22 1.93 0.003  0.11 0.25 1.11 0.671 
Number of chronic condition 
    
 
    
 
   
 
0-1 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
2-4 0.04 0.19 1.04 0.834 
 
0.91 0.21 2.48 <.0001 
 
0.30 0.23 1.35 0.193 
  4+ 0.06 0.21 1.06 0.786  1.08 0.23 2.94 <.0001  0.30 0.25 1.35 0.232 
CCI 
    
 
    
 
    
 
0-2 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 








Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value 
  3+ -0.13 0.11 0.88 0.215   -0.07 0.1 0.93 0.516   0.03 0.12 1.03 0.798 
ADL 
    
 
    
 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 0.07 0.10 1.08 0.456 
 
0.07 0.10 1.07 0.466 
 
-0.02 0.11 0.98 0.827 
  3+ -0.07 0.15 0.93 0.632  -0.09 0.14 0.92 0.539  -0.03 0.16 0.97 0.838 
IADL 
    
 
    
 
    
 
None Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
1-2 -0.03 0.10 0.97 0.763 
 
-0.05 0.1 0.95 0.585 
 
0.19 0.11 1.21 0.100 
  3+ 0.13 0.15 1.14 0.392  -0.02 0.15 0.98 0.886  0.29 0.17 1.34 0.083 
BMI, kg/m2 
              
 
<25.0 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
25.0-29.9  0.02 0.11 1.02 0.846 
 
0.01 0.1 1.01 0.929 
 
0.02 0.12 1.02 0.877 
  ≥30.0 0.24 0.11 1.27 0.029  -0.12 0.11 0.88 0.241  -0.03 0.12 0.97 0.816 
Smoking 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Never Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Past -0.10 0.09 0.91 0.292 
 
-0.12 0.09 0.89 0.165 
 
-0.23 0.10 0.80 0.025 
  Current -0.05 0.15 0.95 0.731  -0.3 0.15 0.74 0.047  -0.22 0.17 0.81 0.216 
Care-seeking attitudes                             
 
Avoid going to a physician 
  
 
    
 
    
 
  Yes 0.11 0.10 1.11 0.291 
 
0.03 0.1 1.03 0.751 
 
-0.06 0.11 0.94 0.586 
   No Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
  Visit a physician as soon as feel bad                       
 
  Yes -0.1 0.09 0.90 0.228 
 
-0.14 0.08 0.87 0.094 
 
-0.06 0.10 0.94 0.542 
   No Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
 
Worry about health more than others 
  
 
    
 
    
 
  Yes 0.06 0.10 1.06 0.586 
 
0.08 0.1 1.09 0.403 
 
0.09 0.11 1.09 0.429 
   No Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
 
Keep to self when sick 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  Yes -0.18 0.09 0.84 0.053 
 
-0.23 0.09 0.79 0.010 
 
-0.07 0.10 0.94 0.527 
   No Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
 
Same physician>5 years 
    
 
    
 








Anti-diabetic Drugs   Antihypertensive Drugs   Antihyperlipidemic Drugs 
Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value   Est. SE OR p-value 
 
  Yes 0.15 0.08 1.16 0.069 
 
0.02 0.08 1.02 0.754 
 
0.13 0.09 1.13 0.172 
   No Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref –  Ref – Ref – 
Environment factors 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Number of primary 
physicians 
-0.011 0.25 0.99 0.966 
 
-0.002 0.25 1 0.995 
 
0.03 0.28 1.03 0.903 
 
Number of hospital beds  -0.004 0.03 1.00 0.880 
 
0.01 0.03 1.01 0.608 
 
-0.01 0.03 0.99 0.775 
 
Percent under Poverty 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.313 
 
0.02 0.01 1.02 0.127 
 
0.02 0.01 1.02 0.134 
 
Unemployment rate  -0.11 0.03 0.90 0.001 
 
-0.16 0.03 0.86 <.0001 
 
-0.13 0.04 0.88 0.001 
  
Education higher than 
high school 
-0.01 0.01 0.99 0.294 
  
-0.02 0.01 0.98 0.010 
  
0.00 0.01 1.00 0.810 
Calendar year 
    
 
    
 
    
 
2006 Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
Ref – Ref – 
 
2007 -0.18 0.14 0.84 0.191 
 
0.03 0.14 1.03 0.805 
 
0.02 0.16 1.02 0.882 
 
2008 -0.30 0.13 0.74 0.025 
 
-0.18 0.13 0.83 0.173 
 
0.05 0.16 1.05 0.759 
 
2009 -0.52 0.14 0.60 0.000 
 
-0.27 0.13 0.76 0.043 
 
0.11 0.16 1.11 0.496 
  2010 -0.50 0.14 0.61 0.000  -0.4 0.14 0.67 0.004  0.17 0.16 1.18 0.304 
Abbreviations: MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS); SE, standard error; MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Areas; CCI, Charlson 
Comorbidity Index; ADLs, Activities of daily living, includes bathing or showering, getting dressed, getting in and out of a chair, walking, and using 
the toilet; IADLs, Instrumental activities of daily living, including using telephone, shopping, preparing food, housekeeping, laundry, traveling, taking 








and other RX coverage, self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, 
smoking, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. For adherence to 
antihyperlipidemic drugs, the statistically significant factors included sex, LIS, census 
region, other RX coverage, and smoking. 
5.6 Results for Sensitivity Analysis 
5.6.1 Results for Sensitivity Analysis 1: Beneficiaries without LIS 
Since Medicare beneficiaries with LIS had different cost-sharing (e.g., copays) for 
prescriptions, and we found PDP enrollees were more like to have LIS than MA-PD 
enrollees. In this sensitivity analysis, beneficiaries with LIS were excluded from the study 
sample. A total of 11,890 beneficiaries were included in the analysis, 6,596 in PDP group 
and 5,294 in MA-PD group, respectively. Appendix F compares the descriptive statistics 
for outcomes of interest between PDPs and MA-PDs. As shown in Table F.1, PDP 
enrollees had significantly higher annual average number of visits to hospitals (0.21 vs. 
0.15; p<0.0001), outpatient settings (2.9 vs. 2.1; p<0.0001), doctor’s office (18.2 vs. 11.9; 
p<0.0001), and prescription fills (40.0 vs. 28.8; p<0.0001). Table F.2 indicates that PDPs 
were associated with higher costs of inpatient care ($1905.2 vs. $1528.6; p=0.001), 
outpatient care ($1020.3 vs. $643.6; p<0.0001), physician’s office ($2858.1 vs. $1663.1; 
p<0.0001) and prescription drugs ($3140.8 vs. $2319.7; p<0.0001), all-type of medical 
services ($5811.8 vs. $3982.0; p<0.0001), and total healthcare costs ($8535.7 vs. 
$6064.7; p<0.0001). Table F.3 shows that PDP group had higher prevalence of CRN than 
MA-PD (12.2% vs. 10.7%; p=0.030), However, PDPs had similar prevalence of spending 
less on basic needs than MA-PDs (4.2% vs. 3.4%; p=0.076).  Table F.4 demonstrates that 
PDP enrollees had higher mean number of fills for antihypertensive drugs (17.0 vs. 14.5, 
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p=0.0003) and antihyperlipidemic drugs (6.3 vs.5.3, p=0.001), compared to MA-PD 
enrollees, but similar Medication adherence measured by PDC. 
Table 5.28 shows the effect of PDPs on healthcare utilizations and costs in both 
Naïve and IV models. For healthcare utilizations, in naïve models, the results indicate 
that PDP enrollees had similar likelihood of using inpatient care (IR=1.09; p=0.098) and 
other medical services (IR=0.90; p=0.665), but had 24% higher likelihood of using 
outpatient care (p<0.0001), 48% higher in physician’s office (p<0.0001), 5% higher in 
prescriptions (p=0.0003). In the IV models, the two groups still had similar utilizations 
on inpatient care (IR=1.04; p=0.868), other medical services (IR=0.57; p=0.568), and 
prescriptions (IR=0.96; p=0.600), but PDP group had 39% higher likelihood of using 
outpatient care (p=0.021) and 41% higher likelihood for visiting physician’s office 
(p=0.001).  
For healthcare costs, in naïve models, the results indicate that PDPs had similar 
costs for inpatient care (IR=1.31; p=0.942), but had 24% higher costs of outpatient care 
(p<0.0001), 65% on physician’s office (p<0.0001), and 22% higher on prescriptions 
(p<0.0001). As expected, PDP group had 37% higher costs for all-type medical services 
(p<0.0001) and 32% higher total healthcare costs (p<0.0001). Similar results were found 
in the IV models, the two groups had similar costs of inpatient care (IR=1.26; p=0.255), 
but PDP group had 63% higher costs for outpatient care (p=0.001), 53% higher on 
physician’s office visits (p<0.0001), and 18% higher on prescriptions (p=0.012). As a 
result, PDP group had 37% higher costs of all-type medical services (p=0.0002) and 29% 
higher costs for total healthcare spending (p<0.0001). Table 5.28 also suggests that PDP 
enrollees had similar risks for CRN, but significantly higher risks for spending less on 
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basic needs (IR=2.39; p=0.008), compared to MA-PD enrollees. In addition, among 
diabetic beneficiaries, PDP enrollees had similar medication adherence measured by 
PDC, but were less likely to be adherent to antihypertensive drugs (OR=0.97; p=0.034).    














 Hospitalizations 0.08 1.09 0.098 
 
– – – 
 Outpatient 0.21 1.24 <.0001 
 
0.33 1.39 0.021 
 Medical Providers 0.39 1.48 <.0001 
 
0.34 1.41 0.001 
 Others Medical services -0.11 0.9 0.665 
 
-0.56 0.57 0.568 
 Prescriptions 0.05 1.05 0.0003  -0.04 0.96 0.6 
Healthcare Costs 
 Hospitalizations 0.27 1.31 0.942 
 
0.23 1.26 0.255 
 Outpatient 0.22 1.24 <.0001 
 
0.49 1.63 0.001 
 Medical Providers 0.5 1.65 <.0001 
 
0.43 1.53 <.0001 
 Others Medical services -3.43 0.03 <.0001 
 
– – – 
 All medical services 0.32 1.37 <.0001 
 
0.31 1.37 0.0002 
 Prescriptions drugs 0.2 1.22 <.0001 
 
0.16 1.18 0.012 
 Total Healthcare 0.28 1.32 <.0001  0.26 1.29 <.0001 
Cost-related nonadherence 0.09 1.1 0.166   – – – 
Spending less on basic 
needs 
0.13 1.14 0.251   0.87 2.39 0.008 
Proportion of Days Covered (PDC) 
 Any antidiabetic agent -0.02 – 0.852 
 
– – – 
 Any antihypertensive drugs -0.19 – 0.085 
 
– – – 
 Any antihyperlipidemic 
drugs 
0.09 – 0.491   – – – 
Adherent (PDC≥0.80) 
 Any antidiabetic agent -0.01 0.99 0.598 
 
-0.04 0.96 0.436 
 Any antihypertensive drugs -0.03 0.97 0.034 
 
0.02 1.02 0.668 
 Any antihyperlipidemic 
drugs 
-0.01 0.99 0.412   -0.03 0.98 0.65 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, 
annual number of health services use was estimated using a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model. 





5.6.2 Results for Sensitivity Analysis 2: Beneficiaries with LIS 
In this sensitivity analysis, the outcomes measures were compared among 
beneficiaries with LIS. Table 5.29 shows the effect of PDPs on healthcare utilizations and 
costs in both Naïve and IV models. For healthcare utilizations, in naïve models, the 
results indicate that PDP enrollees had similar likelihood of using inpatient care 
(IR=0.95; p=0.511), other medical services (IR=1.31; p=0.653), and prescription drugs 
(IR= 0.97; p=0.265), but had 18% higher likelihood of using outpatient care (p<0.0001), 
and 21% higher in physician’s office (p<0.0001), respectively. In the IV models, the two 
groups still had similar utilizations on outpatient care (IR=1.11; p=0.380), other medical 
services (IR=0.46; p=0.333), and prescriptions (IR=0.97; p=0.684), but PDP group had 
still had 41% higher likelihood for visiting physician’s office (p=0.001).  
For healthcare costs, in naïve models, the results indicate that PDPs had similar 
costs for inpatient care (IR= 0.87; p=0.315), outpatient care (IR= 0.87; p=0.155), all-type 
medical services (IR=0.99; p=0.918), and total healthcare (IR= 1.03; p=0.453), but had 
15% higher costs of on physician’s office (p=0.008), and 8% higher on prescriptions 
(p=0.021). In the IV models, however, the two groups had similar costs of inpatient care 
(IR= 1.03; p=0.950), outpatient care (IR= 1.05; p=0.847), all-type medical services 
(IR=1.32; p=0.117), prescription drugs (IR=1.26; p=0.076), and total healthcare costs 
(IR=1.27; p=0.071), while had 61% higher on physician’s office visits (p=0.003). 
Table 5.29 also suggests that PDP enrollees with LIS had lower risks for CRN 
(OR=0.75; p=0.019), and lower risks for spending less on basic needs (IR=0.63; 
p=0.225), compared to MA-PD enrollees. In addition, among diabetic beneficiaries, PDP 
enrollees had similar medication adherence measured by PDC, but were more likely to be 
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adherent to antihypertensive drugs (OR=1.52; p=0.031).    














Hospitalizations -0.05 0.95 0.511 
 
– – – 
Outpatient 0.16 1.18 <.0001 
 
0.11 1.11 0.380 
Medical Providers 0.19 1.21 <.0001 
 
0.34 1.41 <.0001 
Others Medical services 0.27 1.31 0.653 
 
-0.78 0.46 0.333 
Prescriptions -0.03 0.97 0.265   -0.03 0.97 0.684 
Healthcare Costs 
Hospitalizations -0.14 0.87 0.315 
 
0.03 1.03 0.950 
Outpatient -0.14 0.87 0.155 
 
0.05 1.05 0.847 
Medical Providers 0.14 1.15 0.008 
 
0.48 1.61 0.003 
Others Medical services -3.93 0.02 <.0001 
 
– – – 
All medical services -0.01 0.99 0.918 
 
0.28 1.32 0.117 
Prescriptions drugs 0.08 1.08 0.021 
 
0.23 1.26 0.076 
Total Healthcare 0.03 1.03 0.453   0.24 1.27 0.071 
Cost-related 
nonadherence 
-0.28 0.75 0.019   – – – 
Spending less on basic 
needs 
-0.24 0.78 0.101   -0.46 0.63 0.225 
Proportion of Days Covered (PDC) 
 Any antidiabetic agent 0.01 – 0.553 
 
– – – 
 Any antihypertensive drugs -0.02 – 0.370 
 
– – – 
 Any antihyperlipidemic 
drugs 
0.04 – 0.156   – – – 
Adherent (PDC≥0.80) 
 Any antidiabetic agent 0.07 1.08 0.655 
 
-0.15 0.86 0.773 
 Any antihypertensive drugs 0.06 1.06 0.718 
 
0.79 2.21 0.121 
 Any antihyperlipidemic 
drugs 
0.42 1.52 0.031   -0.32 0.73 0.594 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, 
annual number of health services use was estimated using a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model. 





5.6.3 Results for Sensitivity Analysis 3: annual income  
In this sensitivity analysis, annual income was categorized into four levels, 
<$15,000, $15,000-$30,000, $30,000-$45,000, and >$45,000. Table 5.30 compared the 
annual income between beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs vs. MA-PDs. PDP enrollees were 
more likely to have incomes less than $15,000 (37.6% vs. 26.1%), but less likely to have 
incomes of $15,000-$30,000 (30.1% vs. 37.8%), and incomes of $30,000-$45,000 
(13.3% vs. 17.3%), compared to MA-PD enrollees. 
Table 5.30 Sensitivity Analysis 3: Annual Income at Baseline 
Characteristics 













Annual income  
      
<.0001 
 

















>$45,000 1691 18.9   1138 18.8     
a. Percentages were calculated with national weights, p-value was obtained from 
Rao-Scott Chi-Square tests 
The effects of PDPs on healthcare utilizations and expenditures were also 
stratified by the levels of the annual income. As shown in Table 5.31, for healthcare 
utilizations, PDPs had higher use of outpatient care and physician’s office than MA-PDs, 
which was observed across all the income levels. For healthcare costs, similar patterns 
were observed across different levels of annual income. 











































 Outpatient 1.22 <.0001 1.13 0.001 1.25 <.0001 1.32 <.0001 
 Medical providers 1.27 <.0001 1.44 <.0001 1.51 <.0001 1.48 <.0001 
Others medical 
services 
1.05 0.906 1.00 0.991 0.83 0.963 3.04 0.400 
 Prescriptions 1.06 0.013 1.05 0.012 1.10 0.002 1.07 0.02 
Healthcare Costs 
     Hospitalizations 1.16 0.149 1.26 0.065 1.84 0.0003 1.27 0.098 
 Outpatient 1.03 0.734 1.48 0.0040 1.51 0.0002 1.31 0.006 
 Medical providers 1.27 <.0001 1.59 <.0001 1.73 <.0001 1.71 <.0001 
Others medical 
services 
0.04 <.0001 0.08 <.0001 0.18 <.0001 0.15 <.0001 
 All medical services 1.16 0.002 1.37 <.0001 1.56 <.0001 1.43 <.0001 
 Prescriptions drugs 1.23 <.0001 1.24 <.0001 1.20 <.0001 1.27 <.0001 
 Total Healthcare 1.18 <.0001 1.29 <.0001 1.39 <.0001 1.36 <.0001 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, 
annual number of helath services use was estimated using a zero-inflated negative binomial 
model. 
b. IR was calculated as using the equation (e
Coefficient
). 
5.6.4 Results for Sensitivity Analysis 4: Beneficiaries with diabetes 
This sensitivity analysis compared the healthcare utilizations and expenditures 
among beneficiaries with diabetes. As shown in Table 5.32, in naïve models, PDP 
enrollees had similar likelihood of using inpatient care (IR=0.96; p=0.655), other medical 
services (IR=1.20; p=0.996), and prescription drugs (IR= 1.02; p=0.394), but had 39% 
higher likelihood of using outpatient care (p<0.0001), and 41% higher in physician’s 
office (p<0.0001), respectively. In the IV models, the two groups had similar utilizations 
on outpatient care (IR=0.91; p=0.599) and prescriptions (IR=1.03; p=0.732), but PDP 
group had still had 42% higher likelihood for visiting physician’s office (p=0.002). 
For healthcare costs, in naïve models, the results indicate that PDPs had similar 
costs for inpatient care (IR= 1.05; p=0.699), but higher costs for outpatient care (IR=1.70; 
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p<.0001), physician’s office (IR=1.46; p<.0001), all-type medical services (IR=1.29; 
p<.0001), prescriptions (IR=1.14; p<.0001), and total healthcare costs (IR=1.23; 
p<.0001). In the IV models, however, the two groups had similar costs of inpatient care 
(IR=0.70; p=0.213), all-type medical services (IR=0.83; p=0.286), prescription drugs 
(IR=1.07; p=0.530), and total healthcare costs (IR=0.90; p=0.382), while had 91% higher 
on outpatient care (p=0.010) and 56% higher costs on physician’s office (p=0.004). 














Hospitalizations -0.04 0.96 0.655 
 
– – – 
Outpatient 0.33 1.39 <.0001 
 
-0.09 0.91 0.599 
Medical Providers 0.34 1.41 <.0001 
 
0.35 1.42 0.002 
Others Medical services 0.18 1.20 0.996 
 
-3.64 0.03 0.003 
Prescriptions 0.02 1.02 0.394   0.03 1.03 0.732 
Healthcare Costs 
Hospitalizations 0.05 1.05 0.699 
 
-0.35 0.70 0.213 
Outpatient 0.53 1.70 <.0001 
 
0.64 1.91 0.010 
Medical Providers 0.38 1.46 <.0001 
 
0.44 1.56 0.004 
Others Medical services -1.51 0.22 <.0001 
 
– – – 
All medical services 0.26 1.29 <.0001 
 
-0.19 0.83 0.286 
Prescriptions drugs 0.13 1.14 <.0001 
 
0.07 1.07 0.530 
Total Healthcare 0.21 1.23 <.0001   -0.11 0.90 0.382 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve 
Model, annual number of health services use was estimated using a zero-inflated 
negative binomial model. 
b.  In the IV Model, the instrumental variables are the county-level PDP 
penetration.  
5.6.5 Results for Sensitivity Analysis 4: Beneficiaries with other drug benefits 
This sensitivity analysis excluded beneficiaries with other drug benefits. A total of 
13,509 beneficiaries were included in the analysis, 7,975in PDP group and 5,534 in MA-
PD group, respectively. Appendix F compares the descriptive statistics for outcomes of 
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interest between PDPs and MA-PDs. As shown in Table F.5, PDP enrollees had 
significantly higher annual average number of visits to hospitals (0.21 vs. 0.16; 
p<0.0001), outpatient settings (2.8 vs. 2.1; p<0.0001), doctor’s office (17.4 vs. 11.9; 
p<0.0001), and prescription fills (44.5 vs. 33.1; p<0.0001)., compared to MA-PD 
enrollees. Table F.6 suggests that, PDPs were associated with higher costs for inpatient 
care ($1905.2 vs. $1528.6; p=0.001), outpatient care ($955.6 vs. $643.6; p<0.0001), 
physician’s office ($2645.0 vs. $1665.0; p<0.0001), and prescription drugs ($2953.6 vs. 
$2144.9.7; p<0.0001), compared to MA-PDs. As a result, PDP group had statistically 
higher costs for all-type of medical services ($5581.1 vs. $4051.1; p<0.0001) and total 
healthcare costs ($8534.7 vs. $6196.0; p<0.0001). Table F.7 shows that PDP group had 
similar prevalence of CRN (12.5% vs. 11.3%; p=0.090), but PDPs had higher prevalence 
of spending less on basic needs than MA-PDs (5.2% vs. 3.9%; p=0.018).  In Table F.8, 
PDP enrollees had higher mean number of fills for anti-diabetic drugs (9.4 vs. 8.8; 
p=0.001), antihypertensive drugs (15.1 vs. 13.2, p<0.0001), and antihyperlipidemic drugs 
(5.5 vs.4.5, p<0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees. PDP enrollees had higher PDC for 
anti-diabetic drugs (0.59 vs. 0.58; p=0.039), but similar PDC for antihypertensive drugs 
and antihyperlipidemic drugs. 
Table 5.33 shows the effect of PDPs on healthcare utilizations and costs in both 
Naïve and IV models. For healthcare utilizations, in naïve models, the results indicate 
that PDP enrollees had similar likelihood of using inpatient care (IR=1.04; p=0.398) and 
other medical services (IR=00.96; p=0.848), but had 25% higher likelihood of using 
outpatient care (p<0.0001), 43% higher in physician’s office (p<0.0001), 5% higher in 
prescriptions (p=0.001). In the IV models, the two groups still had similar utilizations on 
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prescription drugs (IR=1.05; p=0.249), but PDP group had 53% higher likelihood of 
using outpatient care (p<0.0001), 34% higher likelihood for visiting physician’s office 
(p=0.001), and 10% higher likelihood for using other medical services (p<0.0001). 
For healthcare costs, in naïve models, the results indicate that PDPs had 19% 
higher costs for inpatient care (p=0.010), 22% higher costs of outpatient care (p<0.0001), 
57% on physician’s office (p<0.0001), and 20% higher on prescriptions (p<0.0001). As a 
result, PDP group had 31% higher costs for all-type medical services (p<0.0001) and 
28% higher total healthcare costs (p<0.0001). In the IV models, the two groups had 
similar costs for inpatient care (IR=1.36; p=0.111) and prescriptions (IR=1.09; p=0.182), 
but PDP group had 72% higher costs of outpatient care (p=0.001), 58% higher on 
physician’s office visits (p<0.0001), 44% higher costs for all-type medical services 
(p=0.0002) and 29% higher costs for total healthcare spending (p<0.0001). 
Table 5.33 also suggests that PDP enrollees had similar risks for CRN (IR=1.00; 
p=0.955) and spending less on basic needs (IR=1.05; p=0.650), compared to MA-PD 
enrollees. In addition, among diabetic beneficiaries, PDP enrollees had similar 
medication adherence measured by PDC, and similar likelihood to be adherent to 
medication treatments.  














Hospitalizations 0.04 1.04 0.398 
 
– – – 
Outpatient 0.22 1.25 <.0001 
 
0.43 1.53 <.0001 
Medical Providers 0.36 1.43 <.0001 
 
0.3 1.34 <.0001 
Others Medical services -0.04 0.96 0.848 
 
-2.28 0.1 <.0001 
Prescriptions 0.04 1.05 0.001  0.05 1.05 0.249 
Healthcare Costs 
Hospitalizations 0.18 1.19 0.01 
 












  Est. OR 
p-
value 
Outpatient 0.2 1.22 <.0001 
 
0.54 1.72 <.0001 
Medical Providers 0.45 1.57 <.0001 
 
0.45 1.58 <.0001 
Others Medical services -2.71 0.07 <.0001 
 
– – – 
All medical services 0.27 1.31 <.0001 
 
0.36 1.44 <.0001 
Prescriptions drugs 0.18 1.2 <.0001 
 
0.08 1.09 0.182 
Total Healthcare 0.25 1.28 <.0001  0.25 1.29 <.0001 
Cost-related nonadherence 0.004 1 0.955   – – – 
Spending less on basic 
needs 
0.05 1.05 0.65   0.47 1.6 0.106 
Proportion of Days Covered (PDC) 
Any antidiabetic agent -0.02 – 0.856 
 
– – – 
Any antihypertension drugs -0.08 – 0.424 
 
– – – 
Any antihyperlipidemic 
drugs 
0.20 – 0.100   – – – 
Adherent (PDC≥0.80) 
Any antidiabetic agent 0.003 1.00 0.812 
 
-0.06 0.94 0.225 
Any antihypertension drugs -0.02 0.98 0.055 
 
0.003 1.00 0.951 
Any antihyperlipidemic 
drugs 
0.000 1.00 0.792   -0.05 0.95 0.389 
a. These results were adjusted for the variables listed in Table 5.1. In the Naïve Model, 
annual number of health services use was estimated using a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model. 





This chapter discusses the results of the study as well as implications of the 
findings. It also presents the strengths and limitations of this dissertation.  
6.1 Aim 1: Baseline Characteristics 
One objective of this study is to compare the demographic, socioeconomic and 
clinical characteristics between PDP and MA-PD enrollees. Our findings suggest that 
PDP enrollees had lower socio-economic status and more comorbidities than MA-PD 
enrollees, which is consistent with the published literature.
137
 Riley et al. projected that 
MA-PD enrollees would be healthier than PDP enrollees, by comparing the 
characteristics of beneficiaries enrolled in FFS and MA in 2005, which is one year prior 
to the introduction of Medicare Part D.
137
 Hence, this dissertation provides timely and 
important results comparing the baseline characteristics between Medicare beneficiaries 
enrolled in PDPs vs. MA-PDs. 
Although there are very limited studies comparing PDP and MA-PD enrollees, a 
large body of studies compared characteristics of FFS and MA enrollees, providing 
indirect but important evidence on the characteristics of PDP and MA-PD enrollees.  
Before the introduction of Medicare Part D, FFS beneficiaries had no outpatient 
prescription drug benefits, unless they obtained their drug coverage through Employer 
Sponsored Insurance (ESI) or public insurance plans (e.g., Medicaid, VA), but most MA 
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enrollees had drug benefits because they were enrolled in MA plans with outpatient 
prescription drug coverage. With the implementation of Medicare Part D, however, FFS 
beneficiaries without drug benefits were more likely to enroll in PDPs, while MA 
enrollees might keep their MA plans or MA-PDs.
137
 The published studies indicated that 
beneficiaries enrolled in FFS plans were more likely to be older, unmarried, lower 
income, and enrolled in Medicaid,
123,187,188
 compared to HMO enrollees.  In the studies 
comparing HMO vs. FFS, HMO enrollees were associated with significantly better self-
reported health statuses and function statuses, lower prior-enrollment severity score and 
healthcare use, lower post-enrollment mortality rates, and lower pre-enrollment health 
care utilization.
120-126,132,188-191
 In addition to the substantial differences in health 
conditions between HMOs and FFS plans,  early studies of HMO have also shown 
favorable HMO selection on sociodemographic characteristics, including income and 
marital status.
123,187
 Enrollment of low-cost beneficiaries into HMOs suggests favorable 
selection observed in the MA plans.
127
 This favorable selection was further exacerbated 
through disenrollment of high-cost or sicker beneficiaries from the MA plans. Compared 
to the FFS enrollees, beneficiaries dis-enrolled from MA plans had significantly higher 
risk scores and higher risk-adjusted payments.
119
  These findings demonstrate a pattern of 
selective enrollment of healthy beneficiaries and disenrollment of beneficiaries with 
higher costs or worse health conditions, leading to substantial differences between PDPs 
and MA-PDs. 
This imbalance between PDP and MA-PD enrollees might be driven by the risk 
adjustment payment methodology that is implemented to estimate payment rates for MA 
enrollees. As discussed in the Background section, MA plans receive monthly capitated 
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payments for each enrollee, therefore, MA plans have financial incentives to attract 
beneficiaries whose incurred costs are lower than the predicted costs. Prior to 2004, risk 
adjustment of MA payments was based heavily on demographics (e.g., age, gender, 
Medicaid eligibility, institutional status, and working aged status), but only minimally for 
clinical diagnoses (e.g., diabetes, ischemic heart disease).
16
 Consequently, MA plans had 
the incentives to enroll healthy and avoid chronically ill beneficiaries. In the 1980s and 
1990s, new enrollees in MA plans had lower prior-enrollment costs than their FFS 
counterparts,
120,121,130,192,193
 while HMO dis-enrollees often had higher healthcare costs 
after disenrollment.
130,192,193
 To address favorable selection in MA plans, CMS recently 
implemented a gradual phase-in risk-adjustment system, which initially adjusted only a 
percentage of the total payment based on Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group (PIP-
DCG) and later the CMS Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) methodology. 
However, this dissertation still found the imbalance in demo-socioeconomic and health 
characteristics between PDP and MA-PD enrollees. 
6.2 Aim 2: Healthcare Utilizations and Costs 
One of the major objectives of this dissertation is to examine the impact of PDPs 
on healthcare utilizations and costs compared to MA-PDs. This study provided new 
evidence regarding the impact of PDPs on healthcare use and costs among Medicare 
beneficiaries. Using nationally representative sample data and an instrumental variable 
approach to address selection bias, this dissertation found that PDPs had similar annual 
use and spending for inpatient care. Additionally, PDPs were associated with 
significantly higher use and costs for outpatient care and prescription drugs, among 
community-living Medicare beneficiaries from 2006 to 2010. In the sensitivity analysis, 
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we found a similar pattern of health resources use and costs, only except the analysis for 
beneficiaries with LIS. Compared to MA-PDs, PDPs had higher total healthcare costs 
among beneficiaries with LIS, but had similar healthcare use and costs among 
beneficiaries with LIS. Considering the special design of Medicare Part D and LIS, the 
results from the sensitivity analysis suggest that offering beneficiaries similar drug 
benefits (e.g., $2/prescription for LIS beneficiaries) may lead to similar healthcare 
spending. This finding, on the other hand, proves that drug plans with less generous drug 
plans are associated with higher healthcare spending.  Therefore, these results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that PDPs have higher costs than MA-PDs after 
controlling baseline characteristics and favorable selection of MA plans. 
Although these two types of Part D plans demonstrate substantial differences on 
their baseline characteristics that may influence their healthcare use and costs, there was 
no statistically significant difference in the annual utilizations hospitalizations in both 
naïve and IV models. In the naïve models, after controlling individual-level 
characteristics (e.g., demographics, socioeconomics, health status and functional 
conditions) and environment characteristics (e.g., number of hospital beds), the results 
indicate that PDP enrollees had similar annual use of inpatient services, but had 21% 
higher use of outpatient care, 42% higher use of physician’s office, and 3% higher 
prescription drugs use, respectively, compared to MA-PD enrollees. Since PDP enrollees 
are sicker than MA-PD enrollees, they are more likely to have higher use and costs 
during the study follow-up period. To address the selection bias related to the type of part 
D plans, we performed IV models and found that PDP enrollees had similar use of 
prescription drugs, compared to MA-PD enrollees. However, PDP enrollees had 47% 
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higher likelihood of using outpatient care, and 39% higher likelihood of visiting 
physician’s office than MA-PD enrollees.   
After controlling the baseline characteristics, however, we found that PDPs had 
higher costs for both prescription drugs and non-drug medication services. PDPs were 
associated with 15% higher costs of hospitalization, 12% higher costs of outpatient care, 
50% higher costs of physician’s office, 26% higher of all types of medical services, and 
20% higher of prescription drugs respectively, compared to MA-PD enrollees.  
Consequently, PDP enrollees had 25% higher healthcare expenditures than MA-PD 
enrollees. After controlling the selection bias, the results indicate that PDPs had similar 
costs for inpatient care, but PDPs were associated with 48% higher costs of outpatient 
care, 54% higher costs for physician’s office visits, 39% higher of all types of medical 
services, and 18% higher in prescription drugs respectively, compared to MA-PD 
enrollees.  As a result, PDP enrollees had 30% higher healthcare expenditures than MA-
PD enrollees.    
Although there are very few studies comparing the healthcare utilizations and 
expenditures associated with these two types of part D plans, the impact of MA plans 
compared to FFS has been well-examined in the literature. In the earlier studies, HMOs 
have shown positive impact on reducing health utilizations and expenditures, compared 
to FFS.
 
MA plans were associated with less utilization of overall care, but there was no 
clear pattern in the evidence for inpatient care.
97
 Some data indicated that HMO was 
associated with a lower rate of preventable hospitalizations and overall hospitalizations, 
while other studies suggested that HMOs and FFS plans had similar use of inpatient 
care.
96
 Although HMOs in the early stages achieved significant reduction of healthcare 
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use, the advantage over FFS was not sustained. By the 2000s, the health services use 
among HMOs and traditional FFS had converged. This convergence was, in part, 
attributed to the application of innovated econometric/statistical methods to eliminate 
selection bias between FFS and MA plans. The favorable selection into HMO has been 
demonstrated since the introduction of managed care. Captivated payments for HMOs 
might be the incentives for HMOs to enroll healthy beneficiaries or disenroll those with 
higher health costs, leading to a healthier and lower-cost population in the HMOs. As a 
result, we might observe that HMOs had significantly lower costs than FFS plans.  In this 
dissertation, we found that the impact of PDPs was diminished after controlling selection 
bias, indicating that selection bias may an important role in the differences between PDPs 
vs MA-PDs. However, the magnitude of the positive outcomes associated with MA-PDs 
is still unclear. For example, the positive impact of HMOs cannot be fully explained by 
the selection of healthier beneficiaries into HMOs.
97
 
Another possible explanation for this convergence is that traditional health plans 
implemented similar cost-saving strategies to HMOs. For example, managed care plans 
can influence the healthcare utilizations by denying expensive tests or surgical 
procedures, restricting access to specialists, and providing payment incentives to 
providers, which have been recently adopted by FFS. Recent data indicates that  FFS 
plans achieved similar admission rates or length of stay to those of HMOs.
194
 In addition 
to direct effects on clinical practices, managed care also has demonstrated influences on 
the market level.
195-197
 Improved managed care penetration into the healthcare market is 
associated with increased competition, leading to changes on the practice patterns in the 
regional market. There is substantial evidence suggesting that physicians are more likely 
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to shorten the duration of visits,
198




In this study, PDPs have generally higher cost-sharing than MA-PDs, and PDP 
enrollees may face higher drug costs. Based on the economic theory of demand for health 
services, the demands for health services (including prescription drugs) increase with 
reduced cost-sharing of drug plans, which has been proven in the RAND study. In the 
RAND study, the patients with free care (or 0% cost-sharing) used 5 prescriptions 
monthly, while those with 25% and 50% cost sharing filled 4 prescriptions. Hence, these 
findings indicated that higher cost-sharing is associated with reduced use of prescription 
drugs. However, our study found that PDPs had significantly higher annual numbers of 
prescriptions, which is consistent with published literatures suggesting that HMOs were 
associated with lower use of prescription drugs compared to FFS.
48
 As discussed 
previously, PDP enrollees were sicker and had more chronic conditions than MA-PDs, so 
they may fill more prescriptions and spend more on prescription drugs. Even though we 
applied the instrumental variable technique to address selection bias, we still found that 
PDP enrollees had a higher use of prescriptions. This finding may be explained by the 
price responsiveness that is different for varied conditions. In response to increased cost-
sharing, the reduced use of prescriptions was more salient for drugs used to treat 
symptoms than those used to treat chronic diseases.
158,159
  In this study, elderly 
beneficiaries had relatively high prevalence of chronic diseases, and may not have been 
sensitive to the differences in the cost-sharing between these two types of Part D plans, 
we observed similar utilizations of prescriptions in PDPs and MA-PDs. 
Additionally, the higher costs of prescriptions in PDP group may be explained by 
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HMO’s incentive to use generic drugs. To reduce the drug costs, HMOs influence 
beneficiaries’ decisions on purchasing generic drugs, by applying higher brand versus 
generic cost-sharing differentials.
201
 If patients face high cost differences between brand-
name and generic drugs, they are more likely to purchase generic drugs rather than brand-
name drugs. This leads to increased use of generic drugs, which are relatively 
inexpensive than brand-name drugs.
202
 In the study, we found MA-PD enrollees were 
more likely to use generic drugs than PDP enrollees, which is a possible explanation for 
the similar costs observed between two groups.  
Based on the conceptual framework, environment and individual characteristics 
are very important factors influencing healthcare use and costs. In this dissertation, we 
found higher use of healthcare was associated with demographics, socioeconomics, life 
style (e.g., smoking), regions, health conditions, health altitude, and availability of 
primary physicians and hospital bed, which are consistent with existing literature. In the 
sensitivity analysis, two factors, LIS and annual income, were stratified to better 
understand the risk factors associated with healthcare use and costs. We found that when 
Medicare beneficiaries facing similar coinsurance (e.g., $2 copayment for LIS), PDPs 
had similar impact on healthcare use than MA-PDs, indicating that coinsurance is an 
important factor determining the use of healthcare. However, PDPs demonstrated similar 
impact on the use of health services across different levels of annual income, compared to 
MA-PDs. For example, Weissman et al. reported that increased likelihood of delayed 
care was observed among patients who are black, low income, uninsured, or without a 
regular physician.
203
 Quesenberry et al. indicated that higher BMI is associated with 





6.3 Aim 3: Medication Adherence 
For medication adherence, we accessed CRN among all beneficiaries, and 
medication adherence to anti-diabetic drugs among beneficiaries with diabetes. After 
adjusting baseline characteristics and selection bias, PDP enrollees had similar risks of 
having CRN and spending less on basic needs than MA-PD enrollees. The results also 
reveal that the likelihood of CRN was associated with various factors, including age, 
race/ethnicity, annual income, MSA, census region, self-perceived health status, number 
of chronic conditions, ADLs, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. 
Approximately half of the patients failed to take medication as prescribed.
205
 With 
the aging of the U.S. population, nonadherence will be more prevalent because patients 
take more medications to control their conditions.
206
 To date, the concern about 
nonadherence is rising because of a growing body of evidence showing that 
nonadherence is related to adverse outcomes and higher health care costs.
207
 Osterberg et 
al. estimated that poor  medication  adherence contributed to at least one-third of 
medication-related hospitalizations in the U.S.
207
 Drug cost has been considered as an 
important factor of nonadherence,
208,209
 and CRN can be solved by reducing the out-of-
pocket costs for acquiring medication. The Medicare Part D program was introduced to 
reduce the financial burden of prescription medications for Medicare beneficiaries. After 
the implementing Part D, CRN among elderly decreased.
71,210
 Even though we 
hypothesized that PDPs had higher OOP and more risks of CRN, there is no substantial 
evidence suggesting the differences in the risk of CRN between these two types of Part D 
plans. However, our results revealed risk factors for CRN among elderly beneficiaries, 
including age, sex, race/ethnicity, annual income, LIS, census region, other RX coverage, 
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self-perceived health status, number of chronic conditions, CCI, ADLs, IADLs, and care-
seeking attitudes. This finding is consistent with those from existing studies.
160,162,211,212
 
For example, African Americans had higher risks of CRN than their white 
counterparts,
213,214
 even after controlling for prescription drug insurance.  
Among beneficiaries with diabetes, our findings indicated that PDP enrollees had 
similar PDC for anti-diabetic drugs, but were more likely to have PDC≥0.80, compared 
to those enrolled in MA-PDs. This finding is consistent with existing studies using 5% 
sample. The results also revealed that medication adherence to anti-diabetic drugs was 
associated with various factors, including marital status, living conditions, LIS, self-
perceived health status, BMI, care-seeking attitudes, and environment factors. In the 
sensitivity analysis, we also compared the healthcare use and costs among beneficiaries 
with diabetes who enrolled in PDPs vs. MA-PDs. PDP enrollees still had higher 
healthcare utilizations and expenditures than MA-PD enrollees. 
As demonstrated in the conceptual framework, medication adherence is 
considered as health behavior. In this dissertation, we found a wide variety of factors 
influencing medication adherence, including demographics, socioeconomics, life style 
(e.g., smoking), regions, health conditions, health altitude, and availability of primary 




6.4 Limitations and Strengths  
There are several limitations in this dissertation. This study is non-randomized 
and observational. The major limitation of natural experiments is that omitted variables 
may exist. Failure to control for unobserved confounders leads to biased results. 
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However, an IV approach allowed us to control for unobserved variables and adjust for a 
broad range of potential confounders. Therefore, we do not expect omitted variables will 
result in substantial bias to the results, but still consider the possibility that unobserved 
differences between the MA-PD and PDP enrollees could bias the results. Second, self-
reports were used to estimate healthcare use and costs, and we cannot exclude the 
possibility of recall bias, because PDP and MA-PD enrollees had different health 
conditions and might have different likelihood of having recall bias. However, MCBS 
surveyed Medicare beneficiaries three times a year, and asked them to bring all the 
medical bills and receipts to the interview, to minimize the recall bias. Even if the recall 
bias exists, we don’t expect there is substantial bias due to the use of self-reports.  Third, 
only three drug classes were examined among diabetic patients, and it is unclear whether 
the results can be generalized to other drug classes or Medicare beneficiaries without 
diabetes. Fourth, self-reported diagnosis was used to identify diabetic patients, and we 
cannot rule out the possibility that some diabetic patients are not included in the sample. 
However, using patients’ self-reports has been treated as a gold standard in the 
identification of patients with diabetes, and therefore it is less likely to underestimate the 
patients with diabetes. Fifth, adherence was defined as having PDC≥80%, which might 
be too arbitrary. However, this cutoff point has been validated and widely used in the 
current literature. Furthermore, PDC was also treated as continuous variable in the 
regression models.  
Despite the limitations described above, this study has several strengths. First, the 
observational study design contributes to the generalizability of results. Since only a few 
exclusion criteria were applied, the study sample may be demographically representative 
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of the elderly Medicare population with diabetes. Second, MCBS data includes both 
medical claims and patient-reported sources, which makes robust analyses possible. 
Third, I applied instrumental variable methods to adjust for unmeasured confounders, to 
obtain more consistent estimates of the effect of part D plans on adherence. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This dissertation found that PDP enrollees tended to use more health services and 
had higher costs of total healthcare and prescription drugs, while had higher cost-related 
nonadherence and difficulties in affording prescription drugs, compared to those enrolled 
in MA-PDs. Therefore, the findings suggest that providing more generous drug insurance 
may reduce the total healthcare spending. To our knowledge, this study is the first study 
to compare the effects of two specific Part D plans on healthcare utilizations and 
expenditure. Further studies are warranted to better understand the effects of PDPs 
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APPENDIX A – KEY VARIABLES IN MCBS FILES 
The section describes the key variables utilized for this dissertation. Table A.1 
summarizes the key variables in MCBS database. 
Table A.1 Lists of Key Variables in MCBS Files 
Module/Files  Variable Type Description 
Cost and 
Use/RIC K 
BASEID C  Unique SP Identification Number 
TYPE C  Beneficiary's living situation for year 
STATUS N  Completeness of survey data for the year 
C_DAYS N  Number of community days 
TOT_DAYS N Total person days 
Cost and 
Use/RIC A 
BASEID C  Unique SP Identification Number 
H_ENT01 - 
H_ENT12 
C Medicare entitlement code for Jan to Dec 
H_MEDSTA C C Medicare status code as of 12/31 
H_RESST C  SSA State code of residence as of 12/31 
H_ZIP C  Postal zip code of residence as of 12/31 
H_CENSUS C  Census Region of residence as of 12/31 
H_METRO C  Metro status 
H_GHPSW C  Some group health participation in year 
H_PDTP01-
H_PDTP12 
C  Part D plan type for Jan to Dec 
H_PDLS01-
H_PDLS12 
C  LIS Indicator for Jan to Dec 
H_MCDE01-
H_MCDE12 
C Medicaid eligibility for Jan to Dec 
Cost and 
Use/RIC 1 
BASEID C Unique SP Identification Number 
D_DOB C  Date of birth (YYYYMM) 
ROSTSEX N  Gender of SP 
D_RACE2 N  Race of SP 
HISPORIG N  Is SP of Hispanic or Latino origin 
SPDEGRCV N  Highest grade SP completed 
SPMARSTA N  Marital status of SP 
INCOME N  Income range of SP 
D_DIVCUR C  Census division of SP's residence 
Cost and 
Use/RIC 2 
HEIGHTIN N Height of SP--inches 
WEIGHT N Weight of SP in pounds 
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Module/Files Variable Type Description 
 
EVERSMOK N SP ever smoked cigarettes/cigars/tobacco 
SMOKNOW N Does SP smoke now 
OCARTERY N Ever told had hardening of arteries 
OCHBP N Ever told had hypertension/hi blood pres 
OCMYOCAR N Ever told had myocard infarct/hrt attack 
OCCHD N Ever told had angina pectoris/CHD 
OCOTHHRT N Ever told had other heart conditions 
OCCFAIL N Ever told had heart failure 
OCCVALVE N Ever told had problems with valves 
OCRHYTHM N Ever told had prbs w/ heart rhythm 
OCSTROKE N Ever told had stroke/braihemorrhage 
OCCSKIN N Ever told had skicancer 
OCCANCER N Ever told had other (non-skin) cancer 
OCBETES N Ever told had diabetes 
OCDTYPE N Type of diabetes diagnosed 
OCDVISIT N Was SP told o1+ visits they had diabet 
OCARTHRH N Ever told had rheumatoid arthritis 
OCARTH N Ever told had non-rheumatoid arthritis 
OCMENTAL N Ever told had mental retardation 
OCALZMER N Ever told had Alzheimer's/dementia 
OCDEMENT N Ever been diagnosed with dementia 
OCDEPRSS N Ever told you had depression 
OCPSYCHO N Ever told had mental disorder 
OCOSTEOP N Ever told had osteoporosis/soft bones 
OCBRKHIP N Ever told had broken hip 
OCPARKIN N Ever told had Parkinson's disease 
OCEMPHYS N Ever told had emphysema/asthma/COPD 
OCPPARAL N Ever told had complete/partial paralysis 
HAVEPROS N SP ever be told: Enlarged prostate/BPH 






Private health insurance coverage – January 
to December 
DRUGCAID N Medicaid prescription drug coverage 
DRUGOTH N Other public plan pres drug cov 
D_RX1-
D_RX4 




DUE,  FAE  
OREVTYPE C Original reported event type 
SOURCE C Source of event: survey, claim, or both? 
AMTTOT N Total payment 
AMTCARE N Amount paid by Medicare 
AMTCAID N Amount paid by Medicaid 
AMTHMOM N Amount paid by Medicare HMO 
AMTVA N Amount paid by Veterans Administration 
AMTPRVE N Amt paid by employer-sponsored priv ins 
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Module/Files Variable Type Description 
AMTPRVI N Amt paid by individually-purch priv ins 
AMTPRVU N Amt paid by priv ins (unknown purchased) 
AMTOOP N Amount paid out-of-pocket (OOP) 
AMTDISC N Amount of uncollected SP liability 
AMTOTH N Amount paid by other payor(s) 
ODIAG1 C Primary ICD-9 diagnosis code from claim 
ODIAG2 C Second ICD-9 diagnosis code from claim 




TYPE C Event type-Prescribed Medicine 
DRUGNAME C Prescribed Medicine name 
THERCC C F.D.B. generic therapeutic class 
OTCLEG C Over-the-counter/legend indicator 
FDB_BN C First Databank brand name 
FDB_GNN C First Databank generic name 
SERV_DT C Service Date 
QNTY N Quantity 
DAYSUPP N Days Supplied 
PDEFLAG N PDE Match Indicator 
AMTTOT N Total payment 
AMTCARE N Amount paid by Medicare 
AMTCAID N Amount paid by Medicaid 
AMTHMOM N Amount paid by Medicare HMO 
AMTVA N Amount paid by Veterans Administration 
AMTPRVE N Amt paid by employer-sponsored priv ins 
AMTPRVI N Amt paid by individually-purch priv ins 
AMTPRVU N Amt paid by priv ins (unknown purchased) 
AMTOOP N Amount paid out-of-pocket (OOP) 
AMTDISC N Amount of uncollected SP liability 
AMTOTH N Amount paid by other payor(s) 
Access to 
Care/RIC 3 
SCPMCOST  N Reas not obtain Rx - cost too much 
SCPMMAIN N Main reason not obtain prescription 
GENERRX N Did SP ask for generic form of Rx? 
MAILRX N Has SP purchased Rx via mail/internet? 
DOSESRX N SP took smaller does of Rx 
SKIPRX N Skipped doses to make Rx last longer 
DELAYRX N Delayed getting Rx because of cost 
NOFILLRX N Decided not to get Rx because of cost 
SPENTLRX N Spent less $ to save for needed Rx 
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF ANTI-DIABETIC DRUGS 
The following table describes the generic and brand names of anti-diabetic drugs, 
including both oral anti-diabetic drugs and insulins, which were used to identify the drug 
utilized among beneficiaries with diagnosis of type 2 diabetes. 
Table B.1 Generic and Brand Names of Anti-Diabetic Drugs 








metformin hydrochloride Metformin Hydrochloride, Fortamet, 
glucophage, Glumetza, Riomet 
Sulfonylurea 
glipizide Glipizide, Glipizide XL, GlipizideER, 
Glucotrol, Glucotrol XL 
glyburide Glyburide, DiaBeta, Glynase, micronase 
glimepiride Glimepiride, amaryl 
chlorpropamide Diabinese, Chlorpropamide 
tolazamide Tolazamide, tolinase 
tolbutamide Tolbutamide 
TZDs 
rosiglitazone maleate Avandia 
pioglitazone Pioglitazone, Actos 
SGLT-2 
Canagliflozin Invokana 
Dapagliflozin Forxiga, Farxiga 
Empagliflozin Jardiance 
Combinations 
pioglitazone /metformin  Actoplus met 




Generic Name Brand Name 
glipizide / metformin Glucovance 
glyburide /metformin    
repaglinide / metformin  Prandimet 
dapagliflozin / metformin  Xigduo 
canagliflozin / metformin Invokamet 
pioglitazone/ glimepiride   
Others 
bromocriptine Parlodel, cycloset 












repaglinide Prandin, novonorm 
sitagliptin and metformin 
hydrochloride 
Janumet 
alogliptin and metformin hydrochloride Kazano 
saxagliptin and metformin 
hydrochloride 
Kombiglyze 
alogliptin and pioglitazone Oseni 
Insulins 
Insulin aspart Novolog 
Insulin glulisine Apidra 
Insulin lispro Humalog 
Insulin human Afrezza Inhalation Powder 
Regular insulin Humulin R, Novolin R 
Insulin NPH Hagedorn NPH , Humulin N, Novolin N 
Insulin detemir Levemir 
Insulin glargine Lantus 
Insulin aspart protamine/insulin aspart NovoLog 50/50, NovoLog 70/30 
Insulin lispro protamine/insulin lispro Humalog 50/50, Humalog 75/25 
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APPENDIX C – LIST OF ANTI-HYPERTENSIVE DRUGS 
The following table describes the generic and brand names of anti-hypertensive 
drugs, which were used to identify the drug utilized among beneficiaries with diagnosis 
of type 2 diabetes. 
Table C.1 Generic and Brand Names of Anti--Hypertensive Drugs 
Generic Brand Name 
Alpha-Blockers (Antihypertensive) 
Doxazosin Cardura, Carduran 
Prazosin Minipress, Minipress XL 
Terazosin Hytrin 
Alpha-2 Agonists, Central-Acting 
Clonidine Catapres, Catapres TTS (patch), Dixarit, 
Duraclon, Jenloga, Kapvay, Nexiclon XR 
Guanabenz Wytensin 
Guanfacine Intuniv, Tenex 
Methyldopa Aldomet 
Lofexidine Britlofex 
Aldosterone Antagonists, Selective 
Eplerenone Inspra 

































Metoprolol Lopressor, Toprol XL 
Nebivolol Bystolic 
Sotalol Betapace, Betapace AF, Sorine 
Nadolol Corgard 
Propranolol Inderal LA, InnoPran XL 
Timolol Blocadren 
Calcium Channel Blockers 
Amlodipine Norvasc, Lotrel 
Bepridil Vascor 
Clevidipine Cleviprex 
Diltiazem Calan, Calan SR, Cardizem, Covera HS, 
Isoptin SR, Verelan, Verelan PM 
Felodipine Plendil 
Lacidipine Caldine, Lacimen, Lacipil, Midotens, 
Motens 
Lercanidipine Lercadip, Zanidip 
Levamlodipine EsCordi Cor, Esam, Eslo, S-Amlip 
Isradipine DynaCirc, DynaCirc CR 
Nicardipine Cardene SR 
Nifedipine Adalat, Nifediac, Nifedical, Procardia 
Nimodipine Nimotop 
Nisoldipine Sular 
Verapamil Calan, Calan SR, Covera-HS, Isoptin SR, 
Verelan, Verelan PM 
Diuretics 
Bumetanide Bumex 
Ethacrynic acid Edecrin 
Furosemide Lasix 













Metolazone Zaroxolyn, Diulo, Mykrox 








Hydralazine Apresoline, Dralzine 
Minoxidil Loniten 
Nitroprusside Nipride, Nitropress, Sodium Nitroprusside 
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APPENDIX D – LIST OF ANTI-HYPERLIPIDEMIC DRUGS 
The following table describes the generic and brand names of antihyperlipidemic 
drugs, which were used to identify the drug utilized among beneficiaries with diagnosis 
of type 2 diabetes. 
Table D.1 Generic and Brand Names of Anti-Hyperlipidemic Drugs 
Generic Name Brand Name 
statins 
amlodipine / atorvastatin Caduet 
Atorvastatin Lipitor  
Fluvastatin  Lescol, Lescol XL 
Lovastatin  Altoprev, Mevacor  
Pitavastatin  Livalo 
Pravastatin  Pravachol 
Simvastatin Zocor 
Rosuvastatin  Crestor 
bile acid sequestrants 
cholestyramine  Prevalite, Questran 
colesevelam Welchol 
colestipol Colestid  
fibrates 
fenofibrate  Antara, Lipofen, Lofibra, Tricor, 
Fenoglide, Triglide 
fenofibric acid  Trilipix, Fibricor 
gemfibrozil Lopid  
Cholesterol Absorption Inhibitors 
ezetimibe Zetia 
ezetimibe / atorvastatin Liptruzet 
ezetimibe / simvastatin Vytorin 
Nicotinic Acids 
niacin Niaspan, Simcor 
niacinamide N/A 
lovastatin / niacin extended-release Advicor 
Others 




Generic Name Brand Name 
mipomersen Kynamro 
omega-3 fatty acid supplement Lovaza, Omtryg  
Icosapent ethyl Vascepa 
alirocumab Praluent 
evolocumab Repatha  
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APPENDIX E – ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR SELECTION OF 
PREFERRED MODELS 
This chapter presents the model specification tests and selections of preferred 
multivariable models for each outcomes of interest. 
1. Aim 2.1 Healthcare Utilizations 
1.1 Distribution of count data 
Figure E.1 demonstrates the distribution of count data. All types of healthcare 
utilizations have a positively skewed distribution, indicating the violation of OLS 
assumption. 
1.2 Model specification tests for naïve model 
The following section describes the specification tests for selecting preferred 
models for healthcare count data. 
First, normality tests were performed for each type of healthcare utilizations. As 
shown in Figure E.1, all types of healthcare count data have a positively skewed 
distribution. Table E.1 shows the results from normality tests. The count data has very 
high skewness (>1) and kurtosis (> 3), indicating the violation of the assumption of the 
normal distribution.  
Second, the overdispersion of count data was accessed based on flow chart shown 
in Figure 4.2.  Table E.1 shows that the variance of data is greater than the mean, which 
suggests the presence of overdispersion in the utilization data of all types of healthcare. 
In addition, the likelihood-ratio (LR) tests indicates the overdispersion of count data, and 
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Table E.1 Specification Tests for GLM Models: Healthcare Utilizations 
Outcome 
Measure 
Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis LR 
Vuong 
test 

































Third, a large proportion of beneficiaries reported no use of health services or 
prescription drugs, leading to excess zero values. Based on Vuong tests in Table E.1, the 
zero-inflated negative binomial models fit better than negative binomial models for 
number of hospitalizations, other medical services, and prescriptions, and hence reject the 
standard count model (Table 5.5). While negative binomial models are the best fit for the 
number of outpatient and physician’s office visits.
173,176
 The dependent variable is the 
annual number of health service use, and the key independent variable is the type of part 
D plans.  
As shown in Table E.2, negative binomial models had the relative smaller AIC 












ZIP NB ZINB 
Hospitalizations 
         Log Likelihood -7723 -10825 -7472 -7421 -8140 
    AIC (smaller is better) 16975 16975 16477 16374 16378 
    AICC (smaller is better) 16975 16975 16477 16374 16378 
    BIC (smaller is better) 17329 17329 16846 16736 16756 
Outpatient 
         Log Likelihood 1893 405 7277 22103 -32960 
    AIC (smaller is better) 106431 106431 95666 66013 66017 
    AICC (smaller is better) 106431 106431 95667 66013 66017 
    BIC (smaller is better) 106785 106785 96036 66375 66395 
Medical Providers 
         Log Likelihood 441159 38295 443857 508706 -59299 
    AIC (smaller is better) 253784 253784 248391 118692 118696 
    AICC (smaller is better) 253784 253784 248391 118692 118696 
    BIC (smaller is better) 254139 254139 248761 119054 119073 
Others Medical services 
         Log Likelihood -1089 -10116 -1073 -1075 -1089 
    AIC (smaller is better) 2305 2305 2278 2278 2276 
    AICC (smaller is better) 2305 2305 2278 2279 2276 
    BIC (smaller is better) 2659 2659 2647 2640 2653 
Prescriptions (Claims) 
         Log Likelihood 1636429 93045 1655287 1746683 -72364 
    AIC (smaller is better) 367096 367096 329384 146591 144826 
    AICC (smaller is better) 367096 367096 329384 146591 144827 
    BIC (smaller is better) 367450 367450 329753 146953 145204 
Prescriptions (self-reports) 
        Log Likelihood 1942665 91121 1956684 2082636 -74629 
    AIC (smaller is better) 430161 430161 402127 150222 149357 
    AICC (smaller is better) 430162 430162 402127 150223 149357 
    BIC (smaller is better) 430516 430516 402496 150584 149734 
 
2. Aim 2.1 Healthcare Costs 
2.1 Distribution of cost data 
Figure E.2 demonstrates the distribution of cost data. All types of healthcare costs 
have a positively skewed distribution, indicating the violation of OLS assumption. 
2.2 Model specification tests for naïve model 
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This section presents the specification tests for selecting preferred models for the 
analysis of health costs.  
First, normality tests indicate that each type of healthcare costs is skewed (Table 
E.3, skewness>1), indicating the violation of OLS assumption.  
Second, the Box-Cox statistics (λ) in Table E.3 are close to 0, suggesting a log 
transformation for the cost data. 
Third, the Modified Park’s tests statistics (λ) is ranged from 1.02 to 1.99, which is 
close to 2, indicating a gamma distribution for the cost data.  
Hence, based on the model specification statistics mentioned in Chapter 4, GLM 
models with gamma distribution and log link were used to estimate the effects of PDPs 
on healthcare costs among elderly Medicare beneficiaries. 
Table E.3 Specification Tests for Costs Data 





Hospitalizations 11.10 0.09 1.48 
Outpatient 18.96 -0.01 1.85 
Medical Providers 9.17 0.08 1.54 
Others Medical services 16.12 0.34 1.83 
Total Medical Services 7.58 0.03 1.02 
Pharmacy claims 5.59 0.26 1.99 

















APPENDIX F – ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the additional results for sensitivity analysis, including the 
descriptive statistics for outcome measures between PDPs and MA-PDs. 
1. Sensitivity Analysis 1 – Exclude Beneficiaries with LIS 
1.1 Aim 2.1 Healthcare Utilizations 
Table F.1 presents the unadjusted healthcare utilizations among PDPs and MA-
PDs. Compared to MA-PD enrollees, PDP enrollees were significantly more likely to 
have inpatient (15.1% vs. 12.0%; p<0.0001) and outpatient care (66.8% vs. 63.7%; 
p=0.001), but had similar likelihood of visiting doctor’s office (97.7% vs. 97.6%; 
p=0.598). In addition, PDP enrollees had significantly higher annual average number of 
visits to hospitals (0.21 vs. 0.15; p<0.0001), outpatient settings (2.9 vs. 2.1; p<0.0001), 
doctor’s office (18.2 vs. 11.9; p<0.0001), and prescription fills (40.0 vs. 28.8; p<0.0001). 
Table F.1 Sensitivity Analysis 1: Unadjusted Healthcare Utilizations  
Outcome measures PDPs MA-PDs P-value 
Hospitalization 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 994 (15.1%) 634 (12.0%) <.0001 
 
Numbers of visits, mean±std 0.21±0.58 0.15±0.45 <.0001 
Outpatient 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 4405 (66.8%) 3373 (63.7%) 0.001 
  Numbers of visits, mean±std 2.9±5.8 2.1±5.5 <.0001 
Medical providers 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 6445 (97.7%) 5165 (97.6%) 0.598 
  Numbers of visits, mean±std 18.2±19.5 11.9±18.4 <.0001 
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Outcome measures PDPs MA-PDs P-value 
Other medical services 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 33 (0.5%) 123 (2.3%) <.0001 
  Numbers of visits, mean±std 0.01±0.08  0.03±0.18  <.0001 
Prescriptions (self-reports) 
   
 
Patients with RX fills, n (%) 6380 (96.7%)  5066 (95.7%)  0.003 
  Numbers of fills, mean±std 40.0±36.6  28.8±23.9  <.0001 
Prescriptions (claims) 
   
 
Patients with RX fills, n (%) 6305 (95.6%) 5006 (94.6%) 0.010 
  Numbers of fills, mean±std 33.6±25.9 31.9±28.2 <.0001 
 
1.2 Aim 2.1 Healthcare Costs 
Table F.2 presents bivariate results regarding healthcare costs between PDP 
enrollees and MA-PD enrollees. Compared to MA-PDs, PDPs were associated with 
higher costs for inpatient care ($1905.2 vs. $1528.6; p=0.001), outpatient care ($1020.3 
vs. $643.6; p<0.0001), physician’s office ($2858.1 vs. $1663.1; p<0.0001) and 
prescription drugs ($3140.8 vs. $2319.7; p<0.0001), but had lower costs for other 
medical services ($28.2 vs. $143.4; p<0.0001). As a result, PDP group had statistically 
higher costs for all-type of medical services ($5811.8 vs. $3982.0; p<0.0001) and total 
healthcare costs ($8535.7 vs. $6064.7; p<0.0001). 
Among different sources of payments, for out-of-pocket spending, PDP enrollees 
had similar OOP costs for hospital ($91.6 vs. 121.1; p=0.286) and outpatient ($136.8 vs. 
108.3; p=0.207), compared to MA-PDs. For the costs from public insurance, PDPs had 
similar costs for hospital ($15.3 vs. 18.3; p=0.749), physician’s office ($9.0 vs. $14.2; 
p=0.149), and all medical services ($28.2 vs. 39.9; p=0.277). However, PDPs were 




Table F.2 Sensitivity Analysis 1: Unadjusted Healthcare Costs  
Outcome measures 
PDPs   MA-PDs   P-
value Mean Std.   Mean Std.   
Hospitalization 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 1905.2 6611.7   1528.6 6133.8   0.001 
Outpatient 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 1020.3 3654.8   643.6 3599.0   <.0001 
Medical providers 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 2858.1 4461.2   1666.3 4192.1   <.0001 
Others 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 28.2 501.5   143.4 1266.1   <.0001 
All medical services 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 5811.8 10370.7   3982.0 9418.6   <.0001 
Prescriptions (claims) 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 2723.9 3572.4   2082.8 2489.1   <.0001 
Total Healthcare 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 8535.7 11445.9   6064.7 10146.3   <.0001 
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1.3  Aim 3.1 Cost Related Non-adherence 
Table F.3 shows the bivariate analysis of CRN and medication affordability 
among PDPs and MA-PDs. PDP group had higher prevalence of CRN than MA-PD 
(12.2% vs. 10.7%; p=0.030), However, PDPs had similar prevalence of spending less on 
basic needs than MA-PDs (4.2% vs. 3.4%; p=0.076).  In addition, PDP enrollees had 
higher prevalence of using generic drugs (56.9% vs. 49.1%; p<0.0001), obtaining free 
samples from the doctors (48.2% vs.36.9%; p<0.0001), and comparing pharmacies 
(21.3% vs. 14.8%; p<0.0001), but had lower prevalence of using mail orders (21.7% vs. 
25.7%; p=0.007), compared to MA-PD enrollees.  
Table F.3 Sensitivity Analysis 1: CRN and Affordability  
Outcome Measures 





  n 
Weighted 
% 
Cost-related nonadherence 780 12.2   565 10.7 0.030 
Spending less on basic needs 279 4.2   186 3.4 0.076 
Cost reduction strategies 
      
 
Use generics 3783 56.9 
 
2603 49.1 <.0001 
 
Free samples 3226 48.2 
 
1989 36.9 <.0001 
 
Use mail-order/Internet 1377 21.7 
 
1339 25.7 0.007 
  Compare pharmacies 1381 21.3   789 14.8 <.0001 
 
1.4 Aim 3.2 Medication Adherence 
Table F.4 compares medication use and adherence measured by pharmacy claims. 
The proportion of PDP enrollees with at least 1 prescription was similar to MA-PD 
enrollees. However, PDP enrollees had higher mean number of fills for antihypertensive 
drugs (17.0 vs. 14.5, p=0.0003) and antihyperlipidemic drugs (6.3 vs.5.3, p=0.001), 
compared to MA-PD enrollees. Medication adherence measured by PDC was similar 
among PDP and MA-PD enrollees, however, PDP enrollees were more likely to be 
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adherent (PDC≥0.80) to antihyperlipidemic drugs (20.9% vs. 15.6%, p=0.002), compared 
to MA-PD enrollees. 
Table F.4 Sensitivity Analysis 1: Medication Use among Beneficiaries with 
Type 2 Diabetes  
Outcome Measures PDPs MA-PDs p-value 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 890 (80.5%) 790 (83.5%) 0.075 
 
No. of refills, mean±std 10.5±10. 9.9±9.3% 0.207 
 
PDC,mean±std 0.56±0.33 0.57±0.31 0.314 
  PDC>0.80,  n(%) 321 (29.0%) 251 (26.5%) 0.210 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 974 (88.1%) 846 (89.4%) 0.331 
 
No. of refills, mean±std 17.0±17.5 14.5±13.2 0.0003 
 
PDC,mean±std 0.63±0.30 0.63±0.28 0.991 
  PDC>0.80,  n(%) 382 (34.5%) 307 (32.5%) 0.319 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 742 (67.1%) 646 (68.3%) 0.563 
 
No. of refills, mean±std 6.3±7.7 5.3±5.7 0.001 
 
PDC,mean±std 0.43±0.36 0.43±0.35 0.884 
  PDC>0.80,  n(%) 231 (20.9%) 148 (15.6%) 0.002 
 
2. Sensitivity Analysis 1 – Exclude Beneficiaries with Other Drug Benefits 
2.1 Aim 2.1 Healthcare Utilizations 
Table F.5 presents the unadjusted healthcare utilizations among PDPs and MA-
PDs. Compared to MA-PD enrollees, PDP enrollees were significantly more likely to 
have inpatient (15.3% vs. 12.2%; p<0.0001) and outpatient care (66.2% vs. 63.4%; 
p=0.001), but had similar likelihood of visiting doctor’s office (96.9% vs. 97.4%; 
p=0.053). In addition, PDP enrollees had significantly higher annual average number of 
visits to hospitals (0.21 vs. 0.16; p<0.0001), outpatient settings (2.8 vs. 2.1; p<0.0001), 





Table F.5 Sensitivity Analysis 2: Unadjusted Healthcare Utilizations  
Outcome measures PDPs MA-PDs P-value 
Hospitalization 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 1222 (15.3%) 676 (12.2%) <.0001 
 
Numbers of visits, mean±std 0.21±0.59 0.16±0.48 <.0001 
Outpatient 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 5281 (66.2%) 3507 (63.4%) 0.001 
  Numbers of visits, mean±std 2.8±5.6 2.1±5.3 <.0001 
Medical providers 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 7725 (96.9%) 5392 (97.4%) 0.053 
  Numbers of visits, mean±std 17.4±19.6 11.9±18.2 <.0001 
Other medical services 
   
 
Patients with visits, n (%) 43 (0.54%) 138 (2.5%) <.0001 
  Numbers of visits, mean±std 0.01±0.08 0.03±0.19 <.0001 
Prescriptions (self-reports) 
   
 
Patients with RX fills, n (%) 7668 (96.2%)  5245 (94.8%)  0.317 
  Numbers of fills, mean±std 44.5±41.0 33.1±29.7 <.0001 
Prescriptions (claims) 
   
 
Patients with RX fills, n (%) 7560 (94.8%) 5302 (95.8%) 0.962 
  Numbers of fills, mean±std 37.8±31.1 30.3±26.4 <.0001 
 
2.2 Aim 2.2 Healthcare Costs 
Table F.6 presents bivariate results regarding healthcare costs between PDP 
enrollees and MA-PD enrollees. Compared to MA-PDs, PDPs were associated with 
higher costs for inpatient care ($1905.2 vs. $1528.6; p=0.001), outpatient care ($955.6 vs. 
$643.6; p<0.0001), physician’s office ($2645.0 vs. $1665.0; p<0.0001), and prescription 
drugs ($2953.6 vs. $2144.9.7; p<0.0001), but had lower costs for other medical services 
($28.2 vs. $143.4; p<0.0001). As a result, PDP group had statistically higher costs for all-
type of medical services ($5581.1 vs. $4051.1; p<0.0001) and total healthcare costs 
($8534.7 vs. $6196.0; p<0.0001). 
Among different sources of payments, for out-of-pocket spending, PDP enrollees 
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had similar OOP costs for hospital ($101.6 vs. 151.8; p=0.169), outpatient ($126.9 vs. 
109.5; p=0.381), and all medical services ($900.7 vs. 871.7; p=0.636), compared to MA-
PDs. However, PDPs were associated with higher Medicare spending for all the clinical 
settings. 
Table F.6 Sensitivity Analysis 2: Unadjusted Healthcare Costs  
Outcome measures 
PDPs   MA-PDs   P-
value Mean Std.   Mean Std.   
Hospitalization 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 1954.4 6715.7   1597.4 7393.7   0.004 
Outpatient 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 955.6 3308.2   646.0 3587.3   <.0001 
Medical providers 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 2645.0 4219.6   1665.0 4175.7   <.0001 
Others 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 26.2 476.9   142.7 1239.5   <.0001 
All medical services 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 5581.1 10104.6   4051.1 10534.9   <.0001 
Prescriptions (claims) 
       
 




















PDPs   MA-PDs   P-
value Mean Std.   Mean Std.   
 





  Total costs, $ 2953.6 3609.7   2144.9 2730.9   <.0001 
Total healthcare 
       
 























  Total costs, $ 8534.7 11308.0   6196.0 11344.9   <.0001 
 
2.3  Aim 3.1 Cost Related Non-adherence 
Table F.7 shows the bivariate analysis of CRN and medication affordability 
among PDPs and MA-PDs. PDP group had similar prevalence of CRN (12.5% vs. 
11.3%; p=0.090), but PDPs had higher prevalence of spending less on basic needs than 
MA-PDs (5.2% vs. 3.9%; p=0.018).  In addition, PDP enrollees had higher prevalence of 
using generic drugs (54.7% vs. 47.9%; p<0.0001), obtaining free samples from the 
doctors (46.0% vs.35.8%; p<0.0001), and comparing pharmacies (19.4% vs. 14.1%; 
p<0.0001), but had lower prevalence of using mail orders (19.0% vs. 24.6%; p<0.0001), 
compared to MA-PD enrollees.  
Table F.7 Sensitivity Analysis 2: CRN and Affordability  
Outcome Measures 









Cost-related nonadherence 969 12.5   622 11.3   0.090 
Spending less on basic needs 425 5.2   215 3.9   0.018 
Cost reduction strategies 
       
 






















2.4 Aim 3.2 Medication Adherence 
Table F.8 compares medication use and adherence measured by pharmacy claims. 
The proportion of PDP enrollees with at least 1 prescription was similar to MA-PD 
enrollees. However, PDP enrollees had higher mean number of fills for anti-diabetic 
drugs (9.4 vs. 8.8; p=0.001), antihypertensive drugs (15.1 vs. 13.2, p<0.0001), and 
antihyperlipidemic drugs (5.5 vs.4.5, p<0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees. PDP 
enrollees had higher PDC for anti-diabetic drugs (0.59 vs. 0.58; p=0.039), but similar 
PDC for antihypertensive drugs and antihyperlipidemic drugs. In addition, PDP enrollees 
were more likely to be adherent (PDC≥0.80) to antidiabetic drugs (33.8% vs. 28.6%, 
p=0.006), antihyperlipidemic drugs (38.2% vs. 32.7%, p=0.004), and antihyperlipidemic 
drugs (22.9% vs. 16.0%; p<0.0001), compared to MA-PD enrollees. 
Table F.8 Sensitivity Analysis 2: Medication Use among Beneficiaries with 
Type 2 Diabetes  
Outcome Measures PDPs MA-PDs p-value 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1266 (82.9%) 870 (83.7%) 0.558 
 
No. of refills, mean±std 9.4±7.7 8.8±7.5 0.001 
 
PDC,mean±std 0.59±0.32 0.58±0.31 0.039 
  PDC>0.80,  n(%) 516 (33.8%) 297 (28.6%) 0.006 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1358 (88.9%) 937 (90.2%) 0.290 
 
No. of refills, mean±std 15.1±12.1 13.2±11.3 <.0001 
 
PDC,mean±std 0.65±0.29 0.63±0.28 0.166 
  PDC>0.80,  n(%) 584 (38.2%) 340 (32.7%) 0.004 




With at least 1 fill, n (%) 1044 (68.3%) 714 (68.7%) 0.832 
 
No. of refills, mean±std 5.5±5.9 4.5±4.7 <.0001 
 
PDC,mean±std 0.45±0.36 0.43±0.35 0.167 
  PDC>0.80,  n(%) 350 (22.9%) 166 (16.0%) <.0001 
 
